Walker v. State, CR78-22
| Decision Date | 22 May 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. CR78-22,CR78-22,1 |
| Citation | 565 S.W.2d 605,263 Ark. 485 |
| Parties | Everett WALKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Seay & Bristow by Bill W. Bristow, Jonesboro, for appellant.
Bill Clinton, Atty. Gen., by Joyce Williams Warren, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
In 1970 the appellant pleaded guilty to four felony charges and received concurrent 15-year sentences, with 14 years suspended on condition of good behavior. In 1976 the prosecution filed a petition for revocation of the suspended sentences, asserting that Walker had been guilty of, and had been convicted of, various state and federal offenses, including 10 violations of federal firearm laws and the sale of counterfeit money. Walker was confined in a federal penitentiary when the revocation petition was filed. This appeal is from an order granting the petition. Three points for reversal are argued.
First, it is insisted that the entire proceeding should be dismissed because more than five years elapsed between the original suspension and the filing of the revocation petition. Two statutes are cited in support of this contention, but neither is applicable. First, it was provided by Act 438 of 1965, § 1, that periods of probation should not exceed five years. That limitation applied only to judgments granting probation, not to suspended sentences. Minick v. State, 256 Ark. 564, 509 S.W.2d 289 (1974). Second, the Criminal Code, effective January 1, 1976, contained a five-year limitation on both probation and suspended sentences. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1205 (Crim.Code 1976). The Code, however, does not apply to prior offenses, which are to be punished in accordance with preexisting law. § 41-102(3). Moreover, the Commentary to § 41-1205 pointed out that "present law" (citing the pre-Code statute) sets a five-year limit on probation, but the pronouncement of sentence "can now be suspended" for a period equal to the maximum term of imprisonment. Thus it is evident that the draftsmen of the Code were familiar with the existing law and did not make the Code provision retroactive.
Second, it is argued that the revocation petition should have been dismissed because of the State's delay in bringing the matter to trial. It is conceded, however, that the delay did not exceed that allowed by Rule 28 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (1976). We find nothing in the record to show that the actual delay amounted to a denial of due process. It is also suggested in the reply brief that the State did not act within the 180 days allowed by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Ark.Stat.Ann., Title 43, Ch. 32 (Repl. 1977). A sufficient answer to this suggestion is that no demand for trial was ever made in compliance with Article III(...
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Patterson v. State, CR
...demand for trial in compliance with Article III(a), there was no violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Walker v. State, 263 Ark. 485, 565 S.W.2d 605 (1978). Appellant is procedurally barred from his next point of appeal. In it he argues that the trial court erred in denying hi......
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Matthews v. State
...authorized to revoke the suspension at any time during the full five years, for good cause shown. We note the case of Walker v. State, 263 Ark. 485, 565 S.W.2d 605 (1978), and it is the closest case in point we have found in Arkansas. In Walker there was a 15-year sentence with 14 of it sus......
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Boone v. State, CR
...with wholly unrelated charges based on conduct other than for which the defendant is ultimately sentenced. See Walker v. State, 263 Ark. 485, 565 S.W.2d 605 (1978). Although we agree and the state concedes appellant should have received credit on his revoked suspended sentence for the 114 d......