Walker v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 14 March 1974
• Citation: 112 Cal.Rptr. 767,37 Cal.App.3d 938
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Norman WALKER, Jr., Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 43368.

Page 767

112 Cal.Rptr. 767

37 Cal.App.3d 938

Norman WALKER, Jr., Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 43368.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

March 14, 1974.

Richard S. Buckley, Public Defender of Los Angeles County, Harold E. Shabo, Stewart Rosen, and Michael Rothschild, Deputy Public Defenders, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Joseph P. Busch, Dist. Atty. of Los Angeles County, Harry B. Sondheim, Head, Appellate Div., and Daniel L. Bershin, Deputy Dist. Attys., for real party in interest.

KAUS, Presiding Justice.

Petitioner and defendant Norman Walker, Jr., was charged in one information with possession of a concealable firearm by an ex-felon (Count I, Pen.Code, § 12021) and armed robbery (Count II, Pen.Code, § 211). The information also alleged that defendant had been convicted of 'robbery and narcotics violations' on July 20, 1967, and June 25, 1968. After being held to answer at the preliminary hearing, defendant made a motion to sever the two counts; the motion was denied. This petition which we treat as praying for a writ of mandate followed. We stayed the trial and granted an alternative writ.

FACTS

On April 2, 1973, a robbery occurred at the Western Federal Savings and Loan Association in Inglewodd. The victims identified the robbers as three male Negroes with pistols and one rifle, all wearing knit caps. A cashier found an envelope near her cash drawer after the robbery; she had not seen the envelope before the robbery. One of the robbers, at the far side of the office, had had an envelope of 'some sort' over his face. There were seven fingerprints on the front of the envelope, five of which were identified as belonging to defendant. Another two fingerprints belonged to another, unidentified person.

On July 17--106 days after the robbery--defendant was arrested at an address where four other persons were also detained. These persons were in the living room; defendant was in the bedroom. A police officer saw a .38 caliber revolver in a jacket pocket in an open closet, apparently in the same room where defendant was arrested. When defendant was booked, he gave two addresses; one was the location where he was arrested.

DISCUSSION

Penal Code section 954 provides that an information 'may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, . . . under separate counts, . . . provided, that the court . . . in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different offenses . . . be tried separately. . . .'

Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant his motion to sever, first, because there is no connection between the robbery and the weapon charges, and second, even assuming some connection, joinder of the two counts will severely prejudice him.

The relevant factual and legal circumstances of the charged crimes are as follows; First, defendant was not identified by anyone as the robber; he was linked to the crime by the fingerprints picked off the envelope found in the bank. Second, the only evidence of weapons was that the robbers had 'pistols and one rifle . . ..' No further identification of the weapons is disclosed. Third, a .38 caliber revolver was discovered 106 days later when defendant was arrested. Fourth, when defendant was arrested, there were five people in the apartment; four in the living room, and defendant in the bedroom, where the weapon was apparently found. Fifth, proof of the illegal weapons possession charge requires proof that defendant is an ex-felon.

Joinder of different offenses is permissible 'even though they do not relate to the same transaction or event, if there is a common element of substantial importance in their commission, for the joinder prevents Repetition of evidence and saves time and expense to the state as well as to the defendant.' (People v. Scott, 24 Cal.2d 774, 778--779, 151 P.2d 517.) (Emphasis added.) If there can be no repetition because the evidence is not admissible on both counts, this rationale does not come into play. We agree with defendant that, though both offenses involve a handweapon, there is no 'common element,' where, as here, the handweapon used in each otherwise unrelated crime is not identified as being the same weapon used in both crimes, and any connection based on a class of weapons is attenuated by a considerable time difference in the commission of the crimes.

'Where an accusatory pleading charges separate offenses each involving the use of the same gun in their commission, the joinder has been held to be proper under section 954.' (People v. Pike, 58 Cal.2d 70, 84, 22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 672, 372 P.2d 656, 664; see also People v. Kemp, 55 Cal.2d 458, 475, 11 Cal.Rptr. 361, 359 P.2d 913; People v. Scott, Supra, 24 Cal.2d 774, 778--779, 151 P.2d 517; People v. Dugan, 254 Cal.App.2d 402, 404, 406, 62 Cal.Rptr. 185; People v. Walker, 112 Cal.App.2d 462, 471, 246 P.2d 1009; cf. People v. Stone, 155 Cal.App.2d 259, 269--270, 318 P.2d 25 (common element use of same automobile).)

The People rely on the rule stated in People v. Rinegold, 13 Cal.App.3d 711, 720, 92 Cal.Rptr. 12, 17, that if 'the specific type of weapon used to commit a homicide is not known any weapons found in the defendant's possession after the crime that could have been employed are admissible. There need be no conclusive demonstration the weapon in defendant's possession was the muder weapon.' (Italics omitted.)

We need not, however, decide whether this statement of the rule is too broad. (Cf. People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 577, 305 P.2d 1, 8, relied on in Rinegold ('. . . it May be permissible to admit into evidence . . .' (emphasis added)).) The issue in Rinegold was whether evidence that the defendant possessed a weapon the day before the charged crime was admissible. (13 Cal.App.3d at p. 720, 92 Cal.Rptr. 12.) Even if Rinegold can be interpreted to apply to a situation where the defendant possessed a weapon 106 days after the crime charged, Rinegold did not involve a joinder of...