Walker v. State, 6 Div. 3.

• Citation: 17 So.2d 428,31 Ala.App. 345
• Decision Date: 21 March 1944
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 3.
• Parties: WALKER v. STATE
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

17 So.2d 428

31 Ala.App. 345

WALKER v. STATE

6 Div. 3.

Alabama Court of Appeals

March 21, 1944

W.L Longshore, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Wm. N. McQueen, Acting Atty. Gen., and L.H Brassell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SIMPSON Judge.

The prosecution was for assault with intent to murder. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to three years' imprisonment in the penitentiary. His defense as to the felony charge was that, at the time of the alleged occurrence, he was so drunk he was incapable of entertaining the specific intent inherent in such a crime.

An inquiry into the state of mind of the accused is always proper in prosecutions where intent is an essential ingredient. Tidwell v. State, 70 Ala. 33, 46. In cases, as here considered, the rule has been declared that "when the offense charged consists of an act committed with a particular intent,--when a specific intent is of the essence of the crime,--drunkenness, as affecting the mental state and condition of the accused, becomes a proper subject to be considered by the jury in deciding the question of intent." White v. State, 103 Ala. 72, 81, 16 So. 63, 66. Also, James v. State, 193 Ala. 55, 60 69 So. 569, Ann.Cas. 1918B, 119; Mooney v. State, 33 Ala. 419, 421; McGee v. State, 4 Ala.App. 54, 58 So 1008; Rhodes v. State, 3 Ala.App. 182, 184, 57 So. 1021; Harmon v. State, 23 Ala.App. 468, 126 So. 896; Patterson v. State, 30 Ala.App. 135, 1 So.2d 759; King v. State, 90 Ala. 612, 616, 8 So. 856; Ivory v. State, 237 Ala. 344, 186 So. 460; Dyer v. State, 241 Ala. 679, 4 So.2d 311; Williams v. State, 13 Ala.App. 133, 138, 69 So. 376; Granberry v. State, 182 Ala. 4, 8, 62 So. 52; 32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 506, p. 168.

To sustain this defense the defendant, by his own testimony, sought to prove his mental condition or state of mind shortly before and at the time of the shooting, viz., the last thing he remembered, when he was overcome, etc., after almost a day and a half of whisky drinking. The court, ex mero motu, intervened in the proceedings and forbade the education of any proof of this character. Here, we think, was prejudicial error.

This is not, as divined by the learned trial court, one of the proscriptions of the rule that a witness may not testify to his "undisclosed state of mind." This was not the fact proffered by the testimony, nor was the accused offering an opinion as to his own mental unsoundness, which is likewise forbidden. He was merely seeking to testify "to a fact, of which he should be capable of testifying." This principle and the distinction to...