Walling v. Lansdon

• Decision Date: 28 September 1908
• Citation: 97 P. 396,15 Idaho 282
• Parties: JESSE J. WALLING, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT LANSDON, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, Defendant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

97 P. 396

15 Idaho 282

JESSE J. WALLING, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT LANSDON, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, Defendant

Supreme Court of Idaho

September 28, 1908

POLITICAL PARTIES-FACTIONS-JURISDICTION OF COURTS-PRIMARY ELECTION LAW-LEGAL RIGHTS-RIGHTS OF A MAJORITY OF LEGAL DELEGATES-AUTHORITY OF STATE COMMITTEES AND STATE CONVENTIONS.

1. Courts will not undertake to control the internal affairs of a political party, unless the same encroaches upon, violates or contravenes the law.

2. In an application for a writ of mandate to compel the secretary of state to file a certificate of nominations as the Democratic state ticket, when his answer thereto denies the allegations of the petition and alleges that the convention making such nominations was not the regular Democratic state convention, a general demurrer to the answer will be overruled.

3. The act known as the primary election law (Laws 1903, p. 360) is mandatory, and applies to and governs all political parties not therein specifically excepted.

4. Every right conferred upon a voter at a primary election held under this law is a legal right which may be protected defended and enforced by appropriate legal methods in the courts of this state.

5. In determining factional disputes in a political organization and the legality of party primaries and conventions, the courts will go as far as the law goes, and protect all legal rights conferred by law upon all persons participating therein.

6. Where the legislature of the state has regulated the method and manner of holding primary elections, the selection of delegates and the conduct and duty of conventions, the courts will not be governed or controlled by the action or decision of the party authorities in such matters, but will determine and protect the legal rights of the citizen participating therein.

7. In a contest between two factions of a political party as to which is the regular organization and entitled to represent the party, the court will look to the law, and if the matter is regulated by law, the respective rights of the factions will be determined by the law. If, however, there is no law governing the rights of the contesting factions, the same will be relegated to the party forum.

8. Party conventions, committees or the party authority cannot decide or determine a matter which is regulated by law, and thereby abrogate the law or oust the courts of jurisdiction to hear and determine such matter.

9. In the absence of a statute of this state in relation thereto, a party state central committee has such authority and power as may be given it by the authority creating it, or as is generally exercised by such committees, and may make up a temporary roll of delegates who are entitled to sit in the temporary organization of a state convention, but in so doing can only place on such roll legal delegates.

10. A party state committee or a party state convention is not superior to the laws of this state, and neither can make rules and regulations in violation of the law, or confer rights or privileges upon persons not elected according to law, or deny rights or privileges to persons elected according to law.

11. A party state committee or a party state convention has no power or authority to seat or recognize as members of such convention, delegates not elected to such convention according to the law, or deny the right to sit or participate therein to delegates elected according to the law.

12. The primary election law of this state provides two methods of electing delegates to a state convention: 1st. By a direct vote at such primary for such delegates; 2d. By a convention composed of delegates elected at a primary held under the law; and delegates cannot be legally elected to a state convention in any other manner than as directed by this statute.

13. A minority of legal delegates elected to a state convention cannot combine with illegal delegates, and thereby constitute such legal minority a legal majority, and thereby govern and control a convention, and deny the right to sit or participate therein to delegates elected according to law.

14. A majority of the legal delegates elected to a state convention under the primary election law of this state has the power and authority to organize and control the convention to which they are elected, and may take such steps and adopt such methods, not in violation of law, as will give to such majority a right to organize and act for and as the convention.

15. A minority of legal delegates elected to a state convention has no right or authority to combine with illegal delegates, and thereby deprive the legal majority elected to such convention of the right to organize and control the convention; and if by so doing, the legal majority is denied such right, it may organize the convention in the same hall or elsewhere, and will be recognized as the legal convention.

16. The proceedings of a party convention composed of legal delegates will be recognized as the proceedings of the regular party convention, in preference to the proceedings of a convention composed partly of legal delegates and partly of illegal delegates, if it appears that a majority of the legal delegates participated in and controlled the former convention.

(Syllabus by the court.)

Original proceeding for writ of mandate.

Petitioner denied and cause dismissed. Costs awarded to the defendant.

Henry Z. Johnson, R. H. Johnson, T. D. Cahalan, S. H. Hays, M. G Cage, A. T. Ryan, A. A. Fraser, and C. H. Jackson, for Plaintiff.

The only question to be determined by the court is which of the two tickets in controversy is the ticket nominated by the convention called by the regular state central committee of the party. (Williams v. Lewis, 6 Idaho 184, 54 P. 619; Addle v. Davenport, 7 Idaho 282, 62 P. 681.)

The course pursued by the state committee in this case in organizing the convention is the one adopted by the national conventions of both parties, and has been approved in State ex rel. Howels v. Metcalf, 18 S.D. 393, 100 N.W. 923, 67 L. R. A. 331.

The fact that a contesting delegation voted upon the question of the title to seats in the convention did not vitiate the judgment of the convention where, as in this case, the evidence disclosed that a clear majority of all the delegates present voted in the affirmative, without including the contesting delegation. (State ex rel. Gilchrist v. Weston, 27 Mont. 185, 70 P. 519.)

The convention is clearly the judge of the qualifications and election of its members, and the court will not decide such questions in the absence of statutory provisions relating thereto. (State ex rel. Mitchell v. Larson, 13 N.D. 420, 101 N.W. 315; State v. Lavik, 9 N.D. 461, 83 N.W. 914.)

Judicial inquiry is limited to ascertaining and determining the identity of the party convention, and not to an examination of methods or tactics. (State v. Porter, 11 N.D. 309, 91 N.W. 946; State v. Liudahl, 11 N.D. 320, 91 N.W. 955; State v. Board of Election Commrs., 167 Ind. 276, 78 N.W. 1018.)

The court will take notice of the fact that by party usage and custom the state central committee has the power to pass upon the claims of contesting delegations. (State v. Falley, 9 N.D. 450, 83 N.W. 863.)

The withdrawal of the several delegates from the convention did not dissolve the convention, or destroy its identity, or deprive it of the power of proceeding with the business for which it convened. (Hutchinson v. Brown, 122 Cal. 189, 54 P. 738, 42 L. R. A. 232; State v. Porter, 11 N.D. 309, 91 N.W. 946.)

The defense set up "that if the majority remained in said hall and attempted to assert their rights, riot and bloodshed would result, and many of their members be injured and killed," and they therefore withdrew from the convention, is ludicrous. (State v. Metcalf, 18 S.D. 393, 100 N.W. 926, 67 L. R. A. 331.)

J. H. Hawley, Karl Paine, G. W. Tannahill, John F. Nugent, F. E. Fogg, J. T. Pence, K. I. Perky, and John C. Rice, for Defendant.

The court has jurisdiction to go into the merits of the controversy and determine which of the two tickets nominated at Wallace is entitled to be printed upon the official ballot as the regular Democratic ticket. (State v. Houser, 122 Wis. 534, 100 N.W. 964; State v. Falley, 9 N.D. 450, 83 N.W. 860; Williams v. Lewis, 6 Idaho 184, 54 P. 619.)

Political parties have the same power to determine purely political questions and matters of party procedure, in the absence of legislation, that they always had, but when the legislature essays to regulate any matter, questions arising out of such legislation are legal and not political, and the courts are bound to determine them. (State v. Metcalf, 18 S.D. 393, 100 N.W. 923, 67 L. R. A. 331; Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Ore. 167, 91 Am. St. Rep. 457, 66 P. 714; Neal v. Young, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 183, 75 S.W. 1082; State v. Hogan, 24 Mont. 383, 62 P. 587; State v. Martin, 24 Mont. 403, 62 P. 590.)

Since the case of Williams v. Lewis, supra, and that of Addle v. Davenport, 7 Idaho 282, 62 P. 681, were decided by this court, our legislature has seen fit to enact a primary election law. We think it intended to provide that delegates duly elected in accordance with that statute shall be entitled to seats in the convention to which they are accredited. (People v. Democratic General Committee, 164 N.Y. 335, 58 N.E. 124, 51 L. R. A. 677.)

While the rule is universal that, in the absence of legislation, a political convention is the judge of the qualifications and election of its members, its operation is restricted in this state by that other rule that political parties cannot evade, ignore or violate a statute. (Neal v. Young, supra; State v. Rexford (S. D.), 109 N.W. 217.)

The fact that the...