Walker v. Williams

• Decision Date: 12 November 1964
• Citation: 19 McCanless 195,384 S.W.2d 447,215 Tenn. 195
• Parties: , 215 Tenn. 195 D. E. WALKER, Administrator of the Estate of Katherine Walker, Deceased, v. Russell S. WILLIAMS and wife, Maude V. Williams.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 447

384 S.W.2d 447

19 McCanless 195, 215 Tenn. 195

D. E. WALKER, Administrator of the Estate of Katherine Walker, Deceased, v. Russell S. WILLIAMS and wife, Maude V. Williams.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Nov. 12, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 1964.

H. H. Gearinger, Chattanooga, of counsel, Moore, Gearinger & Swafford, Chattanooga, for petitioner.

Noone, Moseley & Bell, Chattanooga, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

We granted certiorari, heard argument and carefully considered the very comprehensive briefs and supplemental briefs filed by both parties. No question of fact or law, which was not presented to the Court of Appeals, is presented to us. Our conclusion, after hearing argument and studying the record, is that the Court of Appeals has fully answered all the questions presented and correctly decided the case. What they say makes sense to us. To rewrite the opinion on the same assignments would serve no useful purpose and we, therefore, adopt the opinion of the Court of Appeals as prepared for that court by Judge Robert Cooper, which is:

'This appeal is from the action of the trial judge in directing a verdict for the defendants, Russell S. Williams and wife Maude V. Williams, in a suit for damages for personal injuries sustained by Mrs. Katherine Walker in a fall on the premises of the defendants.

'Katherine Walker was the mother of the defendant, Maude V. Williams. Mrs. Walker maintained her own home, but often visited in the homes of her several children on week-ends. On the week-end of October 7, 1961, Mrs. Walker accepted the defendants' invitation to visit in their home. While there, Mrs. Walker left the kitchen to enter the garage, and fell.

'In her declaration, Mrs. Walker alleged that on prior visits, she had observed that the regulator on the kitchen screen door was so adjusted that it required the use of considerable force to open the door; that on the date of her accident, she pushed hard against the screen door, unexpectedly met with no resistance, and was thrown off balance and fell to the floor of the garage, which was two steps below the level of the kitchen floor. Mrs. Walker specifically charged that the defendants were negligent in failing to warn her that the regulator on the screen door was broken.

'Prior to trial, Mrs. Walker died from causes other than the injuries received in the fall, and the cause of action was revived in the name of the present plaintiff, D. E. Walker as Administrator of Mrs. Walker's estate.

'As the result of Mrs. Walker's death, plaintiff found it necessary to call the defendants as his witnesses. Both defendants testified that on Mrs. Walker's prior visits to their home, the last of which was some 4 or 5 months before the accident, the kitchen screen door had ordinary spring type hinges which placed as much tension on the door 'as the ordinary door would have', and which closed the door automatically. Mrs. Williams described the tension on the screen door as 'giving the feeling of support' when you pushed against the door.

'The defendants further testified that the springs on the screen door were broken some three weeks before Mrs. Walker's accident, and had not been repaired; that the absence of the springs permitted the screen door to open under little or no pressure, but that they had not thought to so warn Mrs. Walker.

'Mrs. Williams testified that she saw her mother fall and described the incident as follows:

"We had just had our dinner and I was cleaning away the dishes and I had a few things that I wanted to throw out and I went outside into the garage to get a paper to put it in and so I told her I would be back in a few minurtes.

"So I went out. I wasn't gone but just a minute and I turned around to come back and she was coming out the door and when she--when she started out she put--she had her right hand on the door facing and her left hand on the screen and she, when I turned around she was coming out in that direction and she just came right out and fell flat on her back onto the concrete floor.'

'At the close of plaintiff's proof, the trial court directed a verdict for the defendants on the ground that Mrs. Walker, as a social guest, was merely a 'gratuitous licensee', and that the plaintiff had not alleged nor proven that Mrs. Walker's injuries resulted from any willful or wanton act of negligence on the part of the defendants.

'Plaintiff noved for a new trial contending that the trial court erred in holding that 'Katherine Walker was a gratuitous licensee and not an invitee in the premises of the defendants when she suffered injury, which was the substance of this suit.' When the motion was overruled, plaintiff appealed.

'As pointed out by counsel, there is no reported decision of an appellate court in this State passing upon the status of a social guest. However, the universal rule seems to be that a social guest is a mere licensee. In an exhaustive note in 25 A.L.R.2d 598, 600, the author says:

"The terminology of status (that is, the classification into invitees, licensees, and trespassers) used in classifying the liability of an owner, possessor, or occupant of land to one injured while on the land due to defects therein has caused some difficulty in discussing the issue of liability to a social guest in a home who is injured by the defective condition of the property, since, while such a guest is clearly on the property as the result of an 'invitation' in the layman's sense of that word, the authorities have universally agreed that he should not be entitled to the same degree of care for his safety as one who is on the property of another as what is sometimes called a 'business invitee', that is, for the purpose of conferring some benefit other than purely social.

"Despite the express or implied invitation upon which the social guest relies in coming to his host's premises, the courts have concurred in classifying him as a 'licensee' of some sort * * *'

'In 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, Sec. 117, p. 778, it is stated that:

"* * * The rule appears to be that the relation between host and guest is not that of invitor and invitee, but that of licensor and licensee, * * * No exception is made to the rule because of the fact that the guest enters on the host's express invitation to enjoy his hospitality. It is said that the owner or occupant must have a beneficial interest in a visit in order to impose upon him the duty of using reasonable care in having the premises in a safe condition for the visitor, and that the intangible advantages which arise from mere social contacts do not comprise such an interest. A better reason for the rule is that a host merely offers his premises for enjoyment by his guests with the same security that the host and the members of his family who reside with him have.'

'The American Law Institute Restatement of Torts, Section 331, defines a 'gratuitous licensee' as any licensee other than a business visitor and in the comments on Section 331 it is said that the phrase 'gratuitous licensee' includes 'social guests who, in a sense, are persons temporarily adopted into the possessor's family * * *'

'In 65 C.J.S., Negligence, Section 32b, p. 487, it is stated:

"A 'gratuitous licensee,' or as sometimes called a 'permissive licensee,' is any licensee other than a business visitor, and includes a social guest;'

and in Sec. 32e, p. 489:

"It has been held that one who comes on premises by express invitation for purely social purposes to enjoy hospitality as a guest of the owner or occupant or a guest who enters merely to receive a gratuitous favor from the owner of occupant, has the rights only of a licensee.'

'In addition there are a number of decisions by courts of other jurisdictions reaching the conclusion that where a guest is invited to come upon the premises of the host the relationship created is not that of invitee and invitor in a business sense, but that the guest is a gratuitous licensee. See Comeau v. Comeau, 285 Mass. 578, 189 N.E. 588, 92 A.L.R. 1002; Greenfield v. Miller, 173...