Walker v. Robinson

Decision Date28 December 1984
Docket NumberNo. 9304,9304
PartiesJohn E. WALKER, Appellant, v. Evelyn L. ROBINSON, Guardian of the Person and Estate of Morris C. Mays, and Don Pinkham, Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Pat C. Beadle, Clarksville, for appellant.

J. Michael Brock, New Boston, for appellees.

CORNELIUS, Chief Justice.

John E. Walker appeals from a default judgment invalidating a deed executed by Morris Mays during the pendency of guardianship proceedings over his person and estate. We affirm the judgment.

In September of 1983, Evelyn Robinson was appointed guardian of the person and estate of Morris Mays on a finding that he was a person of unsound mind. On January 24, 1984, Robinson as guardian of Mays, acting under an order of sale issued by the probate court, sold the property at issue to Don Pinkham. Several days later Morris Mays, the ward, individually deeded the same property to Walker.

Robinson and Pinkham brought suit against Walker to remove Mays' deed as a cloud on the title. Walker did not answer or appear at trial. On March 12, 1984, the trial court rendered a default judgment which declared that the deed from Mays to Walker was void and established Pinkham's clear title to the property. Walker timely filed a motion for new trial which was overruled by the trial court.

On appeal Walker asserts that the judgment is supported by insufficient evidence, the pleadings were inadequate, and the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial.

Ordinarily no evidence is required to support a default judgment; the defendant's failure to appear or answer constitutes an admission of all the allegations of the plaintiff's petition. Proof is required only when the suit seeks to recover damages which are unliquidated or not proved by a written instrument. Watson v. Sheppard Federal Credit Union, 589 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.Civ.App.--Fort Worth 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Damages were not at issue in this case so Walker cannot successfully attack the judgment on the basis of insufficient evidence.

With respect to the sufficiency of the pleadings, the general rule is that a plaintiff's petition is sufficient to support a default judgment if it gives the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff is seeking and why. It is not necessary that the petition be technically sufficient to state a cause of action in order to sustain a default. Edward's Feed Mill v. Johnson, 158 Tex. 313, 311 S.W.2d 232 (1958).

The petition in this case gave adequate notice of the relief sought, the land and deed in issue, and the reason relief was proper. It also alleged that the consideration paid by Walker had been paid into the registry of the court for repayment to Walker. It was thus sufficient against the challenge of a defaulted party.

A default judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered if it is proved that the party's failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious...

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4 cases
  • Reeves Royalty Co., Ltd. v. ANB Pump Truck Service
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • September 30, 1987
    ...Mud & Drilling Co., 697 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.Ct.App.1985); Bondeson v. Pepsico, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.Civ.App.1978); Walker v. Robinson, 683 S.W.2d 875 (Tex.Civ.App.1984); Kuper v. Kuper, 336 S.W.2d 819 (Tex.Civ.App.1960); Crouch v. McGaw, 134 Tex. 633, 138 S.W.2d 94 State courts have the mo......
  • Willacy County Appraisal Review Bd. v. South Padre Land Co.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • February 9, 1989
    ...property in accordance with Tex.Tax Code Ann. § 42.24(1) (Vernon 1982). Appellee asks this court to analogize this case with Walker v. Robinson, 683 S.W.2d 875, 876 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1984, no writ), in which the court held, in a suit to declare a deed void, that the default judgment coul......
  • Sisco v. Briones
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • March 20, 1991
    ...or other evidence proving, prima facie, the existence of such a defense. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex.1966); Walker v. Robinson, 683 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1984, no Since the present case is not a tort case, none of the statutory contribution schemes apply. TEX.CIV......
  • Mobil Oil Corp. v. Floyd
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • June 6, 1991
    ...constitute a collateral attack on the Orange County judgment. A judgment of incompetency cannot be collaterally attacked. Walker v. Robinson, 683 S.W.2d 875 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1984, no writ). Brindza claims it would be an abuse of discretion to order the deposition because Brindza is seve......

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