Walker v. Ga. M. Walker

Decision Date08 June 2010
Docket NumberNo. 2007-CA-01074-COA.,2007-CA-01074-COA.
Citation36 So.3d 483
PartiesR.L. WALKER, Appellantv.Georgia M. WALKER, Appellee.
CourtMississippi Court of Appeals

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Joseph Joshua Stevens, Jr., attorney for appellant.

Carrie A. Jourdan, attorney for appellee.

Before KING, C.J., ROBERTS and CARLTON, JJ.

KING, C.J., for the Court:

¶ 1. The Clay County Chancery Court granted a divorce to Georgia M. Walker (Georgia) and R.L. Walker (R.L.) on the ground of irreconcilable differences, divided the marital assets, and awarded alimony to Georgia. Aggrieved, R.L. appeals, raising three issues: (1) whether the chancellor made an equitable division of the marital assets in this cause; (2) whether the chancellor fairly apportioned the indebtedness of the parties; and (3) whether the chancellor erred in ordering R.L. to pay Georgia periodic alimony in the amount of $200 per month. Finding no error, we affirm the chancery court's judgment.

FACTS

¶ 2. Georgia and R.L. married on January 1, 1969. After thirty-five years of marriage, the two separated in 2004. One child, Antonio Lamar Walker, was born as a result of the marriage; Antonio, had just turned twenty-one at the time of trial. Although no other children were born to this union, Georgia had a son, Lamar,1 prior to the marriage, who R.L. raised as his own child. There was testimony that R.L. had fathered children with other women during his marriage to Georgia.

¶ 3. Both Georgia and R.L. worked throughout the entire marriage combining resources to support their family and household. At the time of trial, Georgia, who was sixty-five years old and in fair health, was working as a cook and bus driver for the West Point School District. Also, at the time of trial, R.L., who was fifty-seven years old, had suffered three heart attacks, had a pacemaker, was taking approximately eleven different types of medication a day, and was working as a truck driver. Testimony indicated that R.L., as the primary breadwinner, was primarily responsible for household expenses as his income was higher than Georgia's; and Georgia was primarily responsible for the household chores, caring for the children, and managing their rental property.

¶ 4. Georgia testified that one day R.L. came home and told her that he saw Attorney Josh Stevens to file for divorce. After becoming aware that a divorce pleading had not been filed, Georgia filed for a divorce on August 4, 2004, in the Clay County Chancery Court alleging adultery and habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. In her complaint, Georgia asked the court for complete custody of the minor child, child support, continued medical insurance for the child, reasonable attorney's fees, an equitable division of the marital property, alimony, and possession and control of the marital home.

¶ 5. On October 14, 2004, the chancellor entered a temporary order which granted Georgia possession of the marital home and household contents and directed R.L. to pay the monthly mortgage and $400 per month in temporary alimony to Georgia. The chancellor ordered that neither party dispose of any marital property and instructed each to file an affidavit on the issue of emancipation of the minor son. The issues of child custody and child support were to be held in abeyance until receipt of the affidavits. On June 7, 2005, Georgia and R.L. agreed to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. In the June 7, 2005, pleading styled “Consent,” Georgia and R.L. also agreed to submit to the chancellor certain issues on which they could not agree. Those issues were as follows: (a) child custody and the amount of child support for the minor child; (b) determination of what was the marital estate and an equitable division and distribution of the same, including but not limited to the marital residence, rental properties, retirement and pension accounts, household goods and furnishings and automobiles; (c) the amount of alimony to award; and (d) whether to award attorney's fees.

¶ 6. On January 19, 2006, the chancellor heard evidence on the contested issues. On March 9, 2006, the chancellor issued an opinion, which granted a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. In that opinion, the chancellor awarded Georgia the marital home, the vacant lot, the 1993 Cadillac, the 1994 Dodge, her personal property, and her retirement account. The chancellor also directed Georgia to pay her own attorney's fees and sign all necessary papers giving title to the other vehicles and rental properties to R.L. The chancellor also directed R.L. to refinance the debt on the marital home to give clear title to Georgia and to continue to pay the debt on the Dodge pickup truck until it was paid in full. The chancellor awarded R.L. the rental properties, the 2000 Freightliner truck, the Gooseneck trailer, the 270 John Deere Haycutter, the 1989 GMC Silverado, the 2004 Denali and all other vehicles and trucking equipment, his retirement account, his personal items that were still at the marital home, and the household furnishings that he had inherited from his mother. R.L. was responsible for payment of the debt on the rental properties and his own attorney's fees. R.L. was ordered to pay periodic alimony of $400 per month and to refinance the rental properties in order to relieve Georgia of any financial obligations associated with these properties.

¶ 7. Aggrieved, on April 7, 2006, R.L. filed a motion for reconsideration of the chancellor's judgment. On June 2, 2006, the chancellor reopened the case for submission of Georgia's retirement account balance, which she had failed to submit to the chancellor prior to the ruling on March 9, 2006, and any and all of R.L. financial statements used to obtain financing from banking institutions for the purchase of trucking equipment and rental properties. On August 15, 2006, a hearing on the motion for reconsideration was held, and this information was received by the court. During the hearing, Georgia's retirement account statement from the Mississippi Public Employment Retirement System (PERS) and R.L.'s 2005 income tax return were introduced. The chancellor heard testimony from R.L.'s witness Brenda Wofford, the H & R Block senior tax advisor in West Point, Mississippi, who discussed R.L.'s self-employment tax returns. Allegedly, the financial statements used in R.L.'s applications to obtain financing from banking institutions for the purpose of the rental houses did not exist. After reviewing the additional evidence and testimony, the chancellor, on December 22, 2006, entered an order granting the motion for reconsideration in part. In that order, the chancellor made the following adjustments: R.L. was directed to pay $200 per month in periodic alimony to Georgia, and Georgia was awarded her retirement account. A final judgment was filed on May 29, 2007.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8. “The Court employs a limited standard of review on appeals from chancery court.” Reddell v. Reddell, 696 So.2d 287, 288 (Miss.1997). “If substantial credible evidence supports the chancellor's decision, it will be affirmed.” Id. This Court will not disturb the findings of a[c]hancellor unless the [c]hancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Bell v. Parker, 563 So.2d 594, 596-97 (Miss.1990).

ANALYSIS

¶ 9. Although R.L. presents three assignments of error, because issues one and two raised by R.L. involve the division of marital property, they will be discussed together.

I. Division of Marital Assets

¶ 10. R.L. argues that the division of the martial property was not equitable, and the marital debt was not fairly apportioned. R.L. claims that their combined net worth at the time of trial was $34,968.29. R.L. contends that when the chancellor divided the marital property, Georgia had a positive net worth of $115,899.29, and he was left with a negative net worth of - $80,931, with no debt apportioned to Georgia. R.L. argues that a fair division of the marital property should have left an approximately equal net worth for him and Georgia in the amount of $17,488.14.

¶ 11. R.L. asserts that Georgia received a furnished home and the Dodge pickup truck debt free. R.L. contends that because a part of the vacant lot had been deeded to Georgia's son, Lamar, prior to these proceedings, this lot should be charged against Georgia's share. In addition, R.L. claims that because the Dodge pickup truck is an oversized pickup truck with double rear wheels used to pull the gooseneck trailer he received, the chancellor should not have awarded Georgia the Dodge pickup truck.

¶ 12. In determining equitable distribution of marital assets and debts, the chancellor must first classify each asset as marital or non-marital. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909, 915 (Miss.1994). [N]ot all debts incurred during a marriage are marital debts.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 914 So.2d 193, 197 (¶ 21) (Miss.Ct.App.2005). “Whether a debt is classified as marital or separate depends on who benefitted from the debt.” Id. Once that determination is made, the chancellor must evaluate the equitable division of all marital property pursuant to the guidelines listed in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928 (Miss.1994). An equitable distribution does not mean that the chancellor is required to divide the property equally. Drumright v. Drumright, 812 So.2d 1021, 1026 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2001). Equitable division of marital property is left to the discretion and conscience of the chancellor, “having in mind all the equities and other relevant facts and circumstances.” Humphries v. Humphries, 904 So.2d 192, 198 (¶ 24) (Miss.Ct.App.2005). “Fairness is the prevailing guideline in marital division.” Id. at 198-99 (¶ 24).

¶ 13. “When reviewing a chancellor's judgment in property division we are not to conduct a Ferguson analysis anew, but are to review the judgment to ensure that the chancellor followed the appropriate standards and did not abuse his discretion.”...

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