Walker v. City of Elba, Ala., Civ. A. No. 94-D-139-S.
| Decision Date | 30 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 94-D-139-S. |
| Citation | 874 F. Supp. 361 |
| Parties | Bennie WALKER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ELBA, ALABAMA; Water and Electric Board of the City of Elba, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Kenneth Coy Sheets, Jr., Dothan, AL, for plaintiff.
Alex L. Holtsford, Jr., T. Randall Lyons, Montgomery, AL, for defendants.
DE MENT, District Judge.
This matter is presently before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed July 22, 1994. Defendants filed a contemporaneous brief in support of their motion. On October 17, 1994, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. For reasons articulated more fully below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is due to granted in part and denied in part.
The court may competently assert subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000e ("Title VII").1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable for infliction of emotional distress under Alabama's tort of outrage. This court may adjudicate this state law matter by exercising pendent jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Jurisdiction over the person of the defendants and venue are uncontested.
Plaintiff, Bennie Walker (hereinafter "Walker"), is a black male residing in Coffee County, Alabama. Plaintiff was employed by the Water and Electric Board of Elba (hereinafter the "Board") from September 4, 1991, to December 15, 1992. During Walker's entire tenure with the Board, he was a work release inmate from the Alabama Department of Corrections (hereinafter the "ADC"). Plaintiff contends that he was also an employee of the City of Elba (hereinafter "Elba") because Elba directs and controls the Board.
In August, 1992, Ed Compton (hereinafter "Compton"), a permanent hire and Plaintiff's immediate supervisor, suffered a stroke. As a result, Compton was transferred to another position within the Board because Compton's treating physician restricted the range of duties which Compton could discharge. Prior to his stroke, Compton engaged in "bucket" work.2 Following his stroke, Compton was advised by his treating physician to no longer perform such work. Allegedly acting on the advice of Compton's physician, the Board transferred Compton to a "ground" position.
The Board contends that in order to transfer Compton to work on the ground, a permanent employee had to be hired to work in the bucket. According to the Board, Plaintiff was ineligible to work in the bucket. The Board claims that as a member of the prison work release program, Plaintiff was only a temporary employee with the Board. The Board asserts that since Compton was being transferred it had no further use for the temporary employee spot filled by Walker. According to the Board, it apprised Walker of these developments in September, 1992, and Walker was allegedly terminated shortly thereafter.
Also, the Board further asserts that it has never hired a work release inmate and assigned him to a "permanent" position until such employee had fully served his prison sentence. Because Plaintiff failed to meet the job requirements, the Board claims that the decision to release Plaintiff and not consider him for the position vacated by Compton was not precipitated by racial animus, but was rather a fulfillment of its established policy not to appoint work release inmates to positions requiring permanent employees. Following Walker's discharge, the Board hired one William Murray, a white male, to fill the position vacated by Compton.3
Contrary to the assertion of the Defendants, Plaintiff contends that the Board and Elba have engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis of race. Walker claims that his termination was motivated by racial animus. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants engaged in discrimination in the terms and conditions of his employment in the following manner: 1) by paying blacks less than whites for comparable work performed; and 2) by giving whites preferential treatment in the hiring process.
On February 7, 1994, Walker filed a Complaint in this Court setting forth the following causes of action: 1) violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 2000e et seq. (hereinafter "Title VII") and 2) tort of outrage. Plaintiff brings this action against the Board and Elba. Although the Board executed the hiring of firing of Walker, Walker contends that the Board is under the control of Elba, which makes Elba liable for the actionable wrongs of the Board. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendants' discriminatory conduct, he has suffered and continues to suffer loss of employment, income, and other employment benefits, and has suffered and continues to suffer distress, humiliation, great expense, embarrassment, and damage to his reputation.
On July 22, Elba and the Board filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants contend that Title VII is inapplicable to either of them because they may not be deemed Plaintiff's employer. Elba asserts that it neither directs the acts of the Board nor conducts the Board's affairs; therefore, Elba claims that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to its liability for the actions of the Board. Furthermore, Defendants assert that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's section 1981 claim because this statutory provision applicable only at the contract formation juncture of the employment relationship. Moreover, Elba and the Board claim that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Walker's tort of outrage claim because municipalities are immune from liability for intentional torts.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:
The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The trial court's function at this stage of the case is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.
Elba asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Walker is neither its agent nor employee. Furthermore, Elba contends that the Board is a separate and distinct entity, which is not operated or controlled by Elba. The Court finds that Elba's assertions are correct and its Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted; thus, dismissing it from this action.
Elba was not involved in any regard in the hiring or termination of Walker. Furthermore, Defendant Elba neither constructed Plaintiff's work schedule, set Plaintiff's hours nor endorsed any pay checks distributed to Walker. Plaintiff does not adduce any evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the Court finds that Elba was not Plaintiff's employer.
The Court also finds that Defendant Elba does not control or operate the Board; therefore, the Elba is not liable for any misfeasance in which the Board engages. The Board is a duly incorporated legal entity existing on its own behalf. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of its Certificate of Amendment to Certification, the Board possesses its own Directors, which conducts the affairs of the Board.4 Moreover, the Board charges Elba for the supplies and services rendered. In light of the independence and separateness of the Board from the City of Elba, the Court finds that the City of Elba is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; accordingly, its Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted.
Walker contends that the Board's conduct of dismissing him caused Plaintiff to suffer emotional distress which entitles him to recover under Alabama's tort of outrage. Specifically, Walker claims that he has suffered undue embarrassment as a result of the Board's wrongful conduct. In the seminal case of American Road Service Co. v. Inmon, 394 So.2d 361 (Ala.1980), the Alabama Supreme Court announced the following definition for the tort of outrage:
willful wrongs, or those made so recklessly as to equate willfulness, authorize recovery in damages for the mental suffering caused thereby, and we now recognize that one by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from the distress. The emotional distress thereunder must be so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure....
Since Inmon, the Alabama Supreme Court has found the forgoing standard sufficiently satisfied as...
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