Walker v. Floyd
| Decision Date | 31 March 1860 |
| Parties | WALKER et al. v. FLOYD. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Rule in Upson Superior Court. Tried before Judge Cabaniss, at November Term, 1859.
In an equity case pending between James S. Walker and others, against Nathaniel F. Walker, an award was made against defendant under a rule of reference. He, in part payment of the amount awarded against him, paid to James M. Smith, Esq., one of plaintiff's solicitors, a considerable sum of money, between ten and fifteen thousand dollars. This was a rule by John J. Floyd, Esq., one of the solicitors of complainants in said cause, against Smith, to pay over to him out of said fund the sum of two thousand dollars for counsel fees due to him by complainants in said case, or show cause to the contrary, etc. This rule was predicated upon the ground or principle that movant, as solicitor aforesaid, had a lien, as counsel, for his fees on the funds in the hands of Smith, who was associate counsel in said cause, and an attorney of the court. The question as to the right to maintain this form of procedure, and how to be tried, were decided upon a bill of exceptions brought to the Supreme Court in this and other cases, at August Term, 1859. (See 29 Ga. Rep. 185.) The case being remanded by the Supreme Court, came upagain for trial, before Judge Cabaniss, at November Term, 1859. J. S. Walker, N. F. Walker, Jr., and F. Coleman, complainants in the equity cause, came in under the rule and defended, and were the real parties respondents.
The cause being called, counsel for respondents moved to continue the case on the following grounds:
1st. In order to enable them to obtain and have the opinion of the Supreme Court pronounced in the cause at Atlanta,-August Term, 1859.
2d. Because of the absence of H. Hill, Esq., a material witness for respondents; that witness was a practicing attorney of this court, residing in Macon, Georgia, and that they reasonably expected that he would be present at this term of the court, and at this trial; that he had not been subpoenaed, nor had any steps been taken to take his depositions.,
It further appeared, that the remittiter from the Supreme Court, remanding the case for a new trial, had been received and entered on the minutes of the Court below.
The court refused the motion to continue and respondents excepted.
Counsel for respondents further objected to proceeding to trial, on the ground that rule was not the remedy in a case like this; that it could only hold up the fund in Court, but that movant must establish his demand by action at law.
The court overruled the objection, holding that an attorney at law had a lien on money raised under a judgment obtained by him for his client, which he can enforce by rule; and respondents excepted.
Counsel for respondents further objected to the rule, on the ground that the cause of action, or the particular services Tendered, was not distinctly set forth and specified in the rule.
The court overruled the objection, and respondents excepted.
Counsel for respondents, in the progress of the examination of the witnesses, objected to their testifying as to services rendered, unless such services were specifically set out in the pleadings, and further objected to the witnesses who were lawyers giving their opinions as to the value of the services Tendered by plaintiff.
The court overruled the objections, and respondents excepted.
The case being submitted to the jury upon the evidence, argument of counsel and charge of the court, they returned a verdict for plaintiff for two thousand dollars.
Whereupon, counsel for respondents tender their bill of exceptions, assigning as error the rulings and decisions aforesaid.
N. M. Harris and B. H. Bigham, for plaintiffs in error.
Gibson & PeeplEs, contra.
By the Court.—Lyon, J., delivering the opinion.
1. The Act of 22d of January. 1852, "to regulate the practice of the Supreme Courts and of the Superior Courts of this State, " etc., provides, Under that statute, the plaintiffs in error were not entitled to a continuance of the cause on the first ground. The record does not show that they had exhausted their continuances. That statute evidently intended that the court should continue only for a good and sufficient...
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State v. National Surety Co.
...352, 23 L.Ed. 950; Zentmire v. Brailey, 89 Neb. 158, 130 N.W. 1047; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 107 Ga. 479, 33 S.E. 473; Walker v. Floyd, 30 Ga. 237; Fuller Clemmons, 158 Ala. 340, 48 So. 101.) If the fund on which the lien is claimed is paid into court, the court will not permit it......
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York v. Edwards
...it was unnecessary to split and itemize the particular detailed services, so as to state a specific charge for each item. Walker v. Floyd, 30 Ga. 237, 240. The court did not err in overruling the demurrers. Judgment affirmed. STEPHENS and SUTTON, JJ, ...
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York v. Edwards
... ... meruit, it was unnecessary to split and itemize the ... particular detailed services, so as to state a specific ... charge for each item. Walker v. Floyd, 30 Ga ... ...
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Brown v. Brown, 21321
...the superior court. Evans v. Evans, 190 Ga. 364, 369(2), 9 S.E.2d 254; Milhollin v. Milhollin, 214 Ga. 571(2), 106 S.E.2d 33. In Walker v. Floyd, 30 Ga. 237, 240, it is held: 'The employment of counsel goes to the whole of the litigation, from the time of his employment to the end of the sa......