Walker v. Modern Realty of Missouri, Inc., 81-2240
| Decision Date | 19 April 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-2240,81-2240 |
| Citation | 675 F.2d 1002 |
| Parties | 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 4926 Alan E. WALKER, Appellant, v. MODERN REALTY OF MISSOURI, INC., John E. Tillotson, II, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Charles C. Shafer, Jr., Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.
Knipmeyer, McCann, Fish & Smith, Kenneth O. Smith, James Welsh, Koenigsdorf, Kusnetzky, Wyrsch & Stites, James R. Wyrsch, Kansas City, Mo., for appellees.
Before STEPHENSON, Senior Circuit Judge, ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, and HANSON, * Senior District Judge.
This is a diversity action for breach of a contract of employment. The District Court 1 held that the contract was for an indefinite term and terminable at will by either party. It therefore, the Court said, could not, under Missouri law, be the subject of an action for wrongful discharge. The complaint was dismissed before trial. We agree and affirm.
By letter agreement dated April 16, 1979, defendant, Modern Realty of Missouri, Inc., agreed to employ plaintiff, Alan E. Walker, as manager of land sales. Mr. Walker's salary was fixed at "$40,000.00 per year." The last substantive paragraph of the letter read as follows:
This agreement will not be time limited but shall continue in full force and effect so long as it is mutually satisfactory to both parties.
Plaintiff argues that the contract is ambiguous and could have been found by a jury to obligate defendant to retain plaintiff in its employ for at least a year. (Plaintiff was fired after seven months.) We think not. An agreement that continues in force "so long as it is mutually satisfactory to both parties" necessarily ceases when one party is no longer satisfied with it. The reference to a yearly salary, in the context of a clear provision making continuation of the relationship contingent on both parties' will, can reasonably be read only to establish the rate of pay, not the minimum duration of employment.
Plaintiff claims that the use of the phrase, "to both parties," at the end of the paragraph in issue creates an ambiguity. If the contract were truly terminable at will, the argument runs, it would have provided simply for continuance "so long as it is mutually satisfactory." The word "mutually" is sufficient, without more, to indicate that both parties must be satisfied for the arrangement to continue. Since each word should be considered to mean something that would not have been provided for in its absence, the phrase "to both parties" must have been added, we are told, to make certain that the contract would continue until both parties wished to terminate it. The argument is ingenious but unavailing. The phrase "to both parties" may be redundant, or it may have been added for emphasis, as...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc.
...does not require an employer to have a good reason, or any reason, in order to discharge an employee. Walker v. Modern Realty of Missouri, Inc., 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir.1982). Plaintiff testified that when he was hired he understood his position to be temporary and would probably last six mo......
-
Rosen v. Gulf Shores, Inc.
...that a hiring at a specific sum per week, month or year is no more than an indefinite hiring, see, e.g., Walker v. Modern Realty of Missouri, Inc., 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir.1982); Bethany Reformed Church of Lynwood v. Hager, 84 Ill.App.3d 684, 40 Ill.Dec. 392, 406 N.E.2d 93 (1980); Sullivan v......
-
Bakken v. North American Coal Corp.
...within the state. 2 The facts alleged in this case are sufficiently different from those alleged in Walker v. Modern Realty of Missouri, Inc., 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir.1982) to allow this court to consider the question presented. In that case, the court stated, "If, as plaintiff urges, an imp......
-
Stancil v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co.
...his duties is terminable at the will of either party. 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 31 (1940). See: Walker v. Modern Realty of Missouri, Inc., 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir.1982); Sartin v. City of Columbus Utilities Comm., 421 F.Supp. 393, 401 (N.D.Miss.1976), affd. 573 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. Further......