Wall v. Currie

• Decision Date: 06 October 1948
• Docket Number: No. A-1730.,A-1730.
• Parties: WALL et al. v. CURRIE.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

213 S.W.2d 816

WALL et al. v. CURRIE.

No. A-1730.

Supreme Court of Texas.

October 6, 1948.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Fifth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by Ralph W. Currie against R. P. (Dick) Wall and others for an injunction against interference with plaintiff's discharge of his duties as chairman of the Dallas County Executive Committee of the Republican Party. A judgment of dismissal was reversed and the cause remanded by the Court of Civil Appeals, 211 S.W. 2d 964, and defendants bring error.

Judgment of Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and that of trial court affirmed.

Irion & Cain and M. R. Irion, all of Dallas, for petitioners.

Alvin H. Lane, Runge, Lane & Savage, Webster Atwell, Chas. S. McCombs, George Seargent, W. O. Reed, J. C. Muse, Jr., Robert G. Payne, Charles D. Turner, Max R. Rosenfield and E. E. Berwald, all of Dallas, for respondent.

TAYLOR, Justice.

Plaintiff, Ralph W. Currie, instituted this suit for injunctive relief against the several defendants, R. P. (Dick) Wall, et al., seeking to prevent interference with him in the discharge of his duties as Chairman of the Dallas County Executive Committee of the Republican Party. Plaintiff's allegations were to the effect that he had been duly elected, had qualified, and was acting as such chairman in accordance with the statutes and law of Texas and the established party practice of the Republican Party of the state. He alleged that notwithstanding he was and is in possession of said office and acting in the discharge of its duties, the defendant, R. P. (Dick) Wall, on or about July 15, 1947, arbitrarily, unlawfully, and without justification or legal reason, proclaimed himself to be the Chairman of the Dallas County Republican Executive Committee, and shortly thereafter began to attempt to exercise certain functions of that office and has subsequently continued to do so in derogation of plaintiff's rights and privileges, to his damage.

Plaintiff also alleged that one of the defendants, George C. Hopkins, Sr., Chairman of the Republican State Executive Committee, instructed another of the defendants, Helen Ackenhausen, Secretary of the Republican State Executive Committee, to remove plaintiff's name from the list of county chairmen and to substitute therefor the name of defendant Wall; and further, that these defendants were actively aiding and abetting Wall in his efforts as detailed above, thus hindering plaintiff in the performance of his duties as county chairman; and that such action was casting a cloud upon the validity of acts done by him in the discharge of his official duties and would continue so to do unless defendants were compelled to recognize him as county chairman and were restrained from interfering with him in the performance of his duties; and finally, that plaintiff had no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.

Plaintiff prayed that upon final hearing he be declared the duly elected and acting Chairman of the Dallas County Republican Executive Committee and that defendant Wall be restrained from further efforts to act as such official; that the other defendants be compelled to restore plaintiff's name to the list of Republican county chairmen of the state and accord him the same treatment they are required by law and party practice to accord all other county chairmen, specifying particularly the official recognition prayed to be accorded.

It is unnecessary, in view of the stipulation of the parties made in open court and the special plea presented in connection therewith by defendant, to state the averments of their defensive pleadings directed to the merits of the case.

The stipulation referred to is to the effect that the Republican candidate for Governor of the State received more than 10,000 and less than 200,000 votes. The special plea presented in connection with the stipulation suggested that it clearly appeared on the face of plaintiff's first amended original petition filed Nov. 6, 1947, and from other pleadings filed, that the case embraced only controversies within a political party, and that there was no controlling statute applicable and no clear legal right involved; and that for this reason the court was without jurisdiction to try the case and that it should be dismissed. There was no hearing on the merits of the case, the trial court having concluded, in advance of such hearing, that the court had no jurisdiction of the alleged cause. Judgment of dismissal was accordingly rendered. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for trial on the merits, one justice dissenting. 211 S.W.2d 964.

Writ of error was granted on Wall's third point alleging that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding the office of Chairman of the Dallas County Republican Executive Committee to be an office provided for by statute. We adhere upon full consideration of the case to the tentative view expressed in granting the writ.

We find no more applicable pronouncement of the law than the following which is found at the outset of the dissenting opinion: "Except to the extent that jurisdiction is conferred by statute or that the subject has been regulated by statute, the courts have no power to interfere with the judgments of the constituted authorities of established political parties in matters involving party government and discipline, to determine disputes within a political party as to the regularity of the election of its executive officers, or their removal, or to determine contests for the position of party committeemen or convention delegates." 29 C.J.S., Elections, § 88, pp. 121-122.

The following cases establish the law in this state in accordance with the foregoing statement. Gilmore v. Waples, 108 Tex. 167, 188 S.W. 1037; Pulliam v. Trawalter, Tex.Civ.App., 120 S.W.2d 108; Couch v. Hill, Tex.Civ.App., 10 S.W.2d 170 (dismissed). To the same effect are Winn v. Wooten, 196 Ark. 737, 119 S.W.2d 540; Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 355 Pa. 493, 50 A.2d 496, 169 A.L.R. 1281; State v. Kanawha County, 78 W.Va. 168, 88 S.E. 662, 20 A.L.R. 1035; 18 Am.Jur. p. 273.

The office of chairman of a Republican county executive committee is not regulated by statute, nor is jurisdiction over such office otherwise conferred by statute. The only Texas statute providing for county executive committees of political parties is one under the terms of which the party is required by that law to hold primary elections for the nomination of its candidates. Art. 3118, R.C.S. It provides in this connection the following: "There shall be for each political party required by this law to hold primary elections for nomination of its candidates, a county executive...