Walker v. Walker

• Decision Date: 01 November 2013
• Docket Number: 2111239.
• Citation: 144 So.3d 359
• Parties: Sabrina Gail WALKER v. Steve Allen WALKER.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

144 So.3d 359

Sabrina Gail WALKER

v.Steve Allen WALKER.

2111239.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Nov. 1, 2013.

Ralph K. Strawn, Jr., of Henslee, Robertson, Strawn & Sullivan, L.L.C., Gadsden, for appellant.

Stephen Paul Bussman of Bussman & Guice, P.C., Fort Payne, for appellee.

DONALDSON, Judge.

Sabrina Gail Walker (“the wife”) appeals from a divorce judgment of the DeKalb Circuit Court (“the trial court”), entered pursuant to a purported agreement between the wife and Steve Allen Walker (“the husband”), and from the denial of the wife's postjudgment motion for a new trial or to alter, amend, vacate, or clarify the judgment. Because we hold that the parties failed to reach an enforceable agreement, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

The wife filed a complaint for a divorce on September 14, 2011. The husband filed an answer and a counterclaim for a divorce. The wife and the husband have a daughter (“the daughter”) who was 16 years old at the time the divorce proceedings were initiated. Both parties were represented by counsel throughout the proceedings.

A bench trial was scheduled to begin on April 26, 2012. On that date, following discussions between counsel for the parties before the beginning of the trial, counsel informed the trial court that the parties had reached a settlement on all issues. In open court and on the record, the husband's attorney announced the terms of the purported agreement in the presence of the husband, the wife, and the wife's attorney. The statement addressed the custody of the daughter, child support, alimony, property distribution, allocation of debt, and other topics. Pursuant to the proposed property distribution, the wife was to be awarded an automobile, a shop, most of the parties' household furnishings, and the marital residence, subject to the obligation of the wife to refinance the mortgage indebtedness on the residence within 60 days. The husband's attorney described the wife's obligation to refinance the mortgage as follows:

“The [wife] will be awarded the marital residence. There is some indebtedness owed to, I think, Regions Bank. She will refinance that within 60 days. And there is a shop on there, and the [husband] will have up to a year to remove [his belongings from] the shop.”

The husband was to be awarded a construction business, equipment, and real estate located in an area described as “Dug Out Valley.” The parties were to divide various personal effects. The husband was to execute a release absolving the wife of liability for her allegedly fraudulent conduct regarding a business. The wife was to forgive any debt the husband owed on the daughter's automobile.

Separate from the Dug Out Valley real estate, the parties jointly own 2 parcels of real estate, a 32–acre tract and a 1.5 acre tract on Sand Mountain (“the Sand Mountain properties”). Regarding the distribution of the Sand Mountain properties, the husband's attorney stated:

“[The husband] will be awarded the property that's in [Dug Out V]alley. The 32 acres and the one and a half acres that are on Sand Mountain—those two properties will ultimately go to their daughter, and [the wife's attorney] and I will work on the language to make that happen.”

In the postjudgment proceedings before the trial court and on appeal, the husband disputes the punctuation contained in the reporter's transcript on this issue. According to the husband, the court reporter, among other things, mistakenly inserted a period, instead of a comma, after the word “valley,” and, he asserts, the transcript should read as follows:

“[The husband] will be awarded the property that's in [Dug Out V]alley, the 32 acres, and the 1 and a half acres that are on Sand Mountain. Those two properties, the last two, will ultimately go to their daughter, and [the wife's attorney] and I will work on the language to make that happen.”

After the husband's attorney stated the terms of the purported agreement, the trial court questioned each party as follows:

“THE COURT: All right. [Husband], you have heard your attorney state the settlement for the record. Is that, in fact, your agreement?

“[HUSBAND]: Yes.

“THE COURT: [Wife], is that your agreement?

“[WIFE]: Yes.

“THE COURT: All right, well, the attorneys will prepare an order for me, and they will both, you know, make sure that it's correct and send it to me, and I'll sign it.”

The wife then testified under oath to establish the grounds for granting the divorce.

Following the proceedings in court on April 26, counsel for the parties began corresponding with each other regarding the language of the proposed written order that would be submitted to the trial court for adoption as the final judgment of divorce. The husband's attorney drafted a proposed written order that awarded title to the Sand Mountain properties to the husband. Paragraph 20 of that proposed order stated: “The [husband] cannot sell, transfer, or otherwise convey either tract to anyone other than the minor child. The [husband] may, however, encumber, mortgage, or otherwise pledge the two tracts as collateral as part of Steve Walker Construction.” The wife's attorney responded to that proposal with a letter that, among other things, took issue with paragraph 20 and stated: “[The wife] didn't agree that [the husband] could mortgage, pledge etc[.] the 32 acre tract and the 1 acre tract [presumably the Sand Mountain properties]. That is supposed to go to [the daughter] as soon as it is released from the current mortgage.” The husband's attorney replied with a facsimile that stated, in part: “I deleted the fourth and fifth sentence[s] in paragraph 20. There was never any mention that the property was going to [the daughter] as soon as it is released from the current mortgage. It was not stated in the court record.” The wife, through counsel, continued to object to the husband's proposed order awarding him title to the Sand Mountain properties, and she refused to sign proposed deeds that would transfer title to the Sand Mountain properties to the husband. The husband then filed a “Motion to Enforce Final Decree” with the trial court, and he attached a proposed order containing the following language:

“20. The [husband] shall be awarded the Dug Out Valley properties, the one (1) acre tract, and the 32 acre tract. The [wife] shall execute whatever documents are necessary to effectuate same. The parties daughter, [C.M.W.], shall ultimately receive the one (1) acre tract and the 32 acre tract.”

On June 25, 2012, the trial court held a hearing on the husband's motion to enforce. During the hearing, the husband testified that his understanding of the settlement agreement announced in court on the date of the trial was that he was to be awarded the Sand Mountain properties and that they were to be titled in his name only. He agreed that the intention of both parties was that the daughter would ultimately receive the Sand Mountain properties, but he testified that the transfer would occur only “when [he] thought it was time for her to have [them].” Under cross-examination, the husband testified that his understanding of the agreement was that the daughter would receive the Sand Mountain properties when she reached an unspecified “appropriate” age. He testified that he intended for “her to have [the Sand Mountain properties] when she's of age and can take [them]. I don't want [the wife] having nothing to do with it.” He admitted to having extracted topsoil from the Sand Mountain properties following the announcement of the agreement on April 26.

The wife retained a new attorney before the hearing on the motion to enforce, and the attorney who had represented the wife during the settlement negotiations testified for the wife at the hearing. The attorney testified that his understanding of the parties' settlement agreement was that the parties had intended for the daughter to receive the Sand Mountain properties upon the refinancing of the mortgage on the marital residence, i.e., when the husband was released from the mortgage indebtedness. The attorney testified that the wife had not agreed to transfer title to the Sand Mountain properties to the husband at any time and that during the negotiations the parties had not discussed deferring the transfer to the daughter for a number of years or allowing the husband to use the land for extracting topsoil. He testified that the term “ultimately,” which qualified the transfer to the daughter in the purported agreement announced on April 26, was not otherwise defined by the parties in their negotiations.

The wife testified that her understanding of the settlement agreement was that the conveyance to the daughter would not be immediate because she needed to refinance the mortgage on the marital residence first. Her understanding was that the daughter would receive the Sand Mountain properties as soon as the refinancing of the marital residence occurred. The wife stated that she did not agree, and would not have agreed, to award the husband unencumbered real property (the Sand Mountain properties) while she received the marital residence encumbered with a refinanced mortgage. She also claimed that during the negotiations she had been under duress and heightened anxiety caused by a lack of medication and by allegations of fraud and embezzlement lodged against her by the husband.

On July 10, 2012, the trial court entered an order granting the husband's motion to enforce, concluding that the parties had reached a binding, enforceable agreement at the April 26, 2012, hearing and that the proposed written order submitted by the husband “accurately sets out the agreement of the parties as stated on the record on April 26, 2012.” The trial court entered the proposed order submitted by the husband as its final judgment.

On August 9, 2012, the wife filed a motion for a new trial or to alter, amend, vacate, or clarify the judgment. The trial court subsequently denied the motion, and...