Wallace v. Mamula

• Citation: 1994 WL 389197,30 F.3d 135
• Decision Date: 26 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-3603,93-3603
• Parties: NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Paul WALLACE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert MAMULA and City of Steubenville, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Page 135

30 F.3d 135

NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.

Paul WALLACE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert MAMULA and City of Steubenville, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-3603.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

July 26, 1994.

Before: KENNEDY and BOGGS, Circuit Judges; and HILLMAN, Senior District Judge. ^*

PER CURIAM.

Paul Wallace appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Police Officer Robert Mamula and the City of Steubenville in this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. Wallace maintains that the defendants violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by arresting him. In his motion for summary judgment, Wallace argued that the State's disposition of the charges against him had a preclusive effect in federal court. Wallace also moved for summary judgment on the issue of Mamula's and Steubenville's liability. The defendants also moved for summary judgment, arguing that Mamula was entitled to qualified immunity and that there was no evidence that Steubenville had a policy or practice of denying its citizens' constitutional rights or acted with deliberate indifference to those rights. The court denied Wallace's motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion. For the reasons explained below, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Mamula and we affirm the district court's decision in every other respect.

I

On the evening of November 25, 1990, Wallace and several friends decided to go to a nightclub called Fanny's Bar in Steubenville, Ohio. They parked in a lot about a block from the nightclub and were walking towards the club when Wallace stopped to talk to someone he knew. While he was talking to his friend, Police Officer Mamula pulled up in his cruiser. According to Mamula, there were several people on the sidewalk; he got out of his car and attempted to clear the area by telling people to move along.

During this time, Wallace apparently continued talking to his friend. In his deposition, Wallace stated that the night was chilly and since he was not wearing gloves, he had one hand in his coat pocket and one hand inside his coat. Mamula approached Wallace and told him to take his hand out of his coat. Wallace did not immediately agree to do so. After two or three requests, Wallace complied. As Mamula was walking away, Wallace claimed he said, "[w]hy are you always coming down here messing with the black man?" According to Mamula, Wallace said "[w]hy are all the fucking pigs always fucking with the black man?" Mamula also testified that Wallace said: "We're not going to put up with this BS"; "We're not going to be pushed around"; "These pigs can go fuck themselves".

After Wallace made his comment(s), Mamula turned around and started walking towards Wallace. He told Wallace that he was under arrest for disorderly conduct. Wallace ran. Mamula chased Wallace for about a block, at which point Wallace saw another police cruiser and stopped running. When Mamula caught up with Wallace, he placed him under arrest for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. These criminal charges were dismissed with prejudice, however, after the state court found that the charges violated Wallace's constitutional right to free speech.

Wallace then filed this 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action, asserting that Mamula and Steubenville violated his constitutional rights. He also asserted several state claims. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court denied Wallace's motion and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The district court rejected Wallace's argument that the state court's disposition of the criminal charges prevented Mamula from re-litigating the First Amendment issue. The court also found that Mamula was entitled to qualified immunity and that Steubenville was not liable because Wallace had failed to produce any evidence that it made a deliberate or conscious choice not to provide adequate training to its officers. The district court also dismissed without prejudice Wallace's state claims.

Wallace then filed this timely appeal.

II

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 268, 271 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 466 (1992). We will affirm the district court's order only if we determine that the pleadings, affidavits, and other submissions show "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). All evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).

The moving party need not support its motion with evidence disproving the non-moving party's claim, but need only show that "there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554 (1986). The plaintiff must present more than a scintilla of evidence in support of his position; the evidence must be such that a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986).

A

Wallace first argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of the defendants' violation of his First Amendment rights because an Ohio criminal court dismissed the action against him on those grounds. He contends that by virtue of the state court's disposition, the First Amendment issue is subject either to the doctrine of issue preclusion or to the doctrine of claim preclusion. Federal courts are generally required to give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as the state court would in a similar circumstance. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738. To determine the effect of a state court proceeding, the federal court must look to the laws of the state in which the proceeding took place. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889 (1982).

As long as the party against whom the doctrine is invoked had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, a federal court can collaterally estop a party from re-litigating a constitutional matter in a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101, 103-04, 101 S.Ct. 411, 418, 419-20 (1980). The law in Ohio is well-settled on this issue:

In order to assert collateral estoppel successfully, a party must plead and prove the following elements:

(1) The party against whom estoppel is sought was a party or in privity with a party to the prior action;

(2) There was a final judgment on the merits in the previous case after a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue;

(3) The issue must have been admitted or actually tried and decided and must be necessary to the final judgment; and

(4) The issue must have been identical to the issue involved in the prior suit.

Monahan v. Eagle Picher Indus., Inc., 486 N.E.2d 1165, 1168 (Ohio Ct.App.1984); see also Goodson v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978, 981 (Ohio 1983).

The district court in this case surveyed in detail the cases in which a Sec. 1983 plaintiff claimed that a disposition in a state criminal trial collaterally estopped the defendant from re-litigating a constitutional issue. The case most directly on point is Schwab v. Wood, 767 F.Supp. 574 (D.Del.1991). In Schwab, the court held that a Sec. 1983 plaintiff could not use the doctrine of collateral estoppel offensively against police officers. In that case, Schwab was arrested after refusing to produce identification or to get out of his truck when police officers requested him to do so. When the police officers forced him out of the truck, a scuffle ensued. Id. at 578. Schwab was finally pinned to the ground by two officers and he was charged, inter alia, with resisting arrest. Id. at 579. At trial, however, the court dismissed all charges against Schwab on the grounds that the police officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that Schwab was committing or had committed a crime. Ibid.

Schwab then filed a Sec. 1983 action against the police officers. He moved for partial summary judgment on the grounds that the officers were collaterally estopped from re-litigating the "reasonable suspicion" issue. Id. at 581. He argued that the police officers were in privity with the state by virtue of the officers' participation in the criminal trial. Ibid. The court, however, found that the officers "did not have an interest which was bound by the previous proceeding. Moreover, they simply had no direct personal interest whatsoever in the state criminal proceeding against Schwab." Id. at 582. The court underscored the lack of privity by noting that the roles of the parties had "substantially changed as compared to the previous state criminal proceeding." Ibid. The court held that the officers did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue since they had no control over the proceeding and they did not participate "substantially" in the control over the state's presentation of the case. The court also noted that the officers had no reason to assert any defenses that would otherwise be applicable in a civil suit, and that they had no right to appeal the criminal proceeding, all of which denied them a full opportunity to contest the finding. Id. at 583.

The rationale in Schwab applies to Wallace's case. Here, Mamula was not a party to the criminal action. Thus, Wallace must show that Mamula was in privity with the State of Ohio before the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies. To do this, he must show that all of the parties to the present proceeding were bound by the prior proceeding. Goodson v. McDonough Power...