Walker v. State, 72--733
| Citation | 281 So.2d 41 |
| Decision Date | 11 July 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 72--733,72--733 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
| Parties | Jimmy Glen WALKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
James A. Gardner, Public Defender, and Elliott C. Metcalfe, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Richard C. Booth, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
On August 28, 1972, appellant changed his guilty plea to a plea of nolo contendere to an information charging him with robbery. His plea clearly reserved the right to appeal the trial judge's denial of his motion for discharge. 1 Appellant's plea was accepted by the court and he was sentenced to the Division of Corrections to serve a sentence of five years.
On August 15, 1972, at the hearing on appellant's motion to discharge, the appellee, the State of Florida, stipulated to the facts and, consequently, is bound thereby on this review. It appears from said stipulation that the offense occurred on October 7, 1970, in Pasco County, Florida, the following day appellant left the State of Florida and traveled to Ohio. Several days later, on December 2, 1970, appellant turned himself in to the Ohio authorities for the commission of the Florida robbery. On the same day, an arrest warrant for appellant was issued from Pasco County, Florida. On the following day, December 3, appellant voluntarily waived extradition. According to appellant's testimony, to which the state stipulated as being factually true, on January 4, 1971, an Ohio judicial official dismissed the Florida warrant because Florida officials did not pick appellant up. It therefore is evident that the Pasco County law enforcement authorities had knowledge that appellant was in custody in the State of Ohio. It is reiterated that this fact and other material facts were stipulated to by the assistant state attorney. On January 7, 1971, a direct information was filed in Florida charging appellant with the crime of robbery. The following day, January 8, 1971, appellant pled guilty to the Ohio robbery and was sentenced to serve from 1 to 25 years in the Ohio State Prison. On February 17, 1972, appellant was paroled and moved to Indiana where he was gainfully employed. On May 31, 1972, appellant was taken into custody and subsequently returned to Florida for the October 7, 1970, Florida robbery. On August 11, 1972, appellant filed his motion for discharge on August 18, 1972. Thereafter, appellant entered his nolo contendere plea and this timely appeal ensued.
The sole issue for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for discharge pursuant to RCrP 3.191(d)(1), 33 F.S.A.
We have very meticulously and painstakingly read the record, files and briefs. Oral argument was waived. We have perhaps, it could be said, spent more time in rendering our decision than we would under normal circumstances, for we have, we believe, labored considerably in an attempt to reconcile the facts of the case to the several specific provisions of the Speedy Trial Rule.
The record before us is scant and we are obliged to rely entirely on the facts which have been agreed to by the respective parties in the stipulation, Supra. We conclude, after reading the stipulation, that the state, appellee, had notice of the whereabouts of Walker at least on January 4, 1971, the date of the dismissal of the Florida warrant by the Ohio authorities. It may reasonably be concluded that the Pasco County law enforcement authorities were apprised of the whereabouts of appellant on December 3, 1970, the date he waived extradition in Ohio on the Florida charge. When appellant filed his motion for discharge on August 11, 1972, more than 180 days had elapsed from the time the Pasco County law enforcement authorities learned of his whereabouts in the State of Ohio. As a matter of fact, far more than 180 days had elapsed.
We point out that the Speedy Trial Rule became...
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Miller v. State, 72--777
...stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, we Reverse and remand for new trial. HOBSON, A.C.J., and McNULTY, J., concur. 1 See Walker v. State, Fla.App.1973, 281 So.2d 41; Shreves v. State, Fla.App.1972, 269 So.2d 390; Chesebrough v. State, Fla.1971, 255 So.2d 675; State v. Ashby, Fla.1971, 245......
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Jackson v. State, 73--1183
...Cir. 1973); Cameron v. State, 291 So.2d 222 (4th D.C.A.Fla.1974); Miller v. State, 285 So.2d 41 (2d D.C.A.Fla.1973); Walker v. State, 281 So.2d 41 (2d D.C.A.Fla.1973); See Andersen v. State, 274 So.2d 228 (Fla.1973). In Chesebrough v. State, Supra, the court 'The plea in the case Sub judice......
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State v. Lewis, 76-2712
...JJ., concur. 1 Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551 (Fla.1975).2 Richardson v. State, 340 So.2d 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Walker v. State, 281 So.2d 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973); Ramos v. Amidon, 263 So.2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).3 Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 25 S.Ct. 573, 49 L.Ed. 950 (1905).4 ......
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State v. Miller, 90-02231
...the defendant and does not result in preventing prosecution, the time periods of statutes of limitations are not tolled. Walker v. State, 281 So.2d 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), cert. denied, 289 So.2d 739 (Fla.1974). See also Mishan v. Crews, 363 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Fleming; The trial......