Walls v. State, SC15–1449.

• Decision Date: 20 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. SC15–1449.,SC15–1449.
• Citation: 213 So.3d 340
• Parties: Frank A. WALLS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

213 So.3d 340

Frank A. WALLS, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC15–1449.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 20, 2016.

Billy H. Nolas, Chief, Capital Habeas Unit, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida; and

Baya Harrison, III, Special Assistant, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel—Middle Region, Monticello, FL, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL; and Sandra Sue Jaggard, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, FL, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on appeal from an order summarily denying a motion to vacate a sentence of death under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because the order concerns postconviction relief from a sentence of death, this Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the summary denial of Walls' intellectual disability claim and remand for the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing under the appropriate standards.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

We have described the facts of this case as follows:

Frank A. Walls was convicted of felony murder in the death of Edward Alger and premeditated and felony murder in the death of Ann Peterson in Okaloosa County in July 1987. Alger's and Peterson's bodies were discovered in Alger's home when he failed to report for duty at Eglin Air Force Base. Peterson was shot twice in the head; Alger was shot three times and his throat had been cut. Alger's feet and left wrist were also tied with a curtain cord.

Based on information given to investigators by Walls' former roommate, who lived adjacent to the victims, a warrant was obtained to search the mobile home where Walls lived with a roommate. During the search, several items were seized that were linked to the crime scene.

After his arrest, Walls gave a statement detailing his involvement in the murders. In his confession, Walls stated that he entered the house to commit a burglary and that he deliberately woke up the two victims by knocking over a fan. Walls made Peterson tie up Alger and then Walls tied up Peterson. At some point, Alger got loose from the bindings and attacked Walls. Walls tackled Alger and cut him across the throat with a knife. However, Alger continued to struggle, knocked the knife from Walls' hand, and bit Walls on the leg. Walls then pulled out a gun and shot Alger in the head several times. Walls untied Peterson and informed her that he did not originally intend to harm them, but Alger's attack had changed everything. During a struggle, Walls ripped off Peterson's clothes and shot her in the head. When Peterson continued to scream, Walls pushed her face into a pillow and shot her in the head a second time.

Walls v. State (Walls III), 926 So.2d 1156, 1161 (Fla.2006). Walls was charged with ten offenses, some of which were subsequently dismissed or reduced at trial. Walls v. State (Walls II), 641 So.2d 381, 384 (Fla.1994).

Walls pled not guilty and filed several pretrial motions, including a motion to determine his competency to stand trial. Five experts testified, three stating Walls was incompetent and two finding he was competent. The trial judge agreed with the latter two experts and held that Walls was competent to stand trial. The jury found Walls guilty of all charges submitted and later recommended life imprisonment for the murder of Alger and death for the murder of Peterson. The trial judge concurred. The conviction later was reversed and a new trial ordered.

Id. at 385 (citing Walls v. State (Walls I ), 580 So.2d 131 (Fla.1991) ).

At Walls' retrial, venue was moved to Jackson County because of pretrial publicity. The State's guilt phase evidence consisted of physical evidence, testimony by the investigating officers, testimony by a pathologist, and Walls' taped confession, which was played for the jury. Walls presented no guilt phase case. The jury found Walls guilty on all charges—two counts of first-degree murder, burglary of a structure, armed burglary of a dwelling, and two counts of kidnapping and petit theft.

During the penalty phase, Walls presented evidence of his long history of violent and threatening behavior, his various emotional problems, and his extensive treatment for emotional problems, including placement in a class for emotionally handicapped students in elementary school and a stay in a residential youth camp for children with emotional and behavioral problems at age fifteen. A psychiatrist who had treated Walls when he was sixteen years old stated that he had placed Walls on lithium

in order to control his bipolar mood disorder. However, the psychiatrist also testified that at some point Walls ceased taking the drug. A psychologist testified that Walls' IQ had declined substantially in the years prior to trial and that Walls was impaired during the time the murder was committed.

The jury recommended the death penalty for Peterson's murder by a unanimous vote. Because of the prior jury's recommendation of life, double jeopardy precluded the possibility of a death penalty for Alger's murder on retrial. See [

Walls II, 641 So.2d at 386 n. 1 ]; see also art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. The judge sentenced Walls to death for Peterson's murder, to a life sentence for Alger's murder, to five years in prison for the burglary of a structure, to twenty years for the armed burglary of a dwelling, to twenty years for each of the kidnapping counts, and to two months for petit theft.

Walls III, 926 So.2d at 1162.

As to Walls' death sentence, the judge found six aggravators: prior violent felony for the contemporaneous murder of Alger; committed during a burglary or kidnapping; committed to avoid lawful arrest; committed for pecuniary gain; the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). Walls II, 641 So.2d at 386. The judge specifically rejected the existence of the statutory mental health mitigators, but found nine mitigating factors: Walls had no significant criminal history, was nineteen years old at the time of the crime, had been classified as emotionally handicapped, suffers from brain dysfunction and brain damage, functions intellectually at the level of a twelve year old because of his low IQ, confessed to the crimes and cooperated with the police, has a loving relationship with his parents and disabled sibling, is a good worker when employed, and has shown kindness to helpless people and animals. Walls III, 926 So.2d at 1162.

On direct appeal after the retrial, Walls raised nine issues:

(1) the trial court should have excused a potential juror for cause or granted the defense an additional peremptory challenge to excuse the juror; (2) the State improperly exercised peremptory challenges to dismiss two black jurors based on their race; (3) the jurors were kept in session for overtaxing hours during trial; (4) the trial court gave the jury erroneous penalty phase instructions on the mitigating factors of mental disturbance, impairment, or duress and on the aggravating factors of HAC and CCP; (5) the trial court refused to provide the jury with a detailed interpretation of emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor; (6) the trial court made errors in its findings on the aggravating factors because HAC and CCP were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence did not support the conclusion that the murder occurred during a kidnapping, the commission during a burglary aggravating factor impermissibly doubled the pecuniary gain factor, and the avoid arrest aggravator was improper; (7) the trial court required Walls to prove the mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence; (8) the trial court improperly rejected expert testimony that Walls was suffering from extreme emotional disturbance and substantial impairment; and (9) the death sentence was not proportionate in his case. This Court found no error and affirmed the judgment and sentences. The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied Walls' petition for certiorari. See Walls v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1130, 115 S.Ct. 943, 130 L.Ed.2d 887 (1995).

Id. at 1162–63 (citation omitted).

Walls filed his initial postconviction motion in 1997, amending it later that year and again in 2001. Id. at 1163. The second amended motion raised nine claims:

(1) [Walls] was denied a fair guilt phase proceeding due to ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial court error; (2)counsel conceded guilt and eligibility for the death penalty without Walls' consent; (3) he was denied a fair penalty phase proceeding due to ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and trial court error; (4) counsel failed to obtain an adequate mental health evaluation in violation of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) ; (5) his death sentence is unconstitutional because he is mentally retarded; (6) the trial court did not independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (7) the trial court considered inadmissible victim impact evidence; (8) the jury was improperly instructed on the aggravating factors; and (9) the cumulative effect of these procedural and substantive errors deprived him of a fair trial.

Id. at 1163 n. 1.¹ The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on some of Walls' claims, but eventually denied relief on all of them. Id. at 1163–64.

Walls appealed the denial to this Court raising two claims encompassing several subclaims: the circuit court erred in (1) denying Walls' ineffective assistance of counsel claims for counsel's "failure to exclude and object to the admission of evidence of a possible sexual battery, failure to object to a lack of remorse argument by the prosecutor during closing argument, concession of guilt to the facts of felony murder and to the aggravating factor of commission during a burglary, and failure to...