Walker v. District Court of Second Judicial District in Pinal County

• Decision Date: 30 January 1894
• Docket Number: Civil 395
• Citation: 4 Ariz. 249,35 P. 982
• Parties: JUANA WALKER, a Minor, by ROSETTA JONES, her Guardian, Petitioner, v. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR PINAL COUNTY, and OWEN T. ROUSE, Judge of said Court, Respondent
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

35 P. 982

4 Ariz. 249

JUANA WALKER, a Minor, by ROSETTA JONES, her Guardian, Petitioner, v. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR PINAL COUNTY, and OWEN T. ROUSE, Judge of said Court, Respondent

Civil No. 395

Supreme Court of Arizona

January 30, 1894

PETITION for a Writ of Prohibition.

Fitch &amp Campbell, and Bethune & McCabe, and J. B. Woodward, for Petitioner.

W. H Barnes, Kibbey & Israel, and William R. Stone, for Respondent.

The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ, to issue only when there is no other adequate remedy. High on Extraordinary Remedies, sec. 762; Thomas v. Mead, 36 Mo. 232; People v. Works, 7 Wend. 486; Ex parte Roundtree, 51 Ala. 42; Quimbo Appo v. People, 20 N.Y. 531; Maurer v. Mitchell, 53 Cal. 289; People v Election Commissioners, 54 Cal. 404; Spring Valley Water Works v. San Francisco, 52 Cal. 111.

It is not a writ of right, but it is discretionary with the court having power to issue such writ, and the order refusing or granting the writ is not appealable. It should be issued only in cases of extreme necessity, and not for grievances which may be redressed by ordinary proceedings at law. It cannot be made to perform the functions of an appeal, a writ of error, or a certiorari, its purpose being to prevent any usurpation of jurisdiction. Ex parte Gordon, 1 Black, 503; Ex parte Warmouth, 17 Wall. 64; Ex parte R. R. Ferry Co., 104 U.S. 519.

"The broad governing principle is, that prohibition lies where a subordinate tribunal has no jurisdiction at all to deal with the cause or the matter before it." It does not lie when the inferior court has jurisdiction to deal with the cause, however erroneous its decision may be. It issues only in cases of extreme necessity, and before it can be granted it must appear that the aggrieved party has applied in vain to the inferior court for relief. The jurisdiction is exercised by appellate or superior courts to restrain inferior courts from acting without authority of law. It does not lie for grievances which may be redressed in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings by appeal or writ of error. High on Extraordinary Remedies, secs. 765, 770, 771; Wreden v. Superior Court of Stanislaus County, 55 Cal. 504; Washburn v. Phillips, 2 Met. 296; Supervisors of Bedford v. Wingfield, 27 Gratt. 329; State ex rel. Hernandez v. Monroe, 33 La. Ann. 923; Ex parte Hamilton, 51 Ala. 62; People v. Westbrook, 89 N.Y. 152; People v. Marine Ct., 36 Barb. 341.

It should not be granted except in a clear case of want of jurisdiction in the court whose action it is sought to prohibit. Hart v. Tylor, 61 Ga. 156.

It is never allowed except in cases of a usurpation of power, and not then unless other existing remedies are inadequate to afford relief. State v. Braun, 31 Wis. 600; Ex parte Green, 29 Ala. 52; Ex parte Smith, 34 Ala. 456; Jack v. Adair, 33 Ark. 161; People v. Supervisors of Kern County, 47 Cal. 81, 584.

It will not lie if the inferior court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter. Ex parte Peterson, 33 Ala. 74; Ex parte State, 51 Ala. 60; Murphy v. Superior Court of Colusa County, 58 Cal. 520; Postlewaite v. Ghiselin, 97 Mo. 424; Wilson v. Berkstresser, 45 Mo. 283; Mastin v. Sloan, 98 Mo. 252; State ex rel. U. D. R. R. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 100 Mo. 59, 13 S.W. 398.

Jurisdiction of the subject-matter means the power to hear and determine cases of the class to which the proceeding belongs. Leonard v. Sparks, 117 Mo. 103, 38 Am. St. Rep. 646, 22 S.W. 877; Musick v. Kansas City etc. Ry. Co., 114 Mo. 315, 21 S.W. 491; Hope v. Blair, 105 Mo. 93, 24 Am. St. Rep. 366, 16 S.W. 595; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 316.

The district court has jurisdiction of appeals from probate and justice of the peace courts. Rev. Stats. Ariz., sec. 1298.

Baker, C. J. Sloan, J., and Hawkins, J., concur. Rouse, J., not sitting.

OPINION

The facts are stated in the opinion.

BAKER, C. J.

In this matter there was an appeal taken from the probate court of Pinal County to said district court from a judgment finding the petitioner to be an heir at law of one John D. Walker deceased. It is claimed that a sufficient bond on appeal was not filed, and therefore said district court acquired no jurisdiction to hear and determine such appeal. The petitioner appeared and moved said district court to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, and upon such petition being denied, and the appeal being about to be heard, she prays us to issue a writ of prohibition against said court to prevent the hearing of the appeal, for the reason of want of jurisdiction. The question of a want of jurisdiction in the supreme court to issue such a writ by virtue of its original jurisdiction was extensively argued at the hearing, but inasmuch as the determination of that question is not necessary to the conclusion which we have reached, we do not express any opinion upon that subject. If the power exists in this court to issue the writ, the petitioner, we are convinced, has an adequate remedy by appeal or error from the action of the district court; and it is everywhere agreed that in such case the writ will...