Wallace v. Metrohealth Sys.

• Decision Date: 22 October 2013
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1:13-cv-01017
• Parties: RON WALLACE, Plaintiff, v. THE METROHEALTH SYSTEM, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

RON WALLACE, Plaintiff, v. THE METROHEALTH SYSTEM, Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:13-cv-01017

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

Date: October 22, 2013

MAGISTRATE JUDGE GREG WHITE

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Ron Wallace (hereinafter "Wallace") filed his Complaint on May 6, 2013, alleging a number of civil right actions against his former employer, the MetroHealth System (hereinafter "MetroHealth").¹ (ECF No. 1.) On June 7, 2013, MetroHealth filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 8.) Wallace filed a memorandum in opposition on July 8, 2013. (ECF No. 9.) Thereafter, the parties respectively filed a reply and surreply. (ECF Nos. 11 & 12.) On August 14, 2013, the parties, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, consented to this Court's jurisdiction. (ECF No.15.) MetroHealth's motion is now ripe for adjudication.

II. Civil Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) "should not be granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Well-pleaded allegations must be taken as true and construed most favorably toward the non-moving party. See, e.g., Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 637 (6^th Cir. 1993). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[, as] [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). Although a court may not grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on its disbelief of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1199 (6^th Cir. 1990), a court "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6^th Cir. 1987). "In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must appear 'plausible' on its face, if all of its factual allegations are assumed to be true." Alli v. City of New York, 2012 WL 4887745 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560-70. Consequently, a claim should not be dismissed unless it is unsupported by the law or the facts alleged are insufficient.

When ruling on motions to dismiss, a Court should normally look no further than the complaint, but "[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [plaintiff's]claim." Weiner v. Klais and Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6^th Cir.1997) (citations omitted).

III. Factual Allegations

In pertinent part, the Complaint contains the following allegations. On July 10, 1995, Wallace, who is African-American, began his employment with MetroHealth. (Compl. ¶¶7-9.) He was promoted to Director of Environment Services ("EVS") on March 13, 1999. Id. EVS was one of five departments in Support Services; the directors of the other four departments were all Caucasian. Id. at ¶¶9-10. Wallace received outstanding annual evaluations between 1995 and 2010. Id. at ¶¶13, 16.

In June of 2010, a multi-drug resistance organism ("MDRO"), in this case a serious strain of bacteria, began jeopardizing the health and safety of patients and staff at MetroHealth. Id. at ¶¶17-18. During 2010, the MDRO caused several deaths among patients. Id. at ¶¶19, 21. In late 2010, MetroHealth created a task force to address the MDRO issue. Id. at ¶23. At a meeting held on January 25, 2011, Wallace "sought to explain that the MDRO, acknowledged as a matter of public concern" was not the fault of his department and advised that the origin of the MDRO needed to be determined. Id. at ¶29. During said meeting, Jennifer Hanrahan, D.O., chair of MetroHealth's Infection Control, blamed the spread of the MDRO on Wallace. Id. at ¶30. The accusation against Wallace was "unnecessarily confrontational, condescending and disrespectful," conduct to which Caucasian employees at the same level were not subjected. Id. at ¶32. Wallace complained to Alfred Connors, M.D., chair of MetroHealth's MDRO task force, who did nothing to correct the statements made by Dr. Hanrahan. Id. at ¶33.

Prior to her February 2011 departure, Barbara McBee, Wallace's supervisor and the Vice President of System Services, evaluated Wallace and gave him an excellent performanceevaluation. Id. at ¶¶14-15, 36, 41. MetroHealth claimed that Wallace was not given a performance evaluation in February 2011, and retained an outside vendor to evaluate his work from February 2010 to January 2011. Id. at ¶46. On April 11, 2011, MetroHealth reevaluated Wallace, but MetroHealth's Chief Operating Officer and Human Resources Department would not release a copy of the evaluation to Wallace. Id. at ¶¶48-49, 56-57. MetroHealth placed Wallace on a Performance Improvement Plan ("PIP"). Id. at ¶50.

The outside vendor retained by MetroHealth added eight positions to Wallace's department, stretching the budget of EVS. Id. at ¶¶51, 53. The outside vendor subsequently accused Wallace of being over budget, which was used as a pretext leading to Wallace's termination. Id. at ¶¶52, 65 & 72. MetroHealth blamed Wallace for having his department understaffed despite having previously frozen his employee requisitions. Id. at ¶¶66-67. After Wallace's termination, MetroHealth posted eighteen staff openings in the EVS department, positions that MetroHealth refused to fill while Wallace was director. Id. at ¶68.

On July 25, 2011, Wallace filed charges with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission ("OCRC"). Id. at ¶58. On November 3, 2011, following illegitimate evaluation procedures, MetroHealth terminated Wallace's employment based on race. Id. at ¶65.

IV. Analysis

MetroHealth construes the Complaint as raising the following five causes of action: (1) an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for a deprivation of rights secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (2) an action pursuant to §1983 for a deprivation of rights under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) an action pursuant to §1983 for a deprivation of rights under the Equal Protection clause; (4) an actionpursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1981 for a deprivation of equal contract rights based on race and retaliation; and, (5) an action pursuant to Ohio Revised Code ("O.R.C.") §§ 4112.01, et seq. for race discrimination and retaliation. (ECF No. 8-1 at 1-2.) The Complaint does not set forth separate causes of action, but contains a myriad of claims in its first paragraph. (ECF No. 1 at ¶1.) The Court agrees that the Complaint attempts to raise the five claims stated above. Wallace does not appear to challenge MetroHealth's interpretation of the Complaint in his memorandum in opposition or surreply. (ECF Nos. 9 & 12.)

Though brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the essence of MetroHealth's motion is that the Complaint has not been plead with sufficient specificity to satisfy the requirements of Iqbal and Twombly. (ECF No. 8-1 at 2.)

A. Municipal Liability under § 1983

At the outset, MetroHealth argues that it is not a "person" under the meaning of § 1983; and, that: (1) it cannot be held liable on the basis of respondeat superior and, (2) the Complaint has failed to allege that one of its policies or customs was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation. (ECF No. 8-1 at 6-7.) To the extent MetroHealth is suggesting that it is not a "person" for the purposes of § 1983, such an assertion is incorrect. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that local governments were intended to be included among the "persons" to which § 1983 applies). However, MetroHealth is correct that § 1983 does not permit a plaintiff to sue a local government entity on the theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 692 ("[§1983] cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor."); accord Briner v. City of Ontario, 370 Fed. Appx. 682, 699 (6^th Cir. 2010).

A city's custom or policy can be unconstitutional in two ways: 1) facially unconstitutional as written or articulated, or 2) facially constitutional but consistently implemented to result in constitutional violations with explicit or implicit ratification by city policymakers. Id. Where the identified policy is itself facially lawful, the plaintiff "must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with 'deliberate indifference' as to its known or obvious consequences. A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice." Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1997) (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 388 (1989)). "Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Brown, 520 U.S. at 410. In other words, the risk of a constitutional violation arising as a result of the inadequacies in the municipal policy must be "plainly obvious." Id. at 412; see also Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 865 (6^th Cir. 1997).

Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 752-53 (6^th Cir. 2006). Therefore, "'municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where -- and only where -- a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives' by city policymakers." City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (citing Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-484 (1986); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985)); King v. Marion County...