Wallace v. U.S., 04-CF-299.

• Decision Date: 13 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-CO-1328.,No. 04-CF-299.,04-CF-299.,05-CO-1328.
• Parties: Eric R. WALLACE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

936 A.2d 757

Eric R. WALLACE, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 04-CF-299.

No. 05-CO-1328.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued December 20, 2006.

Decided September 13, 2007.

J. Alex Ward, with whom David A. Handzo appeared on the brief, for appellant.

Robert E. Leidenheimer, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Kenneth

L. Wainstein, United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy W. McLeese III, David B. Goodhand, Michael T. Ambrosino, and James S. Sweeney, Assistant United States Attorneys, appeared on the brief, for the appellee.

Before FARRELL, RUIZ and THOMPSON, Associate Judges.

THOMPSON, Associate Judge:

After accepting a guilty plea from appellant Eric R. Wallace, the trial court found Wallace guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced him to thirty-five years in prison, to be followed by five years of supervised release. Wallace contends that the court erred in finding that he was competent to stand trial and to enter a guilty plea, and that the trial judge abused her discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He argues in the alternative that his sentence must be vacated because it was based on uncorroborated and unreliable information.

We agree with the trial judge that this is a difficult case. However, finding no clear error or abuse of discretion in the court's rulings, we affirm Wallace's conviction and deny the requested relief.

Background

During early 2002, doctors at St. Elizabeths Hospital found appellant incompetent to stand trial in three misdemeanor assault cases that were then pending. The government thereafter petitioned to have appellant civilly committed. Appellant opposed the government's request that he be held at St. Elizabeths pending resolution of the commitment petition, and he was released on October 10, 2002. Later that same day, appellant encountered Claude McCants at 1108 4th Street, N.E., stabbed McCants in the neck, and drove away in McCants' vehicle, leaving McCants to bleed to death.

Relying on a court-ordered competency screening completed in November 2002, the court found appellant competent to stand trial for the murder of McCants. The court also ordered a criminal responsibility study, the results of which were summarized in a June 2003 report that concluded that "on or about October 10, 2002, . . . [appellant] was not suffering from a mental disease or defect that substantially impaired his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." Notwithstanding, on August 12, 2003, appellant filed a motion asking the court to find him incompetent to stand trial and a notice of intent to rely on the insanity defense. In response, the court ordered the Legal Services Division of the Forensic Services Administration¹ to render an opinion as to the "present mental competency of [appellant] to stand trial."

Dr. Oliver performed the competency examination. In a letter dated September 29, 2003, he reported that although appellant "claimed to have no knowledge whatsoever of the judicial process and the roles of various court officials," his "presentation today appeared to be completely volitional." Dr. Oliver concluded that appellant was malingering.² After receiving his report the court scheduled a competency hearing, which was conducted over a five-day period between October 28 and November 4, 2003. Having heard the testimony of five expert witnesses and reviewed numerous written reports about appellant's mental status, the court ruled on November 10, 2003 that appellant was competent to stand trial.

When the parties were before the court again on January 5, 2004 — the date set for commencement of trial — defense counsel informed the court that appellant "indicated again last night that he would like to accept the Government's plea offer." After a colloquy that resulted in the court's finding that appellant "understands the proceedings and is competent to proceed," the court accepted appellant's unconditional plea of guilty to one count of Second Degree Murder While Armed. At a Frendak³ hearing on January 15, 2004, the court also found that appellant "understands the consequences of the choice to waive the [insanity] defense" and that his "waiver is voluntary and intelligent." The court sentenced appellant on February 27, 2004, and appellant filed his notice of appeal on March 26, 2004. On August 19, 2004, he also moved to withdraw his guilty plea, and his appeal was stayed pending resolution of that motion. By order dated October 27, 2005, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw and appellant noted an appeal from the denial order. We consolidated the two appeals.

Analysis

I.

The government urges that we must dismiss appellant's direct appeal. We agree that our case law requires this result. We have said that "as a practical matter virtually every possible avenue of appeal is waived by a guilty plea," Bettis v. United States, 325 A.2d 190, 194 (D.C. 1974), and that "the only issues that are appropriately raised in an appeal from a conviction entered after a guilty plea are the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court and the legality of the sentence imposed." Carmichael v. United States, 479 A.2d 325, 326 n. 1 (D.C.1984) (citing Lorimer v. United States, 425 A.2d 1306, 1308 (D.C.1981) (per curiam)). We have recognized that "a defendant who is sentenced after pleading guilty may later attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea," McClurkin v. United States, 472 A.2d 1348, 1352 (D.C.1984), but have held that "the appropriate method for challenging the voluntary and intelligent character of a guilty plea is by a Rule 32(e) motion to withdraw."⁴ Lorimer, 425 A.2d at 1309.⁵

As appellant points out, some jurisdictions have determined to "treat appeals of competency determinations as an exception to the ... rule" that "a voluntary guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings leading up to the plea." State v. Cleary, 175 Vt. 142, 824 A.2d 509, 512 (2003).⁶ This court, by contrast, has "refus[ed] to exercise our jurisdiction to hear a challenge to a guilty plea" outside the context of an appeal from denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, Lorimer, 425 A.2d at 1309 n. 6, with the objective of "reduc[ing] the great waste of judicial resources required to process frivolous attacks on guilty plea convictions." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).⁷ Even were we free to depart from that practice in this case, we would have no reason to do so, because, as noted, appellant did in fact move in the trial court for leave to withdraw his plea, and we have before us his appeal from the trial court's decision denying that motion.

After the imposition of sentence, as in this case, a court will allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea only "to correct manifest injustice...." Super Ct.Crim. R. 32(e).⁸ To meet this burden, appellant must establish either that "there was a fatal defect in the Rule 11 [plea] proceeding when the guilty plea was taken," or that "justice demands withdrawal under the circumstances of the case." Pierce v. United States, 705 A.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C. 1997).⁹ We review a trial court order denying a Rule 32(e) motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. See Carmichael, 479 A.2d at 327. In light of the procedural history of this case, our review here will largely entail application of a "clear error" standard, as we now explain.¹⁰

Appellant first attempts to meet the burden of establishing that "justice demands withdrawal" of his guilty plea by showing that he was mentally incompetent at the time of the plea. See Willis v. United States, 468 A.2d 1320, 1323 (D.C. 1983) ("Having failed to show that he was mentally incompetent, [appellant] has also failed to meet his burden of proving manifest injustice."). He attempts to make that showing by challenging the validity of the trial court's determination that he was competent to stand trial. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-01, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (holding that the competency required to plead guilty is the same as the competency required for standing trial). Accordingly, we are compelled to consider whether the trial court's November 10, 2003 competency determination is "supported by the record," Bennett v. United States, 400 A.2d 322, 325 (D.C. 1979), or whether the trial court clearly erred when it determined on November 10, 2003 that appellant was competent to stand trial¹¹ (or when it relied on that conclusion in accepting Wallace's guilty plea on January 5, 2004, without any further hearing on competency).

Appellant next argues that the Rule 11 plea proceeding was defective because, regardless of his mental competency he did not actually understand the significance of the proceeding and the rights he was waiving. We therefore have the task of determining whether the trial court clearly erred in finding that appellant made his guilty plea knowingly.¹² See Johnson v. United States, 631 A.2d 871, 878-79 (D.C.1993) (Farrell, J., concurring) (noting that the clear error standard prescribed by D.C.Code § 17-305(a) applies to review of the trial judge's findings based on a defendant's statements during a plea inquiry).

II.

As already noted, appellant contends that "justice demands withdrawal" of his guilty plea because of his lack of mental competency. He argues that the evidence presented at his competency hearing — his diagnoses of cognitive impairment and "dementia due to seizure disorder and insulin-dependent diabetes," and the fact that "six different doctors independently determined that [he] was not competent to stand trial" — either taken alone or viewed in conjunction with post-competency-hearing evidence presented with his motion to withdraw, compels a conclusion that he was incompetent to stand trial and to plead. We consider these arguments in section II.A. infra.

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