Walker v. Mem'l Hosp.

• Decision Date: 12 January 1948
• Citation: 45 S.E.2d 898
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: WALKER. v. MEMORIAL HOSPITAL.

45 S.E.2d 898

WALKER.

v.MEMORIAL HOSPITAL.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Jan. 12, 1948.

Rehearing Denied March 1, 1948.

Error to Corporation Court of City of Danville; Willis D. Miller, Judge Designate.

Action by Irma Blair Walker against the Memorial Hospital, a charitable corporation, to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when she fell down the steps of defendant's hospital while leaving after a visit to her husband, who was a patient there. To review a judgment for the defendant, after verdict far plaintiff, the plaintiff brings error.

Judgment affirmed.

Before HUDGINS, C. J., and GREGORY, EGGLESTON, SPRATLEY, BUCHANAN, and STAPLES, JJ.

Waldo G. Miles and A. M. Aiken, both of Danville, for plaintiff in error.

Edwin B. Meade and Rutledge C. Clement, both of Danville, for defendant in error.

STAPLES, Justice.

The plaintiff in error, Mrs. Walker, sued the Memorial Hospital, a Danville charitable corporation, for damages resulting from personal injuries sustained by her when she fell down the steps of the hospital as she was leaving after a visit to her husband, who was a patient there. Her notice of motion for judgment alleges that the defendant was negligent in allowing ice to accumulate on the apron and steps of the main hospital entrance; that she slipped on the ice and fell. The "apron" is a platform or uncovered porch leading from the top of the steps to the entrance door. The defendant filed a plea of not guilty upon which issue was joined. The trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $9000, which the corporation court set aside as contrary to the law and the evidence, and entered final judgment for the defendant, to review which we granted this writ of error.

The parties are in agreement that the trial court correctly held that the hospital, though a charitable corporation, owed Mrs. Walker the duty to exercise ordinary care to have its premises in a reasonably safe condition, since as a visitor she occupied the legal status of an invitee. We so held in a similar case, Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13, 51 L.R.A., N.S., 1025. On the other hand, it is not denied that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care for her own safety. It is the appropriate application of these principles to the evidence that we are called upon to consider.

The plaintiff's position is that the defendant knew of the slippery and dangerous condition of the platform and steps; that such knowledge had been brought to its attention by the previous fall of another person who reported it to the hospital; that it was negligence on the part of the defendant not to remedy the condition; that it was also negligence on its part not to notify or warn the plaintiff of said slippery and dangerous condition before permitting her to leave by the main entrance at nine o'clock that night, and that, as she had no knowledge or means of knowledge of said slippery condition, she was without fault on her part.

The defendant, on the other hand, asserts that snow had been falling, off and on, during the greater part of the day; that it had cleaned the snow off the steps and platform prior to Mrs. Walker's arrival about four-thirty; that the weather had turned into a freezing rain sometime before seven o'clock which continued up to the time of the accident at nine; that in the exercise of ordinary care it was not incumbent upon the defendant to undertake to remedy the icy condition, or keep plaintiff advised with respect thereto, so long as the sleet continued to fall; that the platform and steps were well lighted and were provided with handrailings on bothsides, and that, on the whole case, as a matter of law it was guilty of no negligence. It also insists that the plaintiff failed to use reasonable care for her own safety; that she should have worn rubbers instead of high heel shoes when she visited the hospital, as she knew of the snow and cloudy weather at that time; that the platform and steps were adequately lighted and because of such previous knowledge of the stormy conditions she should have ascertained the true situation with respect to the outside premises before undertaking to descend the steps, and that therefore the plaintiff was guilty of negligence on her part, which was the sole cause of the accident.

The jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff entitles her to have all conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom resolved in her favor. We will apply this principle in the following review of the evidence.

The plaintiff's testimony was in substance as follows: She arrived at the hospital about the hour of four-thirty on the afternoon of December 13, 1945, for a visit to her sick husband and remained until the close of the visiting period at nine o'clock that night. She had made a number of previous visits to see him and was familiar with the entrance. When she went in that afternoon there was no ice, but she noticed that the snow which had fallen had been swept to the sides of the steps and platform and that the steps were damp looking. The skies were cloudy at this time. She knew it had snowed that morning but if it had snowed in the afternoon she had no knowledge of it, but the weather was cold and it was a bad day. When Mrs. Walker's visit ended and she left the hospital about nine that night, she says she opened the door of the lobby, stepped down on the platform, walked across it and caught hold of the railing at the head of the steps on her left side. This railing extends from the wall of the building proper near the entrance door, along the sides of the platform and along the entire length of the steps on each side. When she took hold of the railing she was about sixteen inches from the snow piled along the side. The steps did not appear to be covered with a sheet of ice when she started down and she did not notice it or know the ice was there. She did not see any ice on the platform when she came out of the lobby door. The lights on the steps were burning but were not any too bright. She stepped down the first step, and, as she stepped on the second, her feet slipped out from under her and she "went all the way down to the bottom". After she had fallen and was being helped back up the steps, she noticed there was ice on them and she "judged it was from where the snow had melted and run down there and frozen." There was no falling weather at that time. No ashes or sawdust or anything of that sort had been placed on the steps. No one in the hospital or anyone else warned her of the icy condition, nor was there any warning sign or placard. She was wearing low quarter shoes at the time of the accident, with heels about an inch and a half to two inches high, and was not wearing rubbers or galoshes.

Plaintiff's witnesses, Thornton and Payne, came out of the same lobby door about the time the plaintiff fell. They corroborated her statement that there was no falling weather then. Thornton testified that there was a solid sheeting of thin ice on the platform and on the steps; that when he first stepped on the platform he slipped but did not fall; that the light was sufficient to enable him to see all right and, after slipping, he saw the ice on the platform, and that there "was plenty ice on the steps and sidewalk too when I went out there"; that he saw the plaintiff down at the bottom "trying to get up"; that he helped her up and also helped her walk back up the steps; that he reported the accident to the lady at the night clerk's desk and she said it was the second fall that night. Payne testified that he wasn't sure whether there was ice on the platform, but that before he started down the steps he saw ice on them. Both witnesses stated they saw a girl at the hospital's night clerk desk as they went out, the desk being near the door, and she could easily see persons leaving by the main entrance; that the girl did not warn them of the slippery conditions outside.

No complaint is made by the plaintiff that there was any defect in the structural condition of the platform or steps. The platform extended from the building to the steps which was seven feet three inches, while the distance between the handrailings on the sides of the platform and steps was eleven feet two inches. The steps were thirteen inches wide with a seven inch riser --that is the distance from the top surface of one step to the step above it. The platform and steps were both of granite construction. Alongside the bottom step was a granite slab or base on either side, on each of which rested an iron standard or pole extending upward higher than the level of the platform. On the top of both standards was a translucent globe, in each of which were three forty-watt bulbs. A photograph introduced in evidence shows the lights to be similar to those commonly used along the sides of city streets. These were lighted at the time of plaintiff's fall.

With respect to the weather conditions on the day and night of the accident, the evidence establishes without contradiction that it snowed sometime during the morning; that it snowed a little around two o'clock in the afternoon, and was also snowing at three o'clock and at five o'clock. The steps were wet but not frozen at six o'clock in the afternoon, and there was no falling weather at that time. Between six and seven o'clock a fine freezing rain began falling and at ten or fifteen minutes to seven it was slippery from previous sleeting. The records of the United States Weather Bureau on file at Richmond showed the temperature, sky conditions, and ground cover, at the Danville Airport at certain time intervals. It was agreed the airport is between three and five miles from the hospital. According to these records, at seven thirty p. m. on the day of the accident the temperature was twenty-seven degrees, a light freezing rain was falling, and there was light smoke. At eight-seventeen and eight-thirty there was a light freezing rain...