State v. Hutchinson

• Decision Date: 16 December 1970
• Docket Number: No. 160,160
• Citation: 260 Md. 227,271 A.2d 641
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Frederick HUTCHINSON.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 227

260 Md. 227

271 A.2d 641

STATE of Maryland v. Frederick HUTCHINSON.

No. 160.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 16, 1970.

Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and Edward F. Borgerding, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief) for appellant.

E. Thomas Maxwell, Jr., Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before HAMMOND, C. J., and BARNES, FINAN, SINGLEY and SMITH, JJ.

FINAN, Judge.

We granted certiorari in this case to review the question of whether or not the trial judge, sitting as a jury, erred in preliminarily admitting into evidence, over objections, the inculpatory statement of the accused obtained during a custodial interrogation and taken in violation of Miranda guidelines. The trial judge subsequently rejected the statement at the close of trial and declared that he would completely disregard it in reaching a verdict. The accused was found guilty of first degree murder and rape, and sentenced to life imprisonment on both charges, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial because, in the opinion of the court, the 'mere knowledge of the substance of the confession by the trier of the facts necessarily tended to deprive appellant (accused and appellee here) of his constitutional right to a fair trial.'

The following facts are essential to an understanding of the issue as we view it:

On May 30, 1966, Judith Jones, a nine year old child was raped in her home in Baltimore City and died at the hospital shortly thereafter. The accused came into custody of the Provost Marshal's Office at Fort Lee, Virginia, on June 2, 1966, in connection with these offenses. Thereafter he was transported to Baltimore City where he remained in the Central Police Station lockup. After several days of sporadic custodial interrogation, he made a statement on June 5, 1966, implicating himself in the crimes for which he had been arrested. However, he immediately repudiated the statement in the presence of the Deputy State's Attorney, to whom the statement had been made. Nevertheless, he was indicted for both offenses on June 14, 1966, one day after Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.E.2d 694 was decided.

A motion to suppress any alleged statements made by the accused was filed on his behalf, and over a five month period numerous evidentiary hearings were held before Judge Meyer M. Cardin. On November 3, 1967, Judge Cardin ruled that the accused had waived his Miranda rights because he had indicated to the police that he did not want counsel to represent him. The Court of Special Appeals in this case used the following language in commenting on Judge Cardin's ruling 'Judge Cardin's ruling was reached despite the fact that appellant was never fully warned of the extent of his right to counsel, including the admonition that if he was indigent, a lawyer would be appointed to represent him. And it was reached in the face of our decision in Robinson v. State, 1 Md.App. 522, 231 A.2d 920, decided July 24, 1967, holding that it was prejudicial error to permit a pre-Miranda confession to be introduced in evidence over objection in a post-Miranda trial where the accused had not been advised of his right to counsel, if indigent.' Hutchinson v. State, 9 Md.App. 41, 262 A.2d 321 (1970).

The trial commenced on August 19, 1968, before Judge Harry A. Cole, without a jury. Judge Cole indicated that he was bound by the decision of Judge Cardin that the confession was voluntarily made and was therefore admissible and the State introduced extensive testimony in support of its introduction of the confession into evidence. Counsel for accused continually objected to the introduction of the confession and each objection was overruled on the grounds that the trial court was bound by the preliminary ruling. At the conclusion of the State's case, a motion for judgment of acquittal was denied on the grounds that the confession was properly in evidence and that the State had made out a primafacie case regarding its admissibility. Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480, 487, 174 A.2d 163 (1961). After the accused introduced evidence, rested and renewed his motions to suppress and for judgment of acquittal, the court stated that it found as a fact that the confession was unreliable, untrustworthy, and not the free and voluntary act of the accused because of police action during the interrogation which in its mind raised the suspicion of coercion, and other deficiencies with respect to the procedural guidelines of Miranda. The court stated that it was completely disregarding the confession in its consideration of the case. The taking of testimony was concluded on August 23, 1968. The court held the matter sub curia until September 18, 1968, a period of almost a month, before rendering its verdict finding the appellee guilty of murder and rape based on the circumstantial evidence in the case.

The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in an unanimous opinion written by Chief Judge Murphy, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The court said:

'Despite the fact that unlike Barnhart (5 Md.App. 222, 246 A.2d 280), Judge Cole was sitting without a jury, and expressly stated that he would not consider appellant's confession in determining guilt, we think the facts of this case are such that the mere knowledge of the substance of the confession by the trier of fact necessarily tended to deprive appellant of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Elementary fairness dictates that the State reap no benefit, however indirect it may appear, from the gross error it committed in placing such an obviously involuntary confession before the factfinder. A new trial at which the confession will not be admitted is, we think, imperatively mandated under the facts of this case.' 9 Md.App. at 46, 47, 262 A.2d at 325.

From a standpoint of jurisprudence we think the issue before us goes to the very marrow of the role, funcition, and capacity of the judge in our legal system.

The Court of Special Appeals, through its interpretation and application of dictum found in Barnhart v. State, 5 Md.App. 222, 226, 227, 246 A.2d 280 (1968) to the case at bar, equated the role of the judge solely with that of the jury as trier of facts to the complete exclusion of his role as the trial judge, whose function is also to pass upon the admissibility of evidence. Inherent in his capacity of trial judge is the dual role of not only trier of facts (judging the credibility and weight of the evidence) but also that of judge of the law of the case (passing upon the admissibility of evidence). Day v. State, 196 Md. 384, 399, 76 A.2d 729 (1950).

The Court of Special Appeals in its opinion in the instant case, Hutchinson, supra, further stated:

'In Barnhart v. State, 5 Md.App. 222, 226-227, 246 A.2d 280, we held that if a confession heard by a jury was later declared by the court to be inadmissible, and the jury admonished not to consider it as part of the evidence in the case, the jury's knowledge of the confession was nevertheless such as was apt to unduly influence its deliberations to the extent of depriving the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. * * *' 9 Md.App. at 46, 262 A.2d at 325.

Actually, this was not the holding in Barnhart, which dealt with the adequacy of the lower court's instruction to the jury on the voluntariness of the confession in light of statements which the trial judge had made concerning the admissibility of that confession. What the court in Hutchinson was referring to in Barnhart was dicta, in which Barnhart reviewed the prior dicta of this Court in Smith v. State, 189 Md. 596, 606, 56 A.2d 818 (1948), wherein our predecessors had quoted from Tooisgah v. United States, 137 F.2d 713, 716 (10th Cir. 1943). We do, however, agree that the above quotation from Hutchinson is a correct statement of the law as it applies to jury trials.

It is also interesting to note that in the Smith case, which the Court of Special Appeals cites in its opinion in the instant case, and which is cited and quoted in Barnhart, supra, the confession was admitted in evidence without any preliminary hearing on its admissibility held out of the presence of the jury. In the instant case, although a nonjury case, there had been a preliminary hearing on the admissibility of the evidence before a judge other than the trial judge.

The fact remains that in the instant case the Court of Special Appeals looked no further than to Judge Cole's role as a trier of facts and emphasized that, 'We think the facts of this case are such that the mere knowledge of the substance of the confession by the trier of fact necessarily tended to deprive appellant (accused) of his constitutional right to a fair trial. * * *' 9 Md.App. at 47, 262 A.2d at 325.

This assumption of the court might be valid were we to first, not believe the trial judge's statement that he was disregarding and eliminating from his deliberations the substance of the inadmissible confession, and secondly, choose to ignore the professional expertise, experience, and judicial temperament with which our legal system has inherently invested a trial judge vis a vis a jury comprised of...