Walker v. State
Decision Date | 03 June 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 3-880A254,3-880A254 |
Citation | 420 N.E.2d 1374 |
Parties | Bruce W. WALKER, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender (Ihor N. Boyko, Deputy Public Defender), Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen. (Michael Gene Worden, Asst. Atty. Gen.), Indianapolis, for appellee.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Bruce W. Walker pleaded guilty to the charge of burglary. 1 The trial court accepted Walker's plea but rejected the prosecutor's recommendation to sentence Walker to a five-year term of imprisonment. Rather, the trial court sentenced Walker to the Indiana Department of Correction for a period of eight years. After sentencing, Walker filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he sought specific performance of the prosecutor's sentence recommendation. Walker appeals the denial of that petition.
On appeal, Walker raises the following issue for review:
Did the PCR court commit reversible error when it failed to resentence Walker in accordance with the prosecutor's sentence recommendation of five years?
We affirm.
Walker and the prosecutor negotiated a plea agreement which required Walker to plead guilty to the charge of burglary in exchange for the following concessions to be made by the prosecutor:
(1) No additional charges arising out of the incident involving the burglary would be filed against Walker.
(2) No habitual offender charge would be filed against Walker as a result of his guilty plea.
(3) The prosecutor "agreed not to argue for more than a five (5) year term of imprisonment."
The plea agreement was presented to the trial court in accordance with IC 1976, 35-5-6-2(a) (Burns Code Ed., 1979 Repl.), of the Indiana plea bargaining statutes. After Walker stated he would plead guilty pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court made the necessary inquiries to determine if Walker knowingly and voluntarily intended to waive the panoply of constitutional rights afforded to a criminal defendant. The trial court also examined Walker to determine if a factual basis existed for the plea. Finding Walker fully advised of the consequences of his plea and finding a factual basis for the plea, the trial court accepted the tendered plea. The trial court withheld imposing a sentence until it could examine Walker's presentence report.
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor, as required by the plea agreement, recommended that five-year sentence be imposed on Walker. 2 Citing the aggravating circumstances of Walker's history of criminal activity and a recent parole violation, the trial court found the prosecutor's five-year sentence recommendation to be inappropriate and sentenced Walker to an eight-year term of imprisonment. Thereafter, Walker commenced this action to seek resentencing in accordance with the prosecutor's sentence recommendation.
Walker contends the trial court's rejection of the prosecutor's sentence recommendation entitled him to withdraw his guilty plea. Because the trial court erroneously failed to afford him the opportunity to withdraw the plea, Walker contends this Court may either vacate his guilty plea or order specific performance of the recommended sentence of five years. Walker, however, voluntarily waives any right he may have to have the plea vacated on appeal and seeks instead to have his sentence reduced to five years.
Walker presents a two-fold argument in support of his contention. First, Walker relies on the following provision of the plea agreement:
Walker contends this provision imposed a mandatory duty upon the trial court to permit Walker to withdraw his guilty plea if the trial court rejected the prosecutor's sentence recommendation. Walker's second argument is predicated upon IC 1976, 35-5-6-2(b) (Burns Code Ed., 1979 Repl.), which provides in pertinent part:
The term "recommendation" as used in IC 35-5-6-2(b) includes a sentence recommendation made by the prosecutor. IC 1976, 35-5-6-1(b)(2) (Burns Code Ed., 1979 Repl.). Walker contends the trial court, after rejecting the prosecutor's sentence recommendation, failed to reject the entire plea agreement and set the matter for trial as required by IC 35-5-6-2(b).
To effectively address Walker's two-pronged attack upon the sentence imposed, the nature of the prosecutor's sentence recommendation must be understood fully. The terms of the plea agreement relevant to sentencing provided:
An examination of these terms reveals that the parties did not condition the trial court's acceptance of Walker's guilty plea upon the imposition of a particular sentence. The recitation of the potential sentencing range as the "TERMS" of the agreement and the requirement that the prosecutor "agreed not to argue for more than a five (5) year" sentence necessarily indicate that the trial court retained full sentencing discretion even if it accepted Walker's guilty plea. The plea agreement itself did not state a definite sentence. Rather, it empowered the prosecutor to advocate the imposition of a sentence of five years or less. This indefiniteness in terms indicates that the prosecutor's sentence recommendation was to serve as another fact relevant to sentencing for the trial court to consider. The only duty imposed upon the trial court by the plea agreement was to entertain the prosecutor's sentence recommendation when the court exercised its sentencing discretion. Furthermore, at the guilty plea hearing, the trial court examined Walker to ensure that he understood the terms of the plea agreement. The trial court informed Walker that a sentence from two to eight years could be imposed under the plea agreement if the trial court accepted Walker's guilty plea. 3 Walker affirmatively acknowledged that fact. Thus, the prosecutor's sentence recommendation was in the nature of a "nonbinding" proposal for sentencing.
Under similar circumstances, the Illinois Supreme Court made the following observations:
People v. Lambrechts (1977), 69 Ill.2d 544, 559, 372 N.E.2d 641, 649, quoting, People v. Baldridge (1960), 19 Ill.2d 616, 169 N.E.2d 353, 356. The Illinois court's persuasive analysis leads this Court to conclude that under the terms of the plea agreement in the present case, the trial court's imposition of an enhanced sentence was not violative of the plea agreement. Walker was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. Thus, the PCR court did not err in failing to order the specific performance of the prosecutor's five-year sentence recommendation.
Walker's reliance upon Paragraph 6 of the plea agreement must fail. That provision merely empowered the trial court to permit Walker to withdraw his guilty plea if the court found any of the terms of the plea agreement unacceptable. It did not impose a mandatory duty upon the trial court to afford Walker an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea if the court rejected the prosecutor's sentence recommendation. The plea agreement provided that the trial court "can reject the plea" under such circumstances. By using the word "can," the parties vested discretionary authority in the trial court to permit withdrawal of the guilty plea if the recommended sentence was not imposed. It would be beyond this court's judicial ambit to rewrite the terms of the plea agreement by substituting either "shall" or "must" for "can" in Paragraph 6. Thus, Paragraph 6 does not alter this Court's construction of the plea agreement.
The application of IC 35-5-6-2(b), which forms the basis of Walker's other challenge to his sentence, does not render the PCR court's judgment erroneous. The Indiana Supreme Court recently examined the purpose and effect of IC 35-5-6-2(b) and reached the following conclusion:
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