Walrod v. Webster County
| Decision Date | 25 January 1900 |
| Parties | CLAUD D. WALROD v. WEBSTER COUNTY, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Wright District Court.--HON. B. P. BIRDSALL, Judge.
ACTION at law to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff in being thrown from a county bridge. Trial to a jury verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Wm. T Chantland and Duncombe & Kenyon for appellant.
Botsford Healy & Healy for appellee.
OPINION
Between the hours of 12 o'clock midnight and 1 o'clock A. M of March 8, 1897, plaintiff was thrown from a county bridge in the defendant county, in consequence of his team going off the south approach thereto. Railings were erected on either side of the approach, something like twelve years before the accident, which, in consequence of neglect and the action of the elements, became out of repair, insecure, and insufficient to meet the purposes intended. The approach from which plaintiff fell was about twenty-two feet long, and the railings were each supported by three posts, the first of which was two and one-half feet from the main pier, the second near the middle of the railing, and the third at the end thereof. Plaintiff was driving a team over the bridge, and when near the north or bridge end of the approach the off horse became frightened by a flash of lightning, and, squatting and setting back in the harness, was guided or pushed by the near horse towards the left or east side of the approach, and against the railing, which gave way, and precipitated the horses and driver over the side of the approach, down to the ground beneath, resulting in the injuries of which plaintiff complains. The evidence tended to show that the horses were not seriously frightened, and were at no time beyond the control of the driver; that they were both on a walk until they went over the side of the approach; and that the sleigh in which plaintiff was riding, and to which the team was attached, traveled from sixteen to twenty feet from the main-traveled track to the point where it went over the approach. No question is made as to the extent of the injuries, and there is no serious dispute regarding the condition of the railing. Contributory negligence is not claimed, and there is no doubt that defendant had knowledge of the condition of the bridge and of the approach. Defendant's main contention is that the defects in the railing were not the proximate or efficient cause of the accident, and that the court was in error in submitting the case to the jury, and in refusing defendant's instructions to the effect that the lightning, and not the defect in the bridge, was the proximate cause. The jury was plainly told that the county was not an insurer against all accidents that might happen upon its bridges; that it was only bound to maintain its bridges and approaches thereto in reasonably safe condition for the ordinary uses to which the same were subject, and was not required to provide for extraordinary emergencies; and that defendant was not guilty if it maintained the railing in the condition required; and was not liable if it were negligent in respect to the railing, unless plaintiff also showed that the accident would not have happened had the bridge been in the condition required. The court further instructed that, if the accident would have happened had the railing been in proper condition, then plaintiff could not recover. The question of proximate cause was left to the jury under these instructions, with the further admonition that they should consider all the evidence in the case relating to the manner in which the accident occurred, how the horses came against the railing, the speed at which they were going, and the force brought against the barrier, and all the other evidence in the case that would aid them in determining the questions submitted. Defendant does not claim that these instructions are faulty in so far as they state abstract propositions of law, but it claims that they are erroneous as applied to the facts, because the real and efficient cause of the injury was the flash of lightning, which caused the horses to jump against the railing, and not the defective condition of the bridge. If the flash of lightning was the proximate cause, then defendant was not responsible. What is the proximate cause of an injury is often a troublesome and perplexing question. Many definitions are given, but, like definitions of reasonable doubt, they tend to obscure rather than to enlighten. It has been defined to be "the efficient cause," "the direct cause," "the cause that set another or other causes in operation," "the dominant cause," and "that cause which set the other in motion, and gave to it its efficiency for harm at the time of the disaster." But as said by Justice Miller in Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 44 (19 L.Ed. 65): "If we could deduct from the cases the best possible expression of the rule, it would remain, after all, to decide each case largely upon the special facts belonging to it, and often upon the very nicest discriminations." Had the evidence shown, as defendant claims, that the horses were frightened and jumped upon the railing, it may be that the case should not have gone to the jury. See McClain v. Town of Garden Grove, 83 Iowa 235 (12 L. R. A. 482). However, we express no opinion on this point, for the reason that the evidence tended to show that the team gradually veered from the main-traveled track against the barrier, and did not jump or fall against it. The off horse was frightened by the lightning, and settled back in his harness. This caused the near horse to pull the load, and the team and vehicle to deviate from its course, and after traveling for some distance at a comparatively slow rate of speed, to come in contact with the railing of the bridge. Now, the court said, in view of this state of facts, that, if the jury found the accident would not have happened had there been sufficient barriers, then the defective barrier...
To continue reading
Request your trial