Walker v. Dorn
| Decision Date | 11 February 1966 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Kenneth G. WALKER and Nancy M. Walker, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Wesley DORN, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 522. |
Walch, Griswold, Braden & Dittmar and S. C. Dittmar, Jr., Hanford, for appellant.
Baum & Aran, and Leonard P. Baum, Beverly Hills, for respondents.
This action arose from a landlord-tenant relationship that began with a written lease in 1952, followed by written renewal leases until June 1, 1958. Plaintiffs-lessors signed and mailed to defendant copies of a written lease covering the period June 1, 1958, through December 31, 1961. At the trial defendant produced two copies of the lease signed by plaintiffs but unsigned by him, and asserted he held possession under an oral lease that varied some of the terms of the written lease. Plaintiff Kenneth Walker testified that defendant returned a signed copy of the lease which he was unable to produce because he discarded it after it expired December 31, 1961.
The trial court ruled that defendant was bound by the terms of the written lease except as to subsequent executed oral modifications.
The principal question on appeal is whether the trial court erred in thus taking from the jury the determination whether defendant held the premises under the terms of the written lease, unsigned by him, or under an oral lease.
The first difficulty defendant faced during trial arose from his pleadings. Plaintiffs pleaded the written lease and alleged defendant wrongfully withheld possession of the premises after the lease terminated. Defendant, by verified answer, denied signing the lease, and affirmatively alleged an oral lease between the parties covering the period June 1, 1958, through December 31, 1961, and a subsequent oral lease for the holdover year 1962. However, defendant also pleaded contradictory allegations that admitted the written lease. In answer to plaintiffs' first cause of action, defendant affirmatively alleged:
'* * * in addition to his oral lease rights above referred to, he was a tenant of plaintiffs concerning agricultural lands who held over and retained possession of the land described in plaintiffs' amended complaint after the termination of the lease referred to in plaintiffs amended complaint ending on December 31, 1961, for a period of more than 60 days after the expiration of the term without demand for possession or notice to quit by plaintiffs being served upon him, * * *' (Emphasis added.)
In answer to plaintiffs' second cause of action, which alleged the written lease, defendant pleaded as follows:
'Answering paragraph III of said second alleged cause of action, admits the allegations thereof except that by an oral agreement made on or about August 1, 1960, when there was a shortage of water to pre-irrigate said land for the 1960-61 barley crop that was to be planted on said land that was grown or to be grown on said land, that was entered into between plaintiffs and defendant the exact time of which was and is known to plaintiffs, modifying the written agreement referred to by plaintiffs, * * *' (Emphasis added.)
As the trial court observed, although these pleadings deny the existence of the written lease, they also admit it and allege subsequent oral modifications. Plaintiffs pointed out the ambiguity and uncertainty in defendant's pleadings, by demurrer and at the pretrial conference. Incredibly enough, the pretrial order, rather than resolving the ambiguity and clarifying the issues before trial, passed the uncertainty along for the trial judge to unravel. Under the heading 'Nature of Case,' the order recites:
'* * * it cannot be ascertained by plaintiffs the exact allegations of the complaint which defendant attempts or purports to deny or to admit, nor can plaintiffs ascertain defendant's theory of defense to the complaint.'
The failure of the law and motion judge and of the pretrial judge to require defendant to clarify his pleadings, placed the trial judge in the position of having to rule on proffered evidence without being certain of the issues.
We turn now to the effect of the pleadings as admissions. Both parties referred to superseded pleadings, and argued the effect of them interchangeably with the effect of the pleadings upon which the case went to trial. In doing so they failed to distinguish between evidentiary admissions and judicial admissions. The distinction is succinctly stated in Witkin, California Evidence, section 224, page 251. As to a...
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