Walker v. State

• Decision Date: 11 August 1971
• Docket Number: No. 460,460
• Citation: 12 Md.App. 684,280 A.2d 260
• Parties: Charles WALKER, Jr. alias Charles Junior Walker v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 684

12 Md.App. 684

280 A.2d 260

Charles WALKER, Jr. alias Charles Junior Walker v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 460.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Aug. 11, 1971.

Hamilton P. Fox, Jr., Salisbury, with whom was Hearne, Fox & Bailey, Salisbury, on brief, for appellant.

James L. Bundy, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and William B. Yates, III, State's Atty., for Dorchester County, on brief, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and MOYLAN and POWERS, JJ.

MOYLAN, Judge.

The appellant, Charles Walker, Jr., was convicted in the Circuit Court for Worcester County by a jury, presided over by Judge Daniel T. Prettyman, of murder in the second degree, attempted robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon, attempted robbery, assault with intent to rob and simple assault. He was sentenced to a term of twenty years inprisonment on the murder count and to terms of five years imprisonment on each of the other four counts, the latter four sentences to be served concurrently with the twenty-year term.

The sole question presented by the appellant on this appeal is whether his confession was properly admitted into evidence against him.

The crimes in this case, all arising out of an attempted robbery of a gas station, occurred on February 11, 1969, in Dorchester County. The appellant was arrested almost one year later on February 2, 1970. He was indicted by the Grand Jury for Dorchester County on February 16, 1970. Through his counsel, he filed on February 18, 1970, a written motion to suppress any statement or confession obtained from him by the police. A full preliminary hearing was held on that motion before Judge C. Burnam Mace on February 24, 1970. Judge Mace ruled that the statement was voluntary.

On February 24, 1970, the appellant had filed a written motion for removal of his case from Dorchester County. Judge Mace ordered the removal on March 6, 1970, to Worcester County. In that county, the case came on for trial before Judge Prettyman and a jury on June 22, 23 and 24, 1970.

When the State reached the point in its case in chief at which the appellant's confession was to be offered, Judge Prettyman made clear his position that, on the question of admissibility, he felt bound by the pretrial ruling made by Judge Mace at the suppression hearing. Judge Prettyman announced:

'Just go ahead and put it in. It has already been ruled on.

The purpose of the preliminary determination, under the motion to suppress, the statement in which you filed, serves exactly the same purpose as would be served had you waited until the trial of the case, and objected to the entering of a statement, which upon the State would have been obliged to produce the evidence in regard to the voluntariness and admissibility of the statement. In that event, of course, the jury would have been excluded, the determination made and, then, if ruled admissible, the same evidence would be presented for the benefit of the jury, to place them in possession of all of the facts surrounding the taking of the statements so that they could weigh the effect of the statement, give it such weight as they wished to give it. However, because this matter has been determined in a preliminary manner then that removes the necessity for doing it during the trial, and that is the purpose of the preliminary determination, and it is of advantage to the Court that counsel do make these objections known, as preliminary matters, so that can be disposed of without the jury sitting for hours waiting for a determination.

Now, the Court is now bound by the preliminary determination that it is prima facie admissible.

The evidence goes in and then if counsel for the Defense wishes to make an objection again, well, then, it can then make the objection again.'

The appellant entered a timely objection both to the admission of the confession and to Judge Prettyman's reluctance to readjudicate the question of admissibility. Judge Prettyman made it clear that all evidence from either party bearing on the issue of voluntariness would be offered before the jury so that the jury could make its ultimate determination upon whether the confession had been shown to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Prettyman also indicated that if, as the evidence on the issue of voluntariness unfolded, there should develop any material difference between the evidence presented at the trial and that presented at the preliminary hearing, he would feel free to make his own independent decision on the question of admissibility. Both parties then proceeded to present to the jury their cases on the question of voluntariness. The only significant additional testimony presented that had not been presented at the suppression hearing was a series of reports about the appellant made by the Maryland Children's Center in 1969, including a Social Service evaluation, a psychiatric evaluation, a psychological evaluation, a medical summary, a group living examination and a group school report. Judge Prettyman commented that he did not think these reports shifted the balance on the question of voluntariness in any way. He, therefore, felt constrained not to substitute his judgment for that of Judge Mace.

McChan v. State, 9 Md.App. 317, 264 A.2d 133, holds that it is proper for the trial judge to accept the findings of a pre-trial suppression hearing as fully dispositive of any issue of admissibility ruled upon at the suppression hearing. This Court, in dealing with a pretrial ruling on the issue of identification which was accepted by the trial court, held, at 322, 264 A.2d at 136:

'The court found that the motion had been ruled on by a court of competent jurisdiction and that it would not entertain the motion because 'the matter has already been ruled on.' We agree that the trial court was not obliged to hear and determine the motion to suppress the identification evidence which had already been fully heard and determined.'

See also Hutchinson v. State, 9 Md.App. 41, 45, 262 A.2d 321, and State v. Hutchinson, 260 Md. 227, 271 A.2d 641.

While we agree that a trial judge may accept the pre-trial finding as res judicata and is under no obligation to readjudicate a settled question, we do not agree that he need feel bound by a pre-trial ruling with which he is in strong disagreement. In the case at bar, Judge Prettyman forcefully concluded that a fundamental constitutional right of this appellant had been violated. We agree with that conclusion. We cannot agree that he was powerless to interpose himself under those circumstances.

It follows that we also disagree with the ruling on the admissibility of the confession made at the pre-trial suppression hearing. Because it parallels so closely our own view on the voluntariness vel non of the confession as we make our independent constitutional judgment thereon, we feel it meet to repeat the analysis made by Judge Prettyman:

'Now, let me say this, if I were to rule upon the admissibility of this statement it would never go into evidence. I think that the totality of the circumstances is such that there has been effectively, although perhaps not deliberate, and perhaps not articulated, coercion when a fifteen year old boy, with a dubious eighth grade education, who functions at such a level that he cannot do the simplest arithmetic problems, and remedial training in all basic learning is recommended, and who gives the obvious appearance of being dull, is taken from his home, at 10 o'clock at night, carried to a police station, makes the request to call his mother, and his mother does, in fact, call the police station, after he has made such requests, but he is not informed that she is on the phone, nor is he permitted to talk with her, when the mother is not informed of the nature of the charge, when the mother is not informed that the child is to be questioned, and who informs the police that she will arrive the next morning, and, then, he is taken to Easton, for what I would concede to be perfectly legitimately police investigation and police work, and according to the witness Cox, it was carried out in a routine and perfectly acceptable and laudatory manner, however, he was then placed alone in the basement of a headquarter's building, in a cell, without light, and there to remain until the following morning, when he is taken to an office, and sits in a chair for at least three hours, without even the offer of breakfast, without the offer of water, in effect, without food nor drink from dinner the night before until lunch the day following, and when he again requested the right to telephone a woman, with whom he had spent all of his formative years, from the age of seven or eight to the age of fourteen or fifteen, and he is again denied that right, and, as Mr. Fox says, in desperation then starts to call for the Sheriff or co-defendant, and is refused, then I suspect, that had he only been refused the right to call Clevon, I wouldn't be at all upset; but even them, I'm not sure but what, in his juvenile mind, Clevon would be such a person as to whom he could place confidence for advice under these trying circumstances. I believe that under all of those facts, that it will be very difficult for an appellate court to find that the confession is admissible. However, I do not honestly believe that under the procedure in Maryland, as of this day, I am at liberty to set aside the previous determination made by the Circuit Court on this issue. There has not been, in my opinion, deduced here any material change in the evidence that would justify this Court in taking the drastic action of setting aside the determination of Judge Mace.'

In looking at the propriety of the determination made at the suppression hearing, a word is in order about the scope of our review. The standard was well-articulated by the Supreme Court in Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741-742, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 1764, 16 L.Ed.2d 895:

'It is our...