Walker v. (People
| Decision Date | 24 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 117138 |
| Parties | REUBEN D. WALKER, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. PAMELA J. McGUIRE (The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Intervenor-Appellant and Cross-Appellee). |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Illinois Official Reports
Supreme Court
Decision Under Review
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, the Hon. Bobbi N. Petrungaro, Judge, presiding.
JudgmentReversed and remanded.
Counsel on Appeal
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Brett E. Legner, Deputy Solicitor General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
David A. Novoselsky, of Chicago, and Laird M. Ozmon, of Joliet, for appellee.
Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Paul A. Castiglione, Jeffrey S. McCutchan and Margarett S. Zilligen, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for amicus curiae Anita Alvarez.
Paul A. O'Grady and Jennifer L. Turiello, of Peterson, Johnson & Murray, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Housing Development Authority.
Justices
¶ 1 At issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of section 15-1504.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code), which imposes a $50 filing fee in residential mortgage foreclosure cases, 2% of which is retained by the clerk of the court in which the foreclosure complaint is filed. 735 ILCS 5/15-1504.1 (West 2012). The circuit court of Will County found section 15-1504.1 violates the judicial fee officer prohibition in article VI, section 14, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 14).
¶ 2 For the reasons that follow, we reverse the order of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 4 In October 2012, plaintiff, Reuben D. Walker, filed a putative class action complaint against defendant, Pamela J. McGuire, clerk of the circuit court of Will County, challenging, inter alia, the constitutionality of section 15-1504.1 of the Code. At the time the complaint was filed, section 15-1504.1 provided, in relevant part, as follows:
¶ 5 Plaintiff asserted that the filing fee, which he was required to pay when he filed a mortgage foreclosure action in Will County, was unconstitutional. Plaintiff also asserted that section 7.30 of the Illinois Housing Development Act (Act) (20 ILCS 3805/7.30 (West 2012)), which established the Foreclosure Prevention Program that is funded by the filing fee, is unconstitutional. Plaintiff alleged that the statutes violate separation of powers (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1); the equal protection, due process, and uniformity clauses (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2; art. IX, § 2); and the prohibition on fee officers in the judicial system (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 14). Plaintiff also alleged that the statutes violate the Illinois Constitution, as interpreted in Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill. 2d 444 (1984), by allowing the collection of a filing feefor noncourt related purposes. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and a return of all filing fees paid pursuant to section 15-1504.1.
¶ 6 The trial court certified a class of plaintiffs consisting of all individuals and entities who had paid the $50 filing fee at the time plaintiff had filed his mortgage foreclosure action, and a class of defendants consisting of all circuit court clerks in Illinois. The State, through the Attorney General, was allowed to intervene in the matter. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 19 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006); 735 ILCS 5/2-408(c) (West 2012).
¶ 7 Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that section 15-1504.1 of the Code and section 7.30 of the Act are unconstitutional. The State filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012)), arguing that plaintiff's claims were legally insufficient. The trial court denied the State's motion, and granted plaintiff's motion. The trial court found that circuit court clerks fall within the judicial fee officer prohibition in article VI, section 14, of the Illinois Constitution, and that the provision in section 15-1504.1 authorizing 2% of the filing fee to be retained by the clerk for administrative expenses creates an impermissible fee office. The trial court declared the statute unconstitutional on its face, and found no just reason to delay appeal or enforcement of its order. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). The State appealed directly to this court. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 302(a)(1) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011).
¶ 8 Plaintiff filed a notice of cross-appeal challenging the trial court's order to the extent the order was limited to the version of section 15-1504.1 in effect at the time the complaint was filed.
¶ 9 We allowed the Illinois Housing Development Authority and the Cook County State's Attorney to file amicus curiae briefs in support of the State and defendant. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 345(a) (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).
¶ 12 The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 20. Statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 22. To overcome this presumption, the party challenging the statute must clearly establish the statute's invalidity. Id. This court has a duty to construe a statute in a manner that upholds its constitutionality, if reasonably possible to do so. Id.; Melongo, 2014 IL 114852, ¶ 20.
¶ 13 The Illinois Constitution contains two distinct provisions relating to fee offices. The provision that appears in the local government article (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 9(a)), which was the subject of a recent opinion from this court (Marks v. Vanderventer, 2015 IL 116226), is not at issue here. Rather, our focus is on the fee officer provision that appears in section 14 of the judicial article:
¶ 14 The State argues that, contrary to the trial court's ruling, circuit court clerks do not come within the fee officer prohibition in the judicial article. The State relies on the plain language of article VI, section 14, arguing that this section, as a whole, addresses compensation of "judges," and not compensation of circuit court clerks. The State also relies on the history and purpose of the fee officer prohibition, arguing that it was intended to abolish masters in chancery and other judicial hearing officers who received a fee from the litigants for their services.
¶ 15 Plaintiff, like the State, relies on the plain language of article VI, section 14. Plaintiff argues, however, that the fee officer prohibition expressly applies to members of the "judicial system," i.e., the judicial branch of government, and that under our case law, circuit court clerks are "nonjudicial officer[s] of the judicial branch of government." County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186, 200 (1987).
¶ 16 The same general principles that govern our construction of statutes also govern our construction of constitutional provisions. Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36. Accordingly, our chief purpose, when construing a constitutional provision, is to determine and effectuate the common understanding of the persons who adopted it—the citizens of this state. Id. To that end, we will consider the natural and popular meaning of the words used at the time of adoption (id.), as well as "the object to be attained or the evil to be remedied" (internal quotation marks omitted) (People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. State Board of Elections, 136 Ill. 2d 513, 526 (1990)). "Where the language of a constitutional provision is unambiguous, it will be given effect without resort to other aids for construction." Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36. If, however, after consulting the language of the constitutional provision its meaning is in doubt, we will consult the drafting history of the provision, including the debates of the delegates to the constitutional convention. Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 225 (1999); Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1996).
¶ 17 Both parties' plain language arguments have at least some merit. On the one hand, article VI, section 14, as a whole addresses the salaries and expenses of "judges." Considered in this light, the fee officer prohibition simply limits the form judicial compensation may...
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