Walker v. Highmark BCBSD Health Options, Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-CV-01975-CCW |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER JAMES WALKER, Plaintiff, v. HIGHMARK BCBSD HEALTH OPTIONS, INC., Defendant. |
Before the Court is Plaintiff Christopher Walker's Motion to Remand. ECF No. 12. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion will be DENIED.
In this putative class action lawsuit, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Highmark BCBSD Health Options, Inc. violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., by placing unsolicited automated/pre-recorded calls to Plaintiff's and putative class members' cellphones without those individuals' consent. ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 1. Plaintiff originally filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County on November 30, 2020. ECF No. 1 at ¶1. Defendant accepted service of the Complaint on December 9, 2020, and thereafter timely removed the case to this Court on December 21, 2020. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 10-12.
On January 27, 2021, one day after Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, in part, Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ECF No. 10, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Remand. ECF No. 12. In his Motion, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's Notice of Removal is deficient because it "fails to establish jurisdiction under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution." ECF No. 13 at 1. In particular, Plaintiff contends that Defendant, as the party invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, has not demonstrated that the Complaint satisfies the injury in fact requirement for Article III standing. Id. at 5. Therefore, because "any doubts regarding a federal court's jurisdiction are resolved in favor of remand," Plaintiff claims that "conflicting opinions of federal court cases addressing Article III standing in TCPA cases" mandate remand here. Id. at 6.
In opposition, Defendant points out that in removing this case to federal court it invoked this Court's federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Defendant violated the TCPA. See ECF No. 18 at 4. Defendant also argues that, even if Plaintiff succeeds in having the case remanded for lack of jurisdiction, the case would become removable again as soon as Plaintiff responds to discovery requests regarding damages. Id. at 6. As such, and in the interest of judicial economy, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand should be denied.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." Standing under Article III is a necessary prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction. See Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016) (). The "'irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing consists of three elements," namely, that the plaintiff has "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). Only the first standing element, injury in fact, is at issue here.
The precedential opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Susinno v. Work Out World, Inc., 862 F.3d 346 (3d Cir. 2017), which discussed standing in a caseinvolving an alleged violation of the TCPA, controls the Court's analysis here.1 In Susinno, plaintiff alleged that defendant had placed one unsolicited call to her cellphone. Id. at 348. She did not answer the call, and defendant left a one-minute, pre-recorded voicemail message. Id. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding in part that the single call and lone voicemail message were insufficient to constitute injury in fact. Id. The Third Circuit reversed. Id.
Applying the analytical framework from In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach Litigation, 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017), the court in Susinno concluded that the plaintiff had alleged a concrete injury in fact. Susinno, 862 F.3d at 351-52. This was so because "[w]hen one sues under a statute alleging 'the very injury [the statute] is intended to prevent,' and the injury 'has a close relationship to a harm . . . traditionally . . . providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts,' a concrete injury has been pleaded." Id. at 351 (quoting Horizon, 846 F.3d at 639-40). Thus, plaintiff in Susinno alleged an injury "squarely identified" by Congress in the TCPA—i.e. "[t]he TCPA addresses itself directly to single prerecorded calls from cell phones, and states that its prohibition acts 'in the interest of [ ] privacy rights'"—and the alleged injury was closely related to a harm traditionally recognized at common law. Id. at 351-52 (quoting Pub. L. 102-243, § 2) ( that the TCPA "sought to protect the same interests implicated in the traditional common law cause of action" of intrusion upon seclusion). That is, by enacting the TCPA, Congress "elevated a harm [i.e. a single unsolicited telephone call] that, while 'previously inadequate in law,' was of the same character of previously existing 'legally cognizable injuries.'"Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff in Susinno had alleged "a concrete, albeit intangible," injury sufficient to confer Article III standing. Id.
Applying the analysis and holding of Susinno to the present case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has standing under Article III. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges multiple violations of the TCPA by Defendant, including six specifically alleged instances of unsolicited, pre-recorded calls and/or voicemail messages to Plaintiff's cellphone from September through November 2020. ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 19-25. And, although Plaintiff does not explicitly claim that these calls were an invasion of privacy, the Complaint states that Plaintiff was never a customer of Defendant and "Plaintiff never provided consent to Defendant for the calls and does not know how Defendant obtained his number," thereby implicating Plaintiff's privacy interests. ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 27-28 (emphasis added). Thus, under the reasoning of the Susinno court—which found one call and one voicemail message sufficient to confer standing—Plaintiff has alleged injuries that are both clearly delineated by the statute and closely related to a harm traditionally recognized at common law. Therefore, the injury in fact element of standing is apparent from the face of the Complaint. Furthermore, although not challenged here, the Court also notes that the Complaint plainly satisfies the remaining standing elements: the alleged TCPA violations are attributed to Defendant making unsolicited, pre-recorded calls to Plaintiff's cellphone and the alleged injury is redressable through statutory and—if the violations are proven to have been willful—treble damages. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).
Accordingly, and because the alleged violations of the TCPA clearly implicate federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand will be denied.
For the reasons set forth above, P...
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