Walker v. State
| Decision Date | 30 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. F-89-508,F-89-508 |
| Citation | 1994 OK CR 66,887 P.2d 301 |
| Parties | Jack Dale WALKER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
Jack Dale Walker was tried by jury and convicted of two counts of First Degree Malice Aforethought Murder in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.1982, § 701.7 (Counts I and II), one count of Assault and Battery with a Dangerous Weapon in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.1982, § 645 (III) and two counts of Assault with a Dangerous Weapon in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.1982, § 645 (IV and V), in Tulsa County District Court Case No. CRF-89-18, before the Honorable Clifford E. Hopper, District Judge. Walker was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for Counts IV and V and twenty years imprisonment for Count III. The jury found three aggravating circumstances and sentenced Walker to death for the murder convictions. We affirm.
On December 30, 1988, at around 8:00 a.m., Walker arrived at a trailer home where Shelley Ellison, his girlfriend and the mother of his three-month-old child, lived. The trailer belonged to Shelley's grandmother, Juanita Epperson. Shelley, the baby, Juanita, Juanita's son Donnie Epperson and his wife Linda and their four children, were all present in the trailer when Walker arrived.
Hansel Norton, who had known and worked with Walker for three weeks, had driven him to the trailer. Norton testified that on the way there Walker seemed very upset. Walker pulled out a knife and said to Norton "Talk to me."1 Walker told Norton he had something to do before he came into work that day. At trial, Norton identified the murder weapon as the knife Walker had shown him in the car.
Walker arrived at the trailer, told Juanita he was looking for Shelley, and she invited him inside. Walker and Shelley talked in a back bedroom. Apparently, Walker wanted to leave with the baby. When Shelley asked Juanita to explain to Walker that the baby was sick and that he could not take him, he attacked Shelley.
Shelley yelled for Donnie to come and help her. Donnie, who had been asleep, ran down the hall toward them. Walker stabbed Donnie and then continued stabbing both Donnie and Shelley. During the attack, Shelley managed to make a 911 call. When the police arrived, she was dead. Donnie was alert and conscious, but he died shortly thereafter. Shelley suffered more than thirty-two stab wounds; many were defensive ones. Donnie sustained eleven. Walker inflicted some of Shelley's wounds with an ice pick from Juanita's kitchen.
Juanita had tried to help Shelley and Donnie by hitting Walker with a pipe wrench. Walker pushed her down, breaking her arm, and then stabbed her. Linda, Donnie's wife, and their nephew had run down the hall after Donnie. At various times, Walker threatened them with the knife and chased them out of and away from the trailer. Walker's infant son and three other children who witnessed the events were unharmed.
When the police arrived, they found Walker lying on the front porch, his wrist bleeding. Juanita testified that Walker had cut his own wrist. She also stated that during the attack, Walker had said he was going to kill himself and had tried to push a paring knife into his own throat.
Police officers recorded a statement Walker gave to them on January 1, 1989. Walker stated he went to the trailer with the "full intention of either taking the baby or murdering [Shelley]."2 He later contradicted himself, stating that "I didn't want to kill Shelley I wanted to kill myself because I knew that we needed somebody to take care of that baby."3 Walker also stated that he knew Shelley was dead when the police arrived, because before he exited the trailer he checked her pulse.4 He stated that he remembered stabbing Shelley.5 He admitted that he used drugs, but stated that he was not under the influence of drugs at the time of the homicides.6 Walker stated that before he left his grandfather's house to go to the trailer, he told him "Paw I love you and I don't know what's going to happen but I don't care...."7 Walker also stated that "[o]ne of the things that provoked me so much to finally come to this was that Shelley's Mom and Dad both on several occasions had made threats on my life."8 Finally, Walker stated that "[t]he knife at first was intended for myself because if me and her didn't work out I was going to walk out on the front porch and stab myself."9
In his second proposition, Walker claims the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights by improperly restricting defense counsel during jury selection. During voir dire, defense counsel explained to one venireperson how the judge might instruct on mitigation evidence. The trial judge sustained the State's objection to this question. Defense counsel also told several venirepersons of evidence he considered mitigating as to Walker, and asked them whether they would also find such evidence to be mitigating. The State successfully objected, arguing that these questions asked the jurors to commit to a particular position on the issue of mitigation.
Despite these limitations upon his questioning, defense counsel was ultimately allowed to define mitigating evidence as "any evidence that says, no, the death penalty shouldn't be imposed, ..."10; as evidence showing "why Jack Dale Walker should not receive the death penalty ..."11; and, as evidence that could determine "whether or not the death penalty really is appropriate" assuming Walker was found guilty of first degree murder.12 Defense counsel was also allowed a lengthy conversation with one prospective juror during which he asked her whether she would be able to look for mitigating evidence, whether she would be able to share with the other jurors her thoughts on mitigating evidence, and whether she would be willing to stand up to eleven other jurors and refuse to impose the death penalty based upon her beliefs concerning the existence of mitigating factors.
The major thrust of Walker's second proposition argument is that the trial court's rulings prevented him from ascertaining whether the prospective jurors would fulfill their duty, under Lockett v. Ohio13 and Eddings v. Oklahoma14 to consider his mitigating evidence. Walker claims that to ascertain whether potential jurors will uphold their second stage duty to consider mitigating evidence, defense counsel must be allowed to describe particular pieces of mitigating evidence and ask each juror whether they would also consider them to be mitigating. By allowing Walker only limited inquiry into whether the jurors would give consideration to the mitigating evidence offered, the trial court prevented him from obtaining sufficient information upon which to base peremptory challenges or challenges for cause. We disagree.
"The principles governing the sufficiency of voir dire questions derive from the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury in criminal prosecutions."15 "The purpose of voir dire ... is to ascertain whether there are grounds to challenge for either actual or implied bias [and] to permit the intelligent exercise of preemptory [sic] challenges."16 As long as the examination of prospective jurors is sufficiently broad to afford a defendant a jury not affected by outside influences, personal interests or bias, a judge's decision to limit questioning will not be ruled an abuse of discretion.17 Voir dire rulings lay within the trial judge's discretion because the "determination of impartiality, in which demeanor plays such an important part, is particularly within the province of the trial judge."18
This Court has ruled that a trial judge's refusal to permit voir dire inquiry into jurors' views on particular mitigating factors does not constitute an abuse of discretion.19 We have stated that permitting this type of questioning might result in improperly influencing the jury by making voir dire "an open forum for discussion of any circumstances accompanying the murder, both mitigating and aggravating."20 Walker cites no state or federal case in which the subject of mitigating evidence in a capital case has been found to require a more detailed voir dire inquiry than is normally allowed.21
After reviewing the voir dire transcript in the present case, it is clear that defense counsel was not so restricted that he was unable either to ascertain juror bias or to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. Although the trial judge limited several of defense counsel's questions, he still explained mitigating factors to the prospective jurors. Accordingly, Walker's right to an impartial jury was not violated by the trial court's rulings restricting some of defense counsel's proffered questions on the subject of mitigating evidence.
Walker argues in his first proposition that the trial court's decision to allow the State to examine his expert witness prior to trial violated his right to a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Prior to trial, defense counsel asked the court to...
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