Walker v. State

• Decision Date: 12 March 1903
• Citation: 43 S.E. 701,117 Ga. 260
• Parties: WALKER v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

43 S.E. 701

117 Ga. 260

WALKER v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

March 12, 1903

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where one intrusted with money by another fraudulently converts it to his own use, he is guilty of larceny after trust, though he may have fraudulently induced the delegation of the trust with intent to so convert the money.

2. The evidence warranted the verdict, and the refusal of a new trial was proper.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; L. S. Roan, Judge.

Sam Walker was convicted of larceny after trust, and brings error. Affirmed.

F. R Walker and R. J. Jordan, for plaintiff in error.

C. D Hill, Sol. Gen., for the State.

FISH J.

Sam Walker was convicted of larceny after trust delegated. He made a motion for a new trial upon various grounds, which being overruled, he excepted. The indictment charged that a firm of which the prosecutor was a member intrusted the accused with $25 belonging to such firm, for the purpose of paying the railroad fare of three designated persons from Birmingham, Ala., to Atlanta, Ga., and that he, after having been intrusted with such money for this purpose, fraudulently converted the same to his own use. The evidence submitted upon the trial fully sustained the charges made in the indictment. Counsel for the plaintiff in error contend that it appeared from the evidence that the prosecutor's firm was fraudulently induced by the accused to intrust him with the $25--his intention at the time being to convert the money, after being intrusted with it, to his own use--and for this reason say that he was not guilty of larceny after trust delegated, and, to sustain their contention, cite Wylie v. State, 97 Ga. 207, 22 S.E. 954. That case is no authority for the contention made. There it appeared that the accused "contracted with the prosecutrix to build for her a house within a stipulated time and at a stated price which she paid to him in advance, and that he really never intended to build the house at all, but fraudulently pretended he would do so, for the purpose of obtaining the money and applying it to his own uses." The court held that, while such facts showed great moral turpitude on the part of the accused, they did not render him guilty of larceny after trust. The evident reason for the ruling made in that case was that there was no trust delegated to the accused, as the money was paid to him in advance, under his contract with the...