Wallace v. State

Decision Date30 May 1891
Citation16 S.W. 571
PartiesWALLACE v. STATE.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from circuit court, Crawford county; HUGH F. THOMASON, Judge.

Frederick & Frederick, for appellant. W. E. Atkinson, Atty. Gen., and Chas. T. Coleman, for the State.

COCKRILL, C. J.

In the case of Siceluff v. State, 52 Ark. 56, 11 S. W. Rep. 964, a conviction for selling liquor to a minor, without the written consent of his parent or guardian, was sustained, although the proof showed that the minor acted as agent of his parent in making the purchase. But in that case the seller was not apprised of the agency, and he dealt with the minor as though he were the vendee. In legal contemplation, the relation of vendor and vendee existed between them. There was therefore a sale to the minor, and, as there was no pretense of written consent by the parent, the offense was complete. The question in this case is, was the statute violated by simply delivering liquor to a minor who was known to be doing an errand for another? The prohibition of the statute is against the sale or giving away of liquor to a minor, (Act Ark. April 6, 1889, p. 122,) and, unless the act complained of amounts to a sale or giving away of liquor to the minor, it is not a violation of the law. "To deliver liquor to a minor for the use of the parent is not to sell it to the minor," says Mr. Bishop, (St. Crimes, § 1021.) The quotation is the statement of an obvious rule of law, when the liquor is delivered for the known purpose of the parent's or another's use, for then no relation of vendor and vendee can be said to exist between the minor and the liquor seller; and, to deliver liquor to one merely to be carried by him to another, is not to "give away" liquor to the one who bears it. We cannot construe the term "give away" in a penal statute to mean something different from its ordinary legal and commonly accepted import. Ward v. State, 45 Ark. 351; Gillan v. State, 47 Ark. 555, 2 S. W. Rep. 185. However defective the law may be thought to be, it is not the province of the courts to extend it so as to cover cases not within its terms, as would be done if we should construe the term "give away" to cover the case stated. But the case stated is only that of the minor who receives liquor from the seller for the known use of another. The statute does not prohibit the minor from becoming the agent of the purchaser or of a donee of liquor, but only from becoming the purchaser or donee. Such is the construction placed upon similar statutes in Massachusetts and Connecticut, the statute in the latter state using the word "furnish" where ours employ "give away." Com. v. Lattinville, 120 Mass. 385; Goddard v. Burnham, 124 Mass. 578; ...

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