Walker v. Johnson
Decision Date | 30 June 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 4:CV-94-1775.,4:CV-94-1775. |
Citation | 891 F. Supp. 1040 |
Parties | Malinda WALKER, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children Alexis Larabee and Lydia Walker, Plaintiff, v. James P. JOHNSON, Esquire, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
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Malinda Walker, plaintiff, pro se.
Jane Nelson Bolin, State College, PA, for defendants Watson, Allar, Young, Patterson, Dauberman, Culhane, Rice, Smith and Johnson.
Michael H. Collins and Robin A. Read, McNerney, Page, Vanderlin & Hall, Williamsport, PA, for defendants Norma and Thomas Flickinger.
Plaintiff Malinda Walker filed this section 1983 action on behalf of herself and her minor children Alexis Larabee, aged 4 years, and Lydia Walker, aged 23 months. Plaintiff alleges that her constitutional rights and those of her children were violated by Centre County, Pennsylvania officials and employees.
Named as defendants are: James P. Johnson, Esq., attorney for Children and Youth Services of Centre County (CYS); Terry Watson, director of CYS; Donna Allar, case worker supervisor for CYS; Leslie Young, case worker supervisor for CYS; Monica Patterson, caseworker for CYS; Mary I. Dauberman, case worker for CYS; Jennifer A. Culhane, case worker for CYS; Lisa Rice, case worker for CYS; Colleen Smith, case worker for CYS; and Thomas and Norma Flickinger, foster parents allegedly acting under the supervision of CYS.1 All defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff alleges that at all relevant times each was acting under color of state law.
According to plaintiff's allegations, her minor children, Alexis and Lydia, were adjudicated dependent,2 taken into the custody of CYS and placed, under the foster care program, in the care and custody of Thomas and Norma Flickinger. (Plaintiff's complaint, ¶¶ 3-12).
Walker alleges that while in the care of the Flickingers, her children have accompanied the Flickinger family to Protestant religious services against her wishes. In her words, Walker alleges that her children have been compelled to attend a "Fundamentalist, evangelical, Christian Church selected by the foster family and approved by CYS" over her objections.
In documents filed subsequent to the complaint initiating this action, plaintiff states that she follows Judaism and wishes to have her children indoctrinated in that religion and to follow its teachings.
Plaintiff further alleges that defendants' conduct has caused irreparable harm to her and her children for which there is no adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff seeks, on that basis, a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction (Plaintiff's complaint, p. 10, ¶ 3)
In an order and memorandum dated November 23, 1994, this court dismissed all claims except plaintiff's First Amendment claim and her state law claim for the alleged theft of her breast milk as legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).
Before the court are: 1) a Rule 12(b) motion by defendants Watson, Allar, Young, Patterson, Dauberman, Culhane, Rice and Smith to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action and for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction (record document no. 11); 2) a Rule 12(b) motion by defendant Johnson to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action and for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction (record document no. 12); 3) a Rule 12(b) motion by defendants Thomas and Norma Flickinger to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action (record document no. 19); and 4) a motion by defendants for default judgment (record document no. 21).
Defendants move in their Rule 12(b) motions, in the alternative, for summary judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. For the reasons which follow, we will consider all three motions as motions for summary judgment and will enter an order 1) granting all three motions, 2) entering judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on plaintiff's First Amendment Claim, the sole remaining federal claim, 3) dismissing without prejudice the remaining state law claim, and 4) denying, as procedurally inappropriate, the remaining motion for default filed by defendants.
Summary judgment standard
Rule 12(b) provides that if matters outside the pleadings are presented to, and not excluded by the court in hearing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the motion can be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 so long as the parties are "given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The parties were notified in our order dated May 30, 1995 that defendants' motions would be disposed of as motions for summary judgment, and plaintiff was given additional time to file briefs and supporting documents in opposition to defendants' outstanding motions.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of stating the basis for its motions and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. He or she can discharge that burden by "showing ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at 323 and 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 and 2554.
Issues of fact are "`genuine' only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence presented, could find for the non-moving party." Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 693-94 (3rd Cir.1988), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Material facts are those which will affect the outcome of the trial under governing law. Anderson, supra, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. In determining whether an issue of material fact exists, the court must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. White v. Westinghouse Electric Company, 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3rd Cir.1988).
Because plaintiff's allegations center, in part, on the consequences and significance of an adjudication of dependency, some background on that issue will be helpful. Under the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act, a "dependent child" is defined as one who "is without proper parental care or control ... or other care or control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health or morals." 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 6302(1). The party petitioning for an adjudication of dependency must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child is presently without proper parental care and that such care is not immediately available. In re S.M, 418 Pa.Super. 359, 614 A.2d 312 (1992) and In re Justin S., 375 Pa.Super. 88, 543 A.2d 1192 (1988). Such a finding must be supported by testimony that is "so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In re Justin S., 375 Pa.Super. 88, 543 A.2d at 1197. In such matters, the courts attempt to strike a balance between the state's interest in protecting the child from potential harm and the rights of the parents. Safeguards, including stringent evidentiary requirements, are in place to guard against the possibility that overly zealous state employees may seek and obtain an adjudication of dependency in cases which do not warrant such drastic action.
Once a child is adjudicated dependent, significant consequences follow. Legal custody of that child then vests in the state, albeit on a temporary basis, with the ultimate goal usually being reunification of the family. The Court of Common Pleas for the jurisdiction where the child resides or is present is then authorized to determine where and with whom that child will reside based upon an assessment of the child's best interests. The alternatives available to the court include: 1) allowing the child to continue residing with his or her parents under conditions prescribed by the court; or 2) transferring temporary legal custody of the child to a private or public agency. 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 6351.
Even though an adjudication of dependency has been made, the child may be removed from the custody of his or her parents only in cases where there is a clear necessity for removal. Once such a determination has been made, the court...
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