Wallace v. MEADOW ACRES MANUFACTURED HOUS. INC.

• Decision Date: 27 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 02A03-9907-CV-265,02A03-9907-CV-265
• Citation: 730 N.E.2d 809
• Parties: Diana WALLACE, Doug Wallace, Lora Wallace, Andru Wallace, Brandin Wallace and Evin Wallace, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. MEADOW ACRES MANUFACTURED HOUSING, INC., Redman Homes, Inc., and Redman Industries, Inc., Appellees-Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

730 N.E.2d 809

Diana WALLACE, Doug Wallace, Lora Wallace, Andru Wallace, Brandin Wallace and Evin Wallace, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. MEADOW ACRES MANUFACTURED HOUSING, INC., Redman Homes, Inc., and Redman Industries, Inc., Appellees-Defendants.

No. 02A03-9907-CV-265

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

June 27, 2000.

Marianne L. Vorhees, Charles R. Clark, Beasley & Gilkison, LLP, Muncie, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellants.

Robert T. Keen, Jr., Diana C. Bauer, Miller, Carson, Boxberger & Murphy LLP, Fort Wayne, Indiana, Attorneys for

Appellee Meadow Acres Manufactured Housing, Inc.

Darla S. Brown, Kelley, Belcher & Brown, Bloomington, Indiana, Joseph G. Eaton, Michael D. Moon, Jr., Barnes & Thornburg, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellees Redman Homes, Inc. and Redman Industries, Inc.

OPINION

VAIDIK, Judge

Diana Wallace, Doug Wallace, Lora Wallace, Andru Wallace, Brandin Wallace, and Evin Wallace (collectively, the Wallaces) appeal the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees, Meadow Acres Manufactured Housing, Inc. (Meadow Acres), Redman Homes, Inc., and Redman Industries, Inc. (Redman). However, because the Wallaces concede that they are unable to prove causation with regard to their cause of action without certain expert testimony on formaldehyde levels which was excluded by the trial court, essentially, they are challenging the trial court's conclusion that their expert's testimony is unreliable. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert's testimony, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History¹

Redman manufactures mobile homes. Meadow Acres sells Redman's mobile homes at retail. On March 23, 1989, Doug and Diana Wallace purchased a Redman mobile home from Meadow Acres. After the Wallaces moved into the mobile home, they began to develop health problems.

On December 1, 1992, Diana Wallace contacted the Indiana State Department of Health, which collected an air sample from the Wallaces' home to analyze the formaldehyde concentrations. Subsequent testing revealed a formaldehyde concentration level of 0.05 parts per million (ppm) in the kitchen. This level was below the occupational health permissible exposure limit for formaldehyde of 1.0 ppm, an "action level" of 0.5 ppm, and the suggested indoor air guideline for formaldehyde of 0.1 ppm.

In February of 1994, the Wallaces moved out of their mobile home. From February 1994 to October 8, 1994, a period of approximately eight months, the Wallace home was completely closed. There was no airflow into or out of the home.

The Wallaces filed this lawsuit against Meadow Acres and Redman on October 7, 1994. On October 8, 1994, Thaddeus J. Godish, Ph.D., a professor at Ball State University in the Natural Resources and Environmental Management Department who had studied formaldehyde for twenty years, tested the air in the home by obtaining ambient air samples. Record at 404. Before performing the test, he instructed Diana Wallace to keep the doors and windows in the manufactured home closed. He also instructed her to heat the home to 78 degrees Fahrenheit in order to simulate the high end of the temperature range that would usually exist in a manufactured home in Indiana in October. On the day of testing, the relative humidity in the Wallace home was 70%. At the time of the test, the home was heated to 71½ degrees Fahrenheit. After the air samples were taken, Dr. Godish recorded the following levels of formaldehyde in different areas of the home:

Kitchen 0.105 ppm Master Bedroom 0.114 ppm East Bedroom 0.111 ppm Inside Kitchen Cabinet 0.230 ppm

In order to determine the formaldehyde levels that would have been present at 78 degrees Fahrenheit on October 8, 1994, Dr. Godish applied a formula called the "Berge equation." Using this formula, he determined that the formaldehyde levels would have been "as high as .17 parts per million" at 78 degrees Fahrenheit. Record at 157. Dr. Godish then calculated what he believed the formaldehyde levels would have been when the Wallaces purchased the home in March 1989 by a process of extrapolation. He based his calculations on the probability that the formaldehyde levels had decreased twice during that time period (decay rate). Dr. Godish's calculation revealed a formaldehyde concentration in the Wallace home exceeding.4 ppm in March of 1989.

On April 30, 1999, Redman filed a Motion to Exclude Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert, Dr. Godish. In their motion, the defendants contended that Dr. Godish was not qualified to render ultimate expert opinions on medical causation. They further argued that his methods and opinions were: (1) unreliable, (2) not based on sound science, (3) not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, and (4) not grounded in scientific knowledge, as required by Ind. Evidence Rule 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Record at 243. The Wallaces filed a memorandum in opposition on May 13, 1999. During a hearing on the motion, Dr. Godish testified regarding the different levels of formaldehyde present in the home on October 8, 1994, and the levels he believed were present in March 1989 based on the Berge equation and the process of extrapolation.

Following the hearing, the trial court ruled that although Dr. Godish was permitted to testify to the formaldehyde levels in the home on October 8, 1994, he was precluded from testifying regarding either the formaldehyde levels determined using the Berge equation or the estimated levels found using the extrapolation method. As the Wallaces conceded they were unable to prove causation without Dr. Godish's testimony, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

The trial court excluded the results Dr. Godish arrived at using the Berge equation and the extrapolation method because the scientific principles the calculations rested upon were unreliable and therefore, inadmissible under Evid. R. 702(b). The Wallaces assert the trial court erred in excluding this evidence.

The proponent of expert testimony has the burden of proving the reliability of the principles upon which the expert's testimony rests. McGrew v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1289, 1290 (Ind.1997). The burden of proving the reliability of Dr. Godish's testimony in this case rests upon the Wallaces. In determining whether expert testimony is reliable, the trial court assumes the function of "gatekeeper" in ensuring that an expert's testimony rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the issue at hand. Hottinger v. Trugreen Corp., 665 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).

Deciding whether expert testimony is reliable and therefore admissible is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman, 705 N.E.2d 539, 550 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999), trans. denied. The trial court determines whether the expert testimony has a sufficiently reliable basis so that the expert's testimony will "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue." Evid. R. 702(a); Ford Motor Co., 705 N.E.2d at 550. We reverse a trial court's decision to exclude evidence only if that decision "is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the Court, or the reasonable, probable and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom." Burkett v. State, 691 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied.

Here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(A) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. Therefore, in reviewing the exercise of the court's discretion, we must apply a two-tiered standard of review. We decide whether the "evidence supports the findings and the findings support the judgment." Chidester v. City of Hobart, 631 N.E.2d 908, 910 (Ind.1994). We construe the findings liberally in support of the judgment. OVRS Acquisition Corp. v. Community Health Servs., Inc., 657 N.E.2d 117, 124 (Ind.Ct. App.1995), reh'g denied, trans. denied. The findings are erroneous only when a review of the record indicates to the court that a mistake has been made. Id. When a judgment is not supported by the findings of fact and the conclusions, it is clearly erroneous. DeHaan v. DeHaan, 572 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (Ind.Ct.App.1991),reh'g denied, trans. denied. The court must consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and must draw all reasonable inferences therefrom. Id.

II. Rule of Evidence 702

Indiana Rule of Evidence 702 provides:

(a) If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

(b) Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is satisfied that the scientific principles upon which the expert testimony rests are reliable.

Under Evid. R. 702, evidence which is not first established to be reliable under 702(b) will not "assist" the judge or jury pursuant to 702(a). Therefore, reliability is a threshold issue for a Evid. R. 702 analysis of scientific evidence.

Although Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which is the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert, and Evid. R. 702 are not identical:

[t]he concerns driving Daubert coincide with the express requirement of Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b) that the trial court be satisfied of the reliability of the scientific principles involved. Thus, although not binding upon the determination of state evidentiary law issues, the federal evidence law of Daubert and its progeny is helpful to the bench and bar in applying Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b).

Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind. 1995).

In deciding whether scientific evidence is reliable, the trial court must determine whether it appears...