Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc.

Citation400 F.3d 370
Decision Date09 March 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03-6468,03-6468
PartiesErric WALKER, Steve Ricketts, and Vickie Atchley, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. RYAN'S FAMILY STEAK HOUSES, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

ARGUED: Michael S. Pitts, Nexsen, Pruet, Jacobs & Pollard, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. M. Reid Estes, Jr., Stewart, Estes & Donnell, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Michael S. Pitts, E. Grantland Burns, Nexsen, Pruet, Jacobs & Pollard, Greenville, South Carolina, William Alexander Blue, Jr., Constangy, Brooks & Smith, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. M. Reid Estes, Jr., Tanya B. Spavins, Stewart, Estes & Donnell, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellees.

Before: COLE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.*

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc. appeals the October 2, 2003 order of the district court, denying its motion to dismiss and petition to compel arbitration, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4, of Plaintiff Erric Walker's, Steve Ricketts', and Vickie Atchley's claims for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

I.
A. Procedural History

On November 12, 2002, Plaintiffs Erric Walker, Steve Ricketts, and Vickie Atchley filed a self-styled "collective action" complaint for violations of the FLSA against Defendant Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc. ("Ryan's") in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Ryan's is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in South Carolina, and owns and operates a chain of over 300 restaurants in 22 states. Plaintiffs, former employees at various Ryan's locations in Tennessee, allege that Ryan's failed to pay them the minimum wage and/or one-and-one-half their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of each 40 hour work week, in violation of the FLSA. After Plaintiffs filed suit, 18 additional unnamed plaintiffs filed their consent to become party plaintiffs in the lawsuit. Ryan's moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint and petitioned for an order compelling Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4. Ryan's argued that Plaintiffs federal court claims were foreclosed by the arbitration agreements that each had executed at the outset of their employment.

On October 2, 2003, the district court denied Ryan's motion, holding that there was inadequate consideration for the arbitration agreements, the agreements had the hallmarks of unconscionable adhesion contracts, the agreements were not founded upon mutual assent, and Plaintiffs did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their constitutional right to a jury trial. The court also held that the arbitration forum provided for in the agreements is not able to provide for effective vindication of statutory claims and is an inappropriate substitute for the judicial forum. The court observed that the pool of arbitrators would be constituted in a biased manner and that the limited discovery available in the forum suggested structural bias in favor of the employer. The court further determined that the arbitration agreements appear to prohibit arbitration of class-based claims, which provides a powerful disincentive for employees to pursue individual claims of relatively low monetary value. Ryan's timely appealed.

B. Substantive Facts

Since 1996 or 1997, any individual who applies for employment with Ryan's has been presented with a 12-page application packet. The second page of the packet notifies the applicant that he or she is required to complete and sign the "Job Application Agreement to Arbitration of Employment-Related Disputes" (hereafter "Arbitration Agreement") in order to be considered for a position. Failure to sign and accept the Arbitration Agreement and its related rules and procedures purportedly terminates the job application process. After the one-page notice come five pages of single-spaced rules and procedures governing the arbitration procedure. Only after wading through the rules does the applicant get to the one-page job application for the positions of server, salad bar, dishwasher, frontline, hostess, meatcutter, cook, breadroom, or cashier. The two-page Arbitration Agreement, which the applicant must sign, then follows the application.1

Plaintiffs cite several examples of applicants who were hired on the spot after a 15 to 20 minute interview, during which the hiring manager hurriedly presented them with various documents that they were instructed to sign in order to be considered for a job. The manager rarely explained the nature of the Arbitration Agreement to the applicants, nor were the applicants given the opportunity to take home and review any of the forms before signing or provided with copies of the executed Arbitration Agreement or rules. Consequently, many of the applicants do not even recall executing the agreements.

One Ryan's employee, Nanella Dukes, was hired on the spot, without filling out any paperwork. Only after working for four or five days was Dukes handed the application packet and told to sign the documents, with her manager explaining that the agreement meant that if Dukes "ever had any problems with Ryan's or Ryan's management, [she] had to `go through Ryan's arbitration."' Plaintiffs Julie Oaks and Steven Ricketts also were hired on the spot without first completing the Arbitration Agreement. Oaks's manager explained that the arbitration agreement meant that if Oaks ever had any problems with Ryan's, she "had to `go through Ryan's' before [she] could go to an attorney."

According to Dukes, based on her experience conducting new employee orientations, Ryan's managers would place an "x" in every spot an applicant was required to sign, and applicants would be instructed to sign every "x" without any explanation. Dukes's explanation of the application process is consistent with that of Paul Heuther, who worked as a manager at various Ryan's restaurants over a ten-year period. Heuther states that the application process typically would last no longer than 20 minutes, applicants often would be hired on the day that they applied when managers presented the application packet, they would simply tell the applicants that if they wanted a job, "sign these documents here." Heuther further explains, "Our supervisors at Ryan's told us during manager meetings with them, that if it came up to tell any job applicant that the arbitration agreement meant that problems would be handled `up the chain of command,' and that we would handle problems `in house' first, and if the problem could not be resolved there, then it would be taken to the supervisor to resolve."

Plaintiffs complain that the time-limited context in which they were presented with the Arbitration Agreement, combined with the managers' provision of misleading information about the agreement, is particularly problematic because many of the plaintiffs have not completed high school and/or were in dire financial circumstances at the time of application and therefore were desperate for the low-wage jobs Ryan's offers. Plaintiffs point out that the average annual salary for a top-paid Ryan's restaurant worker is approximately $16,000, while minimum wage employees make approximately $11,000 annually. Accordingly, Plaintiffs suggest that they had neither the ability nor the incentive to comprehend the significance of executing the Arbitration Agreement.

Unlike the typical pre-employment arbitration agreement which involves a contract between the applicant and his or her potential employer, Ryan's Arbitration Agreement is not between the applicant and Ryan's. Rather, it is between the applicant and Employment Dispute Services, Inc. ("EDSI"). EDSI is a South Carolina corporation whose sole business is the marketing and administration of the Employment Dispute Resolution Program. The program is a third-party arbitration system which was established in 1992 to provide employers and employees outside of the securities industry with a purportedly fair and expeditious means of resolving employment-related disputes. EDSI has contracts with a total of seven companies, including Ryan's.

The Arbitration Agreement that Plaintiffs executed explains that Ryan's (referred to therein as the "Company") had entered into a separate agreement with EDSI "to arbitrate and resolve any and all employment-related disputes between the Company's employees (and job applicants) and the Company." Although Plaintiffs were not provided with a copy of Ryan's separate agreement with EDSI, that agreement obligates EDSI to, inter alia,"administer and provide access to the EDSI alternative dispute resolution procedures and forum for all Company job applicants, employees, and the Company itself, as provided in the EDSI Rules and Procedures"; train managers and supervisors about the alternative dispute resolution program; and train managers and employees selected to serve as potential "adjudicators" in the program. Also, for an additional fee, EDSI will conduct "an employee relations audit (personnel polices and procedures, handbooks and other personnel forms), management training, and employee attitude surveys with recommended management responses." Ryan's agreement with EDSI is renewable from year to year, but Ryan's may cancel the contract with ten days' written notice.

By executing the Arbitration Agreement with EDSI, Plaintiffs agreed to (a) bring any employment disputes that he or she may have against Ryan's and that would otherwise be decided in a state or federal court only in EDSI's arbitral forum2 and (b) be bound by a final decision of the EDSI arbitration panel. The purported consideration for Plaintiffs' promise to arbitrate...

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