Walker v. Walker, 6514
| Decision Date | 18 May 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 6514,6514 |
| Citation | 231 S.W.2d 905 |
| Parties | WALKER v. WALKER. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Hatchell, Storey, Hatchell & Rainey, and Harvey P. Shead, all of Longview, for appellant.
D. S. Meredith, Jr., Longview, Mike Anglin, Ballinger, for appellee.
This suit filed by appellee, Mrs. Virginia Walker, resulted in the dissolution of the marriage existing between her and appellant, H. L. Walker, the award to her of the custody of their three children, ages 11, 6 and 5, and the adjudication of property rights, Under the points presented, appellant attacks the division of the property rights, no complaint being urged to he dissolution of the marriage.
With the exception of the homestead of litigants, situated on Arkansas Street, in Longview, Texas, owned by appellant prior to marriage which was awarded to him as his separate estate, and not here involved, all the remaining properties, real, personal or mixed involved in this litigation were acquired by plaintiff and defendant after their marriage with community funds, and as further found by the trial court to which there is no controversy, the properties were not acquired by either of them by means out of any separate estate or by gift, devise or descent. This property so acquired during the marriage consisted of two rent houses in Longview, Texas, with the furniture therein; a duplex in Marshall with a lien outstanding to secure the balance due on the purchase price; a promissory note for $10,000 secured by a lien on a packing plant situated in Florida; a store building and various lots in and around Sarasota, Florida; improvements made on the homestead out of community funds; moneys and bank stock; cash value of life insurance policies; motor vehicles; a note secured by lien on a diamond ring; and other items of personalty.
The judgment sets out, as found by the court, that the $10,000 note secured by a mortgage on a packing plant in Florida, held by and payable to appellant, was of the value of $10,000; that the store building and some thirty-five vacant lots situated in and around Sarasota, Florida, and legal record title of which was in appellant were of the value of $12,500. The judgment further recites the value of each of the other items of realty, each item of personalty, and the aggregate respective values of the realty and the personalty. Premised on above values the court decreed that H. L. Walker, the husband, 'shall take as his separate estate out of the division of their community estate' the $10,000 note secured by the lien on the packing plant, the life insurance policies, the moneys on deposit, motor vehicles and other personal property, all of which are therein described; and that Virginia Walker, the wife, 'shall take as her separate estate out of the division of their community estate' the two rent houses in Longview, Texas, with the furniture therein, the duplex in Marshall, Texas, and certain other items of personal property as specified in the judgment. After allowing for the community indebtedness of $4,575.58 which was charged to appellant, the court found that the value of the properties awarded to her was $6,061.55 less than the value of the properties and equities decreed to him and awarded her a judgment over and against him for this latter amount.
Appellant asserts that in the division of the community property the trial court 'took into consideration the property owned by H. L. Walker, the husband, in the State of Florida, both real and personal and in making such division attempted to set aside to the wife property in Texas that would equal in value a one-half interest in the Florida realty, when as a matter of law the wife has no interest in the Florida property real or personal which had been accumulated during the marriage of the parties.' Associated with above is the further contention that 'it was error for the trial court to divest title out of him of his interest or any part of his interest, or to divest either litigant of title to the real estate, it being community property.'
The decree makes no attempt to divest title to the Florida realty out of the husband. The legal record title still remains in him. Title in him to the $10,000 note remains unimpaired. The trial court did take into consideration the value of community funds that the husband carried out of Texas and invested same in realty in Florida, a common-law state where the community interests of a wife are not recognized. It is to be pointed out that during the acquisition of above funds and the other properties involved in the community estate here, plaintiff and defendant were and still are resident citizens of Gregg County, Texas. With a single exception to be discussed later, appellant does not attack the court's finding of value of any item; the aggregate value of the community estate; or any calculation that is recited in the judgment.
Under the general equitable powers inherent in the District Court and the provisions of art. 4638, R.C.S. of Texas, the trial court in order to effect a fair, just and equitable division of the whole of the community estate was clother with the power and authority to take into consideration the value of the community funds so invested in the Florida realty in a foreign jurisdiction and to charge the husband with one-half of the value of such funds in the allocation as here to the wife of...
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In re Finch
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