Walker v. State Acc. Ins. Fund

• Jurisdiction: Oregon
• Parties: In the Matter of the Compensation of Betty Jean WALKER, Claimant, Appellant, v. STATE ACCIDENT INSURANCE FUND, Respondent.
• Citation: 28 Or.App. 127,558 P.2d 1270
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 17 January 1977

Page 1270

558 P.2d 1270

28 Or.App. 127

In the Matter of the Compensation of Betty Jean WALKER Claimant, Appellant, v. STATE ACCIDENT INSURANCE FUND, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 23, 1976.

Decided Jan. 17, 1977.

Harold W. Adams, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Kevin L. Mannix, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lee Johnson, Atty. Gen., and W. Michael Gillette, Sol. Gen., Salem.

Before SCHWAB, C.J., and THORNTON and TANZER, JJ.

THORNTON, Judge.

The issue presented in this workmen's compensation case is whether claimant's injury while enroute home after work arose out of and in the course of her employment as required by the Workmen's Compensation Law.

Claimant appeals from an order of the circuit court reversing the referee and the Workmen's Compensation Board which had held that she was entitled to workmen's compensation benefits.

Claimant, a Clerk-Matron II in the Marion County Sheriff's office, was injured when struck by a car while walking to her own automobile, which was parked on a Salem street, following the end of her shift.

Generally, injuries sustained by employes when going to or coming from work are not compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Law. White v. S.I.A.C., 236 Or. 444, 389 P.2d 310 (1964); Gumbrecht v. S.A.I.F., 21 Or.App. 389, 543 P.2d 1189 (1975). This general rule, known as the 'going and coming rule,' is subject to several exceptions. See, e.g., Montgomery v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 224 Or. 380, 356 P.2d 524 (1960); Boyd v. Francis Ford, Inc., 12 Or.App. 26, 504 P.2d 1387 (1973), and authorities cited therein.

In this case claimant advances a so-called 'police officer exception' to the going and coming rule. This exception has been recognized in several jurisdictions. Neither appellate court in Oregon has considered this issue.

Claimant's theory is that she is a police officer and that tecause of the special nature of her duties, her on-call status, and the fact that she was uniformed at the time of the accident, the going and coming rule should not be applied. As noted above this 'police officer exception' to the going and coming rule has some support in other jurisdictions. See, Garzoli v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 2 Cal.3d 502, 86 Cal.Rptr. 1, 467 P.2d 833 (1970); Warg v. City of Miami Springs, 249 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1971); Sweat et al. v. Allen, 145 Fla. 733, 200 So. 348 (1941); Jasaitis v. Paterson, 31 N.J. 81, 155 A.2d 260 (1959); Mayor & Aldermen v. Ward, 173 Tenn. 91, 114 S.W.2d 804 (1938).

We conclude that the case at bar falls within the scope of the 'going and coming rule' as interpreted by the appellate courts of this state, and that we should not follow the proffered rule. Absent special circumstances such as a finding that claimant at the time of the injury was engaged in furthering the employer's business, claimant would not be entitled to benefits. Claimant relies on the fact that she was in uniform and on call at the time of the accident. We find no persuasive distinctions between her situation and that of a myriad of other uniformed, on-call persons ranging from hospital personnel to housing maintenance personnel and are unwilling to forge a general exception to the going and coming rule...