Wallace v. Eason

• Decision Date: 23 April 1923
• Docket Number: 23084
• Citation: 132 Miss. 106,95 So. 834
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: WALLACE et al. v. EASON

95 So. 834

132 Miss. 106

WALLACE et al. v. EASON

No. 23084

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 23, 1923

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS. Statutes providing consolidation of districts held not to vest supervision and control of property of old districts in trustees of consolidated district.

The statutes which provide for the consolidation of school districts do not vest the supervision and control of the property used for school purposes in the old districts in the trustees of the new consolidated district, or that such property shall be used for school purposes by the new district.

HON JAS. G. MCWOWAN, Chancellor.

APPEAL from chancery court of Tate county, HON. JAS. G. MCGOWAN Chancellor.

Suit by E. W. Wallace and others, trustees of Looxahoma Consolidated School District, against H. T. Eason. From a decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed and remanded.

Affirmed and remanded.

E. D Dinkins, for appellants.

The board of supervisors (Laws 1918, ch. 234, sec. 4006c, Hem. Code) is authorized to make conveyance of the property of an old school district which is embraced in the new consolidated school district (as in the instant case), upon petition of majority of the qualified electors of the old district, but in so doing they exercise a special and limited jurisdiction and are acting as the agent of the legislature but the bill in this case specifically charges that the board of supervisors in executing the quit-claim sought to be cancelled did not act on such petition and that there was no pretense made of complying with the act referred to without which they were totally without right to execute it.

It is not unusual for the legislature to delegate to the boards of supervisors authority in many things that are aside from their regular duties, such as the issue of district school bonds, but this clearly because of the public character and easy accessibility of their records, and in the exercise of such authority they are not only limited to the letter of the statute but all jurisdictional facts must be stated in their records, and no presumptions are indulged in their favor. Our school system is a state institution functioning in the state and counties under legislative control, and it is within the competency of the legislature to require boards of supervisors and other agencies to serve that department, but such inherent power in regard to the public school system as is conferred by the Constitution, is vested in the department of education, of which school trustees are an agency, and, consequently, in the absence of a statute authorizing protective litigation as to school property, the right to act is referable to the department of education rather than to the board of supervisors, but there is neither lack of legislative authority, nor precedent, as the statute to which reference has been made (secs. 7344-5, Hem. Code) specifically charges the trustees with the care and protection of school property, and I will undertake later to show that this court has recognized their right to sue to that end.

If the title to district school property vests in the trustees, their right to maintaining protective suit is beyond controversy, and there is nothing in our statutes, or laws, even suggestive of the idea that such title vests in the board of supervisors or that they are trustees therefor or are charged with any duties with reference to it or have any jurisdiction over it except in such special cases as the legislature may require, and it is difficult to understand, how the learned chancellor could take the view suggested, or hold that the relation of the trustees was not such as entitled, or even mandatorily required them to apply to the court for the protective relief sought in this case.

The text in 24 R. C. L. 564, reads "School Districts are quasi-municipal corporations, sometimes termed, involuntary corporations. They have perpetual succession and may sue or be sued even in the absence of a statute authorizing such action." In Carmichael v. School Trustees, 3 How. 84, this court has held that trustees of school lands are such corporation, and in Cornell v. Woodard, 5 How. 665, 37 A. D. 173, that they will be considered as suing as such corporation and in Beeks v. Forshe, 3 Cush. 55, which was a suit by school trustees on a contract with a teacher, no objection was interposed as to parties. The cases last referred to seem to involve township trustees, but the principal is the same as in the case of district trustees. Suits by and against school trustees have been permitted in this state ever since its organization, and the early cases under statutes much less comprehensive than at the present time.

That district trustees are a quasi-corporation and may sue and be sued seems hardly to have been questioned, but I desire to call attention to a few of the cases in which their authority to sue has been recognized. McLoud v. Selby, 27 A. D. 689; Morris v. School District, 63 Ark. 149, 37 S.W. 565; Lewis v. Trustees, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 767; Wright v. Baker, 94 Ky. 347, 22 S.W. 335; School District v. Raymond, 86 N.Y. 182; Alderman v. School Directors, 91 Ill. 176, and School District v. Arnold, 21 Wis., but reference to these ancient holdings should not be necessary in view of the very recent decision of this court in Trustees of Indian Springs Public School v. Carter, et al. , 123 Miss. 457, 86 So. 289, where the question is squarely presented in a case identical with the instant one and decided in favor of the right to sue.

Without any statutory provision on the subject, as uniformly held by the courts, the trustees not only have the right to sue but should be held bound to do so for the protection of title to school property, but our statute (secs. 7344-5, Hem. Code), enjoins the duty upon them under the enumeration of their powers and duties, where it is said that they shall "protect the school property" and "to manage and control the school property within their district," the word "protect" as defined by the courts and lexicographers means: "To cover, shield or defend from injury, harm or danger of any kind. To shield from trespass, to preserve in safety." 3 W. & P. (2 ed.), 1312. The term "property" is sufficient to comprehend every species of estate, real and personal.

On the trial of this case in the court below the learned chancellor was influenced by two decisions of this court, one being Trustees Yazoo City Public Schools v. Yazoo City Library Assn., 12 So. 30, and McKinnon Supt. v. Gowan Brothers, 90 So. 243, conceiving them, and especially the former case to hold that trustees were not authorized to maintain or defend a suit involving title to school property but it is very clear that such construction cannot be placed on the holding in either case.

In the Yazoo City case it is absolutely clear that the claim asserted by the Trustees of the Yazoo City Public School township with which the trustees of Yazoo City School had no connection and was not authorized to represent. It was a question of suing, or defending, by the wrong trustees, with no suggestion that the township trustees would not be authorized to make the defense.

In the McKinnon case the question of proper parties was not involved, but the court permitted the suit to be maintained against the trustees of an agricultural high school, but held that the school property was not subject to mechanic's lien which it was the purpose of the suit to enforce. There was no objection as to the parties and no suggestion of the necessity of joining the board of supervisors.

Title in local district. As before stated if the title to school property is in the local district then, certainly, the trustees of the district elected by the patrons of the school and in the manner provided by statutes, they become the agents of the district and, independently of the statute prescribing their duties and of any statute authorizing them to sue or be sued, the very nature of their office would confer the right and impose the duty of maintaining such suit as might be necessary to protect the property of the districts for which they are the agents.

The most satisfactory statement, and practically the only clear one I have been able to find as to the ownership of school property is in 24 R. C. L. 581, sec. 30, where the text reads:

"The ownership of school property is generally in the local district as trustees for the public at large. The legislature may control or dispose of this property without the consent of the local bodies, so long as it does not apply it in contravention of the trust, for the local bodies are mere agencies of the state."

Conclusion. Property involved in this suit is of slight value, but the principal is far-reaching in that the decision will determine the right of control and intervention by district school trustees to protect property especially committed to their card without application to the board of supervisors.

The question in my mind is settled by the statute defining the duties of trustees and by this court in the cases referred to, and also by the principles governing the rights of trustees who are, necessarily, the lawful agents for the districts, for the public at large and of the department of education. I respectfully submit that the decision of the lower court should be reversed and the cause remanded for trial on proof.

H. Talbot Odom, assistant attorney-general, for the state.

In view of the fact that appellee's counsel cite the case of National Surety Company v. Board of Supervisors of Holmes County, 81 So. 792, and, further in view of the fact that they argue that the trustees in this case were not given the express authority to bring this suit by statute. I again wish to call the...