Walker v. Peters

• Decision Date: 06 December 1909
• Citation: 124 S.W. 35,139 Mo.App. 681
• Parties: A. W. WALKER, Respondent, v. MARIAN N. PETERS, Appellant
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

124 S.W. 35

139 Mo.App. 681

A. W. WALKER, Respondent, v. MARIAN N. PETERS, Appellant

Court of Appeals of Missouri, Kansas City

December 6, 1909

Appeal from Howard Circuit Court.--Hon. A. H. Waller, Judge.

Reversed and remanded. (with directions).

Edward E. Beidleman, E. W. Henry and W. F. Spottswood for appellant.

(1) The certificates pointed out where the fund should go in the contingencies which happened, namely, to the legal representatives of the insured. The words "legal representatives" were employed in the certificates in the sense of executors and administrators. Loos v Insurance Co., 41 Mo. 538; 3 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 975; 18 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 813; Insurance Co. v. Bank, 121 Mo.App. 487; Johnson v. Van Epps, 110 Ill. 551; Common People v Phelps, 78 Ill. 147; Wason v. Coldburn, 99 Mass. 342; Sulz v. Mutual Reserve Fund L. Assn., 145 N.Y. 563; Kelly v. Mann, 56 Iowa 625. (2) As was said in Bank v. Abernathy (32 Mo.App. 211), the words "legal representatives" are wellnigh universally held to mean executors and administrators, when applied in connection with the death of anyone. This rule of interpretation is applied to policies of life insurance. 3 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), 975, supra; Insurance Co v. Bank, 121 Mo.App. 479, supra, and other authorities cited, supra. Armstrong v. Insurance Co., 11 F. 573.

W. N. Williams and Scarritt, Scarritt & Jones for respondent.

(1) The certificates are to be construed according to the laws of this State. Pietri v. Sequenot, 96 Mo.App. 265. The statute provides that the proceeds "shall not be used, taken, appropriated or applied, by any legal or equitable process, nor by operation of law, to pay any debt or liability of a policy or certificate holder." R. S. 1899, sec. 7908; McCoy v. Bankers Life Ass'n, 134 Mo.App. 35. (2) No attempt was made by the certificate holder, either by his will or in any other manner, to change the beneficiary in the original certificate. (3) The statutes of this State, as well as the by-laws of the association, show that the principal purpose and object of the association issuing the certificates, was not to enhance the estates of the members, but to provide a fund for the benefit of their families and those dependent upon such members. "The fund . . . was not an asset of the estate of the testator; nor was it a debitum in presenti, solvendum in futuro. . . . Nor could the administrator apply the fund as de bonis testatoris." Graham v. Allison, 24 Mo.App. 516; Thomas v. Cochran, 46 L. R. A. 160. (4) The words "legal representatives," as used in the benefit certificates, mean heirs at law and should be so construed. Loos v. Insurance Co., 41 Mo. 538; Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n v. Jones, 26 A. 253; 1 Cooley's Briefs, 809.

OPINION

ELLISON, J.

A. F. Hendrix died in Howard county, unmarried. In his life time he made a will and appointed the plaintiff as his executor. As such executor plaintiff received payment of two beneficiary certificates of insurance for two thousand dollars each. The defendant Marian N. Peters was engaged to be married to deceased and the other defendants, Mary H. Hall and Magdalen L. Hendrix, are deceased's only sisters and heirs. Defendant Marian claimed the fund under the will and the other defendants denied her right and themselves made claim thereto as only heirs of deceased. In this situation plaintiff as executor brought this action to have the court determine to whom it should be paid. The defendants Mary and Magdalen answered jointly and Marian filed her separate answer. The circuit court rendered judgment for the former and against the latter.

The two certificates were made payable to Hendrix's mother, who died before he did. The certificates provide that "In the event of the death of the beneficiary prior to that of the member, or in case none is named, the benefit then to be payable to the legal representatives of the member." We are thus left to the provisions of the incorporation and by-laws of the association and the will to determine to whom the money should be paid. The will reads thus:

"First, I desire that my funeral expenses and just debts be paid out of my estate as soon as practicable after my decease.

"Second, I give and bequeath to my beloved sister, Mary H. Hall, of Carthage, Missouri, all my furniture, jewelry and other articles or personal property of which she may have charge at the time of my death, absolutely, and likewise, I give and bequeath to my beloved sister, Magdalen L. Hendrix, of Fayette, Missouri, all of my furniture, jewelry and other articles of personal property of which she may have charge at the time of my death, absolutely.

"Third, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest and residue of the property of which I may die seized, real, personal and mixed, absolutely, to Marian N. Peters, of Middletown, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania."

Under the provisions of the third clause Marian will get about $ 4,500; but, as already stated, she claims the will also gives her the funds arising from the two beneficiary certificates.

The articles of incorporation declare that the object of the association is "The equitable distribution of the fund among the families or beneficiaries of deceased members." They further declare that any number of certificates not exceeding three "may be issued to one member, and each certificate shall entitle the heirs, or legal representatives or designated beneficiary" of a deceased member to $ 2,000 benefit.

They further provide that a change of beneficiary may be made with the consent of the association, but that "No change shall be consented to unless the new beneficiary shall be the wife, relative, legal representative, heir or legatee of the member, except that if the certificate was issued for the benefit of others than the wife and children of the member, it may be changed so as to be payable to creditors."

It will be seen that the certificates naming the deceased's mother as beneficiary and in case she died, then his "legal representatives," there could not be a failure of a beneficiary; for if the one named died, or if none were named, the legal representatives were designated as the beneficiary.

But defendants, the sisters, claim that the object of the association was for the protection of the family of deceased and therefore the term "legal representatives" should not be given its usual and general meaning (executors or administrators) but should be said to mean the legal heirs of deceased. Frequently the words "legal representatives," on account of the connection in which used, are given an interpretation different from what they generally signify. They are frequently shown to mean heirs as here claimed. [Loos v. Insurance Co., 41 Mo. 538.] But the connection in which used in this instance will not justify a meaning differing from that usually given them. [Insurance Co. v. Bank, 121 Mo.App. 479, 487, 97 S.W. 195.]

The statement of the object as being to provide and distribute a fund for the families of the members, or their beneficiaries, does not afford ground for a departure from the usual meaning. In the first place there is no showing that the sisters were of deceased's family. That relation to him, alone, would not necessarily make them his family or of his family. And if it did, they would still not be helped by the declared object. For the statement is not absolutely to provide for the families of deceased members, but for such families or beneficiaries of the members. In addition, the further connection in which the words are used show we ought not to allow them a meaning different from that generally given. The other provisions above quoted from the articles of association show that the word "heirs" is used where "heirs" are meant and a distinction is clearly made between that word and the term "legal representatives," for both designations run through the articles, following one another, and it cannot be said in any reason to be a mere fault of tautology. [Sulz v. Insurance Co., 145 N.Y. 563.]

But it is claimed that the statute itself (sec. 7908, R. S. 1899) carries out the idea that heirs are meant and not legal representatives in the sense of executors or administrators. For it is said if that could be, then creditors could take that which was primarily intended for the family and thus would result an interpretation which would be in the face of a statutory declaration of policy. But the statute only prevents creditors from taking the fund belonging to a debtor beneficiary. The statute, while exempting the fund from debts of the beneficiary, in no wise prevents a fund payable to the member's legal representatives from being a part of his estate; the only difference would be in the manner of distribution. [Kelley v. Mann, 56 Iowa 625, 10 N.W. 211.] It reads that the proceeds of such certificates shall not be taken or seized by process of law for any debt of a certificate holder or beneficiary.

While the statute means that the creditor cannot appropriate the fund to the payment of his claim against the beneficiary, yet it does not apply, of course, to a case where the beneficiary is himself the creditor. And so it has been held by the St Louis Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge BARCLAY, that the statute did not disable a member of such association from making his creditors his beneficiaries, and that too by the designation of "executors or administrators." [Pietri v. Seguenot, 96 Mo.App. 258, 69 S.W. 1055; Williams v. Carson, 9 Baxt. 516.] It thus appears clear that...