Walker v. Clark Equipment Co., 67218
| Decision Date | 16 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 67218,67218 |
| Parties | Richard WALKER, Sr., Administrator of the Estate of Carl C. Walker; Richard Walker, Sr., Individually; Norma Walker; and Karen Jo Ann Walker, Plaintiffs, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Ross H. Sidney and Patrick J. McNulty of Grefe & Sidney, Des Moines, for defendant.
Paul R. Huscher, Des Moines, for plaintiffs.
Considered en banc.
In Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981), we for the first time recognized a cause of action for emotional distress caused by witnessing peril to a victim proximately caused by the negligence of another. The questions certified here are as follows:
(1) May a bystander, whose allegations satisfy the five elements set forth in Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d at 108, maintain a claim of strict liability in tort against the manufacturer of a product for emotional distress caused by witnessing peril to a victim proximately caused by a defect in design or manufacture of the product?
(2) May a bystander, whose allegations satisfy the five elements set forth in Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d at 108, maintain a claim based upon the breach of implied warranties of fitness and merchantability against a manufacturer of a product for emotional distress caused by witnessing peril to a victim proximately caused by defects in the product that rendered it unmerchantable or unfit for its intended purposes?
We think the questions can and should be considered together. Any consideration which might tend to answer either question would seem to apply also to the other. We answer both questions in the affirmative.
Carl Walker was killed when a forklift truck he was operating rolled over and crushed him. His sister Karen witnessed the accident. Various members of Walker's family, including the administrator of his estate, and also including Karen, filed the present suit in federal court against the manufacturer of the forklift truck. Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. Iowa law controls.
Karen sought damages for severe emotional distress which she says she suffered from personally witnessing the accident. She sought these damages on theories of negligence, breach of warranties, and strict liability. In Barnhill we did not consider whether the cause of action for emotional distress would lie where the peril to the victim is claimed to have been caused, not by negligence, but by breach of warranty or by an act for which a defendant may be held strictly liable.
The defendant here conceded Karen stated a cause for emotional distress based on a theory that the defendant was negligent. Defendant however moved to dismiss those counts in which Karen sought damages for emotional distress based on theories of breach of warranty and strict liability. The federal court, on its own motion, reserved ruling and certified the above questions to us. See § 684A.1, The Code 1981.
Karen's focus is on foreseeability. She points out that we have long applied strict liability in appropriate situations in products liability suits, and have expressly done so for bystanders. Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d 7, 16 (Iowa 1977). Karen also points to section 554.2318, The Code, as authority that recovery is allowed to a bystander for breach of implied warranty so long as damages are reasonably foreseeable:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.
Because, in Barnhill, we relied on Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968), Karen argues we should adhere to the holding in another California case, Shepard v. Superior Court...
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