Walker v. Dancer

• Citation: 386 So.2d 475
• Parties: Willie Mae WALKER v. Idell DANCER. Civ. 2272.
• Decision Date: 16 July 1980
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 475

386 So.2d 475

Willie Mae WALKER v. Idell DANCER.

Civ. 2272.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

July 16, 1980.

William K. Higgins, Jr., Birmingham, for appellant.

Mark B. Polson, Birmingham, for appellee.

EDWARD N. SCRUGGS, Retired Circuit Judge:

This case involves the involuntary commitment of a mentally ill person, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the patient, to the custody of the State Department of Mental Health for proper treatment of her illness.

Unquestionably the patient suffers from a mental disease. The issues before this court are: first, did she pose a real and present threat of substantial harm to herself or to others and manifest such by a recent overt act; second, was commitment the least restrictive alternative necessary and available for the treatment of her illness; and, third, whether § 22-52-10, as amended, of the Code of Alabama of 1975 was unconstitutionally applied in her commitment? Only substantial facts bearing upon such issues will be summarized herein.

The appellant and her niece had been lodged in a boarding house which was certified each ninety days by the State Department of Mental Health for the care of disturbed adults. She had been most protective of her almost completely helpless niece. For example, the niece disliked bathing and the appellant would protest when the management of the boarding house would suggest that the niece bathe or when they supervised her baths. The problem became so aggravated that the appellant and her niece were assigned to different houses.

Evidently the appellant was also averse to bathing. She had not had a bath for a week when the boarding house operator asked her to bathe, whereupon the patient refused and locked herself in the bathroom from 10:00 A.M. until after 4:00 P.M., when the operator went to the courthouse and filed the present commitment petition against the appellant.

When she was last released from the hospital her prescription for Resperine required her to take four pills per day. They were effective until the dosage was reduced by one-half. Her behavior became more bizarre and she refused to take her medication. Subsequently, her behavior became so difficult that, on three different occasions, the operator called the police to remove her from a house, to make her go home for the night.

Approximately three weeks before the commitment hearing, the appellant was using foul language towards a teacher at the boarding house. When a part time employee attempted to calm her, she picked up a chair and later pushed the worker around the room when the worker took her arm to lead her out.

There was evidence that when this appellant was asked to do anything she would become upset and begin verbally lashing out, cursing.

A resident physician in psychiatry testified that this patient had been admitted to University Hospital on three occasions. She suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, which is a psychotic mental disease where persons are afraid that other people will harm them in some manner and they have delusions about this, which can cause such mentally ill persons to react, sometimes violently, towards others. This patient daily consistently stated that the people at the boarding house were trying to harm her. The appellant stated to the probate judge that most people try to harm her.

Treatment is available for her in the form of pills to be taken by mouth. The doctor further testified that confinement would be necessary for her safety and well being or the safety and well being of others since she was not under good control at that time as to her mental illness. The doctor further expressed the judgment that she presented a real and present threat of substantial harm to herself or to other people. The threat to herself was because of the poor judgment which she then possessed. She even refused to take her medicine while in the hospital. Because of her condition, the doctor was of the opinion that Bryce Hospital would provide the least restrictive confinement and the means for her treatment. Other alternatives such as the boarding house had been unsuccessfully tried but they failed because of her lack of cooperation and failure to take her medicine.

The patient apparently has no friend or relative who could, or would, take her into their home, and she has no place to go for care and treatment.

At the conclusion of the evidence the probate judge made the following observations:

Q Well, I don't know what to do with you except I've got to get you some more medicine, so I guess I'm going to have to have you committed to the State for further observation and treatment. That's to see if you can't get a little better. We've got to get you a place to stay.

Judge Reynolds:

I sure would like for someone to take this up on appeal and see what the Supreme Court is going to say where we can send these people. I just . . . I doubt if we meet the statutory requirements. You've got a very negative situation as far as the overt act. But for this woman's sake, I've got to get her some place to sleep and some place to eat. I don't have any other choice. There is nowhere I can turn her aloose to. If I had anybody to take care of her, I would let them, but I don't have anybody.

Mr. Higgins: I don't know whether you've stated on the record a finding of fact concerning the overt act. I would like that on the record.

Judge Reynolds:

I don't point out any particular act, I just tell you that I find there is sufficient basis to cause her to be detained. On the Final Hearing I find that there is sufficient basis on which to justify her commitment to the State Department of Mental Health authorities for treatment.

After the hearing, the final order of commitment contained this language:

(T)he Court is therefore of the opinion from the clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence that,

1. The said Willie Mae Walker is mentally ill and poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to herself and to others.

2. The said danger to herself and others has been evidenced by recent overt acts.

3. There is care and treatment available for the illness diagnosed.

4. Confinement in a hospital is necessary for said individual's safety and well-being and for the family's and community's welfare.

5. Commitment is the least restrictive alternative necessary and available for the treatment of her illness.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED BY THE COURT that said Willie Mae Walker be committed to the custody of the State Department of Mental Health for proper treatment of her illness.

The guardian ad litem appeals and raises the issues heretofore enumerated.

In Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.Supp. 378 (M.D.Ala.1974), in the majority opinion written by Judge Johnson for the three judge district court panel, most of Alabama's legislation as to the involuntary commitment of insane persons was held to be unconstitutional because of multiple violations of the due process clause of the constitution. In lieu of the statutes, certain definite procedural and substantive due process minimum requirements for involuntary commitments to any of Alabama's mental institutions were imposed by the court. Subsequently, the Alabama legislature adopted the court's requirements. § 22-52-10, as amended, Code of Ala.1975. The probate judge's finding of fact in his final judgment followed the language of the statute.

The issues raised in this case involve questions of fact. The probate judge personally heard all of the evidence at the commitment hearing. The usual presumption of correctness applies if the evidence supports his findings. We are not authorized to disturb his factual findings contained in the final judgment unless he was clearly and palpably wrong. These rules of law, however, must be applied in joint consideration with the high burden of proof required in cases of this nature.

In Lynch v. Baxley, supra, on due process grounds, it was held that "the trier of fact must be persuaded by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the subject of the hearing is in need of confinement under the minimum standards for commitment herein enumerated." Id. at 393. The same "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard of proof was accordingly adopted by the legislature (§ 22-52-10, as amended) and the probate judge, in the final judgment in this case, stated that she should be committed because he was of the opinion from the clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence of the existence of such requirements for involuntary commitment.

In 1979, the Supreme court of the United States spoke for the first time as to the measure of proof required in involuntary commitment cases. They decided that such proof must be "clear and convincing," a burden in between our "reasonably satisfied" in most civil cases and "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal cases. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). The Supreme Court rejected the argument that due process required that the word "unequivocal" be included in such standard because "(T)he term 'unequivocal', taken by itself, means proof that admits of no doubt, a burden approximating, if not exceeding, that used in criminal cases." Id. at 432, 99 S.Ct. at 1812. In further discussing such problem, the court stated:

We have concluded that the reasonable doubt standard is inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed medical treatment. Similarly, we conclude that use of the term "unequivocal" is not constitutionally required, although the states are free to use that standard. To meet due process demands, the standard has to inform the fact-finder that the proof must be greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to other categories of civil cases.

We noted earlier that the trial court employed the standard of "clear, unequivocal and...