Wall v. Stinson

• Decision Date: 23 July 1999
• Docket Number: No. S-7667.,S-7667.
• Citation: 983 P.2d 736
• Parties: Robert B. WALL, Appellant, v. Linda E. STINSON, f/k/a LINDA E. WALL, Appellee.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

983 P.2d 736

Robert B. WALL, Appellant, v. Linda E. STINSON, f/k/a LINDA E. WALL, Appellee.

No. S-7667.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

July 23, 1999.

Jeri D. Byers, Law Office of Jeri D. Byers, and Albert Maffei, Law Offices of Maffei, Inc., Anchorage, for Appellant.

Diane L. Wendlandt, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Bruce M. Botelho, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee.

Before MATTHEWS, Chief Justice, COMPTON, EASTAUGH, FABE, and BRYNER, Justices.

OPINION

BRYNER, Justice.

We grant full faith and credit to another state's judgment only if the issuing court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject in controversy. But when jurisdiction has been fully litigated in the issuing court, we must credit that court's jurisdictional decision. Alaskan Robert B. Wall appeared in court in Oregon and contested Oregon's jurisdiction over his person and over the subject matter of his child support action. The court decided that it had jurisdiction and entered a child support judgment against Wall. Wall abandoned his appeal. He later attacked the Oregon judgment in Alaska on jurisdictional grounds. We hold that Oregon's decision on jurisdiction is binding and bars Wall's attack.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In December 1980, Robert and Linda Wall (now Linda Stinson) were married in Oregon. Their first child, Robert, was born there in January 1981. In 1982, Wall moved to Alaska, and, the following year, Stinson and Robert joined him. In 1985, the couple had their second child, Randall. Stinson returned temporarily to Oregon for Randall's birth. In 1987, Stinson returned to Oregon permanently, taking the children without Wall's knowledge or consent.

A. 1988 Oregon Support and Custody Order

Stinson filed for separation in Oregon shortly after arriving. The Oregon court determined that it had jurisdiction to enter a separation order and a temporary order for custody and support. Just after receiving notice of the separation proceedings, Wall filed for divorce in Alaska. Wall argued in the Alaska proceeding that, under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),¹ Alaska rather than Oregon had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the child custody issues. The court in Alaska initially disagreed, determining that Oregon had jurisdiction. Wall also participated through counsel in the Oregon proceedings; he repeatedly but unsuccessfully litigated the issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Stinson eventually converted the separation proceeding into a dissolution proceeding. In 1988, the Oregon court dissolved the marriage and awarded Stinson custody and child support. Wall began to prosecute an appeal in Oregon, but later abandoned it.

B. 1989 Alaska Support and Custody Order

Once Oregon entered its Decree of Unlimited Separation, the Alaska court revisited its determination that Oregon had jurisdiction. On reconsideration, it determined that Oregon lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the child custody issues. In 1989, it entered its own divorce, property settlement, child custody, and child support decree, awarding custody and support to Wall. Apparently, neither Stinson nor the children participated in the Alaska proceedings.

C. 1993 Alaska Order

The Alaska support order made Wall's entitlement to support dependent on his taking physical custody of the children. But Wall never took physical custody of the children. In fact, Stinson has retained physical custody of the children for over ten years. In 1993, the Alaska Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) registered the Oregon order in Alaska—the first step toward judicial enforcement. Wall objected to the registration and moved that it be vacated. He argued, among other things, that Oregon's support order was unenforceable because, in 1988, Alaska had determined that Oregon lacked jurisdiction under the PKPA. CSED did not oppose Wall's objection; the superior court vacated the registration, noting CSED's non-opposition.

D. 1996 Alaska Court Order Clarifying the 1989 Order

CSED nevertheless enforced the Oregon child support order administratively. Wall, through counsel, objected to the administrative enforcement. In response to Wall's objection, CSED, in 1996, requested that the superior court clarify its 1989 support and custody order, which had declared the Oregon judgment unenforceable under the PKPA as to the subject of custody. Although CSED conceded that the Oregon custody order was unenforceable under the PKPA as to the subject of custody, it argued that the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA)² required enforcement of the Oregon judgment's child support provisions.

The superior court agreed with CSED that jurisdiction for child custody and jurisdiction for child support are distinct. It concluded that, although Oregon lacked jurisdiction under the PKPA to make a child custody determination—the precise issue previously litigated in the 1988 Alaska proceeding—Oregon did have jurisdiction under the FFCCSOA to enter a support order. The court thus found the Oregon support order enforceable. Wall appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Wall raises two narrow issues. First, he argues that CSED is barred from relitigating the validity of the Oregon child support order. He contends that the 1993 Alaska order vacating CSED's registration of the Oregon order amounts to a final adjudication establishing that the Oregon support order is unenforceable.³ Second, he collaterally attacks the Oregon order, maintaining that it is not entitled to full faith and credit because Oregon lacked personal jurisdiction over him and subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of child support.

For the reasons below, we hold that the 1993 Alaska order did not finally adjudicate the validity of Oregon's order and that Wall may not today collaterally attack Oregon's order for want of jurisdiction.

A. Standard of Review

Whether Oregon's child support order is entitled to enforcement under the FFCCSOA⁴ turns on the interpretation of federal and state law. Statutory interpretation is a question of law to which we apply our independent judgment.⁵ Normally when considering questions of law, we are "not bound by the lower court's decision" and will "adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy."⁶ Whether collateral estoppel applies in a particular situation is also a legal question subject to our independent consideration.⁷

B. The 1993 Alaska Superior Court Order Vacating Registration of the Oregon Support Order Did Not Finally Adjudicate the Validity of Oregon's Order.

Wall argues that the 1993 Alaska court order vacating the registration of the Oregon support order determined the invalidity of that order and that, consequently, res judicata or collateral estoppel precludes CSED from any further attempt to enforce the support order.

CSED counters that the 1993 order vacating its registration of the Oregon support order did not rule on the order's validity. According to CSED, the order vacating registration was entered only because CSED did not oppose Wall's motion to vacate. CSED explains that, because it believed that it was entitled to enforce the Oregon order without court approval through administrative action, it had no incentive to oppose Wall's motion to vacate the registration, which would have been necessary only if CSED pursued judicial enforcement. CSED maintains that, under these circumstances, collateral estoppel is inapplicable because the validity of the Oregon order was never actually litigated or necessarily decided. CSED further maintains that it would be unfair and inappropriate to preclude relitigation of the matter, since it would not be in the best interests of the children to do so.

In contending that CSED is barred from relitigating the validity of Oregon's support order, Wall mentions both res judicata and collateral estoppel. But he appears to concede that res judicata is inapplicable and devotes his entire argument to collateral estoppel. Thus, we need only consider whether collateral estoppel applies.⁸ The doctrine of collateral estoppel "bars relitigation, even in an action on a different claim, of all `issues of fact or law that were actually litigated and necessarily decided' in [a] prior proceeding."⁹ Collateral estoppel precludes relitigating an issue in a second action only if the issue was actually and finally decided in the first action:

1) The plea of collateral estoppel must be asserted against a party or one in privity with a party to the first action;

2) [t]he issue to be precluded from relitigation by operation of the doctrine must be identical to that decided in the first action;

3) [t]he issue in the first action must have been resolved by a final judgment on the merits.¹⁰

The weight of authority supports the conclusion that default judgments should not be given any issue-preclusive effect, because they do not entail a full and actual litigation of the underlying factual issues.¹¹ We agree.

Wall relies on Rapoport v. Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Company¹² for the proposition that a default judgment can support collateral estoppel. But Rapoport is distinguishable. In that case, two related superior court cases were pending; Rapoport defaulted on both.¹³ He moved to set aside the default judgment in the first case under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b), arguing excusable neglect.¹⁴ He essentially contended that he had been too sick to realize that he was being sued.¹⁵ The court denied his Rule 60(b) motion.¹⁶ Rapoport then moved to set aside the default judgment in the second case, raising the same excusable neglect argument.¹⁷ The second court held that collateral estoppel barred him from litigating the issue of excusable neglect that he had already raised and lost in his first Rule 60(b) motion.¹⁸ Thus, it was not the underlying default judgment that supported collateral estoppel in Rapoport. Rather, collateral estoppel was found to apply because...