Walker v. Walker
| Decision Date | 10 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | 2140610. |
| Citation | 216 So.3d 1262 |
| Parties | Sabrina Gail WALKER v. Steve Allen WALKER. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
Alabama Supreme Court 1151013.
Ralph K. Strawn, Jr., of Strawn & Robertson, LLC, Gadsden, for appellant.
Stephen B. Bussman and Stanna Crowe Guice of Bussman & Guice, PC, Fort Payne, for appellee.
On Rehearing Ex Mero Motu
This court's opinion of May 6, 2016, is withdrawn, and the following is substituted therefor.
This case is before this court for the second time on appeal. In the first appeal, we reversed the judgment of the DeKalb Circuit Court ("the trial court") divorcing Sabrina Gail Walker ("the wife") and Steve Allen Walker ("the husband") because the judgment had incorporated an unenforceable, purported settlement agreement between the parties, and we remanded the cause for further proceedings. Walker v. Walker, 144 So.3d 359 (Ala.Civ.App.2013). On remand, the trial court entered a divorce judgment after conducting a trial on all the issues. The wife appealed. In this second appeal, the wife fails to demonstrate any ground requiring reversal of the divorce judgment. We therefore affirm the divorce judgment.
The wife and the husband were married in 1994. Before the marriage, the wife owned what would become the marital residence on Sand Mountain and the husband owned 5.9 acres of land with a house and other land used as a trailer park in an area described as "Dug Out Valley." Those properties became jointly owned by the parties after the marriage. During the marriage, the parties purchased 32 acres of land and another 1 acre of land on Sand Mountain ("the Sand Mountain properties").1 The parties have a daughter ("the daughter") who was 16 years old when the divorce proceedings commenced.
On September 14, 2011, the wife filed a complaint for a divorce. The husband filed an answer and a counterclaim for a divorce. The parties purportedly reached a settlement agreement; however, the wife refused to sign or approve the written settlement agreement prepared by the husband's attorney, and the husband eventually filed a motion to enforce that agreement. On July 10, 2012, the trial court entered a divorce judgment, which incorporated the purported settlement agreement prepared by the husband's attorney. Walker, 144 So.3d at 363. The judgment placed sole physical custody of the daughter with the wife and ordered the husband to pay $400 a month in child support. The trial court ordered the husband to pay the wife $600 a month for 24 months as alimony in gross. In accordance with the purported settlement agreement prepared by the husband's attorney, the judgment divided the marital property as follows:
The wife appealed to this court. See Walker, supra. We held that a meeting of the minds between the parties never occurred regarding the timing and the manner of conveyance of the Sand Mountain properties to the daughter. 144 So.3d at 365–66. Because, we held, the parties had only agreed to agree on that issue, we reversed the judgment. Id. We remanded the cause for a trial on all issues because of the interrelatedness of the provisions in the judgment regarding property division and alimony. 144 So.3d at 366.
On January 5, 2015, on remand, the trial court conducted a trial on all the issues. Testimony showed that, during the marriage, the husband owned a contracting business with his business partner, Ed Houstan. Their business involved using heavy construction equipment. They had one full-time employee, and they hired temporary workers as needed for projects. According to the wife's testimony, the husband had also during the marriage purchased all of Houstan's interest in the business. The wife testified that she and the husband had compiled a statement of assets in 2007 ("the 2007 statement"), when the husband was the sole owner of the business, and that she had prepared the 2007 statement with the husband in conjunction with an application for a loan. Referring to the 2007 statement, the wife testified to the following values of equipment that, according to her, the husband still used in his business: a Freightliner truck ($10,000), a Mack truck ($80,000), a Peterbilt dump truck ($50,000), a Case backhoe ($27,000), a Cat trackhoe ($38,000), a Track loader ($7,000), a Case "dozer" ($34,000), a portable trailer ($1,300), and a Chevrolet Silverado truck ($17,000).
Both parties testified that the Chevrolet Silverado was damaged beyond repair in an automobile accident. The husband testified that he no longer owned the Freightliner truck and that he never owned a Track loader. He testified that he owed Danny Wagner $41,000 and that, pursuant to a business arrangement, he was allowed to use the following equipment while Wagner held a bill of sale on them: the Case backhoe, the Cat trackhoe, and the Case dozer. The husband testified to the following values for that equipment: the Case backhoe ($18,000), the Cat trackhoe ($7,000), and the Case dozer ($12,000). He testified to the current value of the equipment he still owns: the Mack truck ($25,000), the Peterbilt dump truck ($20,000), and the portable trailer ($1,000 to $1,300). The husband testified that he owed $30,000 in the principal amount of a bank loan for the business. Houstan testified that the husband still owes him $35,000 and that business in the construction industry had been slow since 2008. The husband reported on his tax return in 2012 an adjusted gross income of $5,802 and a profit from the construction business of $6,037.
Both parties testified that the wife had deceived the husband in financial matters. The husband testified that, early in their marriage, the wife had incurred thousands of dollars in debt with credit cards despite an agreement that they would not have credit cards. The wife testified that, even after the husband found out about her credit-card debts and those debts were paid, she continued to incur thousands more in credit-card debt. The wife testified that she manipulated their checkbook register and cut and pasted bank statements so that certain bills, such as bills for dentist visits for their daughter, appeared to be completely paid when they were not. The husband testified that $38,000 was missing from their checking account when they separated. The husband testified that they had had to continuously obtain new loans to pay for the financial problems caused by the wife.
The wife testified that, early in the marriage, the marital residence had a mortgage balance of $46,000. The parties refinanced the mortgage to increase the balance to $150,000, which the wife testified funded the purchase of Houstan's business interest and payment on a small note owed by the husband. A few years later, the parties refinanced the mortgage again in the amount of $155,000. Testimony showed that, in 2008, there was a principal amount of $134,000 owed on the mortgage encumbering the marital residence and $14,000 on a mortgage encumbering the Dug Out Valley properties when the parties obtained refinancing in the amount of $155,000. The new loan was to be used to pay for both mortgages. The wife handled the loan closing for the refinancing while working for a law firm. The wife altered the documentation so that the proceeds from the new loan paid for the mortgage on the marital residence but the mortgage on the Dug Out Valley properties remained outstanding. In 2009, the husband discovered that the mortgage on the Dug Out Valley properties was outstanding, and he paid that mortgage debt.
The wife testified that she neither spent any of the missing money on luxury items nor kept the money hidden anywhere. The wife testified that her reasons for seeking a divorce on the ground of incompatibility included the husband's temper tantrums, his control over all finances, and their fights over money. She testified that the husband had had an affair in 2002 or 2003. She testified that their last fight before the separation was over the checking account. The husband testified that the wife was at fault for the divorce because of her financial mismanagement.
At the time of the trial, the wife was 51 years old and the husband was 54 years old. The wife testified that she had a high-school diploma and had attended college for several semesters. She testified to having experience working as a secretary, a legal assistant, a substitute teacher, and a rental-property manager. At the time of the trial, she was working sporadically at an automobile auction. The wife testified that she had submitted resumes to employers but that she had been unable to find full-time employment. She testified that she was living with her parents and was receiving food stamps.
The parties provided differing valuations regarding the Dug Out Valley properties and the Sand Mountain properties. Referring to the 2007 statement, the wife testified that...
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