Walker v. Skyclimber, Inc.
Decision Date | 29 September 1983 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 1981/290,1981/291. |
Citation | 571 F. Supp. 1176 |
Parties | Moses A. WALKER and Enema Walker, Plaintiffs, v. SKYCLIMBER, INC., and Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., Defendants. Francis E. CHARLES and Theresa Charles, Plaintiffs, v. SKYCLIMBER, INC., and Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
Mark L. Milligan, Christiansted, St. Croix, V.I., for plaintiffs.
Richard D. Keeling, Christiansted, St. Croix, V.I., for defendant Skyclimber, Inc.
Britain H. Bryant, Christiansted, St. Croix, V.I., for defendant Hovic.
This action for personal injuries and damages is before this Court on Motion of defendant Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. ("HOVIC") for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings or, In the Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment. The sole issue sub judice is whether HOVIC is a seller of a chattel in this instance; and may thus be held on a strict liability theory under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1977). The Court finds that HOVIC is not a seller in the context of this action. Accordingly, HOVIC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment will be granted.
This case arises out of a May 22, 1981 accident at the HOVIC oil refinery on St. Croix, USVI. Plaintiffs Francis Charles and Moses Walker ("plaintiffs") were injured when they fell from a scaffolding device while working at the HOVIC tank farm. At the time of the accident, plaintiffs were employed by Litwin Panamerican Corporation St. Croix ("Litwin"), the major independent contractor working at the HOVIC refinery.
Plaintiffs were engaged in sandblasting and painting a large oil storage tank. In order to reach all portions of the tank, plaintiffs were using a motorized two point suspension device, which allowed plaintiffs to ascend and descend the tank. The unit consisted of two motorized hoists ("skyclimbers") with scaffolding platforms suspended between them. The skyclimber units themselves were hung from steel cables which in turn were secured at the top of the storage tank.
Plaintiffs were in the process of lowering the scaffolding when one of the skyclimber units stalled. Plaintiff Walker changed the lever on the hoist to the position to raise the scaffolding, then changed the lever back to the descend position. At that moment, the steel cable attached to the stalled skyclimber snapped, sending the plaintiffs falling to the ground approximately forty to fifty feet below.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed this action seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in the accident. Plaintiffs' claim against both HOVIC and Sky Climber, Inc. ("Sky Climber"), the manufacturer of the hoist, sounds in negligence as well as strict liability. Regarding the latter cause of action, plaintiffs allege that the accident was caused by a defect in the skyclimber hoist.
The history of this allegedly defective skyclimber is pertinent to the issue presently before the Court. In 1974, HOVIC purchased the unit from Sky Climber, and shortly thereafter transferred the unit to Litwin. Plaintiffs contend that HOVIC regularly supplies contractors with such equipment as part of its overall refinery operation. Thus, plaintiffs argue, HOVIC is a seller of such hoists and may be held strictly liable for any defects therein pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.1
HOVIC disagrees, asserting that the transfer of the skyclimber to Litwin was but an isolated occurrence. Consequently, HOVIC argues, it is not a "seller engaged in the business" of selling hoists, but fits within the "occasional seller" exception to the strict liability precept of § 402A.
The appropriate starting point in analyzing HOVIC's status in this matter is an examination of the requirements for recovery in a products liability action as set forth in § 402A, which is the controlling law in this territory. 1 V.I.C. § 4.
Section 402A states:
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1977).
It is axiomatic that one basic requirement for application of the rule is that the defendant must be engaged in the business of selling the chattel. Streatch v. Associated Container Transp., Ltd., 388 F.Supp. 935 (C.D.Cal.1975); Zimmerman v. Moore, 441 N.E.2d 690 (Ind.App.1982) reh'g denied (1982); Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736 (1977); See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir.1976). The reason for this requirement is stated in Comment f to § 402A:
The plain meaning of Comment f is that § 402A strict liability theory is a theory not suited for application to the occasional seller. See Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34 (7th Cir.1980); Richards v. Georg Boat and Motors, Inc., 179 Ind.App. 102, 384 N.E.2d 1084 (1979); Abdul-Warith v. Arthur G. McKee and Co., 488 F.Supp. 306 (E.D.Pa.1980) aff'd 642 F.2d 440 (3d Cir.1981). For example, in Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App.3d 633, 105 Cal.Rptr. 890 (1970), Papermate Manufacturing Company bought a press from Improved Machinery, the manufacturer, and five years later sold it to Balido's employer. Balido was injured while working with the machine and attempted to go against Papermate on a § 402A theory. The Court rejected her claim finding:
There was nothing to suggest that Papermate was a conduit for the production or distribution of Improved's presses. Papermate was no more than a one time occasional seller who does not become subject to strict liability for manufacturing or design defects.
Id. 105 Cal.Rptr. at 895; See generally 99 A.L.R.3d 651 (1980).
In determining whether HOVIC is "engaged in the business of selling" hoists, this Court must look not to the volume of HOVIC's sales, but to whether they "carried on an established and well-recognized kind of business which has been a regularly maintained activity on its part." Abdul-Warith, supra 488 F.Supp. at 311 (quoting Stewart v. Uniroyal, Inc., 72 Pa.D. & C.2d 179, 202 (1974), aff'd, 339 A.2d 815 (1975).
In support of its motion, HOVIC submitted an affidavit of its comptroller who states that HOVIC is only engaged in "refining crude oil into petroleum products" and that HOVIC "is not in the business of selling, distributing, advertising, or maintaining any sales agency for hoists of any type, specifically ... those made by Sky Climber, Inc." Affidavit in Support of HOVIC's Motion; filed May 26, 1983. Plaintiffs counter asserting that the agreement between Litwin and HOVIC required HOVIC to supply "scaffolding" to Litwin. Litwin-HOVIC Agreement, p. 5; filed ...
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