Walters, In re

• Decision Date: 18 December 1975
• Docket Number: Cr. 18488
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 543 P.2d 607 In re Leonard Austin WALTERS on Habeas Corpus.

Page 239

126 Cal.Rptr. 239

15 Cal.3d 738, 543 P.2d 607

In re Leonard Austin WALTERS on Habeas Corpus.

Cr. 18488.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Dec. 18, 1975.

Richard E. Erwin, Public Defender, for petitioner.

Fred Okrand, Joseph Remcho, Los Angeles and Ephraim Margolin, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Russell Iungerich and Shunji Asari, Deputy Attys. Gen., C. Stanley Trom, Dist. Atty., and Robert J. Bayer, Deputy Dist. Atty., for respondents.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

Petitioner Leonard Austin Walters seeks a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the absence of a judicial determination of probable cause for his detention following a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor renders that detention constitutionally impermissible. (U.S.Const., 4th Amend.; Cal.Const., art. I, §§ 7, 13.) In light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54, we agree with petitioner and hold that a judicial determination of probable cause to hold an arrestee for trial on a misdemeanor charge must be made if the arrestee requests that determination, unless pending trial he is released on his own recognizance. ¹ We will set forth herein pretrial procedural guidelines which in our view satisfy constitutional requirements for such a judicial determination of probable cause to detain for trial those arrested on misdemeanor charges. ²

On February 15, 1975, petitioner was arrested without a warrant by a deputy sheriff on misdemeanor charges of possession of marijuana (Health & Saf.Code, § 11357) and being under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or drug (Pen.Code, § 647, subd. (f)). A complaint charging the two offenses was filed on February 19, 1975, which stated the charges by reciting the language of the relevant code sections. The complaint did not include on its face facts purporting to support the conclusionary statement of the charges. It was signed by a person who did not have personal knowledge of the allegations therein set forth.

Petitioner was arraigned on February 19, pleaded not guilty, and a trial date was set. Bail was fixed at $500. Petitioner requested a preliminary hearing to determine the existence of probable cause for his detention. Defense counsel expressly relied on the Gerstein decision, decided by the United States Supreme Court one day earlier, and stated that 'the court, in misdemeanor cases, cannot hold someone for trial or hold them in custody without having some type of a hearing to determine probable cause for the arrest.' Understandably, neither the judge nor counsel was fully aware of the nature of the hearing necessary on the issue of probable cause. The judge nevertheless ruled, on the basis of the police reports of petitioner's arrest, that there was probable cause to believe 'the crime charged was committed and (that petitioner) committed it. . . .'

Applicability of Gerstein Decision to Instant Case

Petitioner is no longer in pretrial detention and his request for a writ of habeas corpus has thus been rendered moot. However, since the case presents an issue of statewide importance affecting generally the rights of all persons charged with misdemeanors who are detained in custody, it is argued that we 'may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue even though an event occurring during its pendency would normally render the matter moot.' (In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 23, 89 Cal.Rptr. 33, 37, 473 P.2d 737, 741.)

Where questions of general public concern are involved, particularly in the area of the supervision of the administration of criminal justice, we may reject mootness as a bar to a decision on the merits. (See In re Fluery (1967) 67 Cal.2d 600, 601, 63 Cal.Rptr. 298, 432 P.2d 986; In re Newbern (1961) 55 Cal.2d 500, 505, 11 Cal.Rptr. 547, 360 P.2d 43.) Furthermore, habeas corpus is an appropriate procedure for disposing of the present case since it can be used by petitioner to obtain a declaration of rights in the prevailing circumstances. ³ (In re Harrell 1970) 2 circumstances. ³ (In re Harrell (1970) 2 P.2d 640; In re Fluery, supra, 67 Cal.2d 600, 601, 63 Cal.Rptr. 298, 432 P.2d 986; In re Gonzalves (1957) 48 Cal.2d 638, 639, 311 P.2d 483; Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) §§ 789--790, at pp. 762--764; Id. (1973 supp.) § 790, at pp. 604--606.) While this court would have undoubtedly been presented with other habeas corpus petitions seeking to resolve the questions presented herein (cf. In re William M., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 25, 89 Cal.Rptr. 33, 473 P.2d 737), each case would have in turn become moot before we could have acted upon it since the pretrial detention would necessarily have ended. (See Pen.Code, § 1382, subd. 3.) Consequently, we consider petitioner's case an appropriate vehicle for articulating pretrial procedures in misdemeanor cases which must conform with Gerstein. ⁴

Analysis of Gerstein Decision

In Gerstein the United States Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of a pretrial detention following an arrest pursuant to a prosecutor's information when there was no judicial determination of probable cause for pretrial restraint of liberty. That case, which arose in the State of Florida, involved the arrest of one defendant on charges of robbery and of carrying a concealed weapon and of a second defendant on charges of breaking and entering and of assault and battery. The opinion does not indicate that there was an arrest warrant for either defendant. Bail was denied for both defendants.

Under Florida procedures these offenses could be charged by information without a preliminary hearing. Furthermore, once an information was filed, the Florida courts had construed the applicable statute to mean that 'the filing of an information foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing.' (Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. 103, 106, 95 S.Ct. 854, 859, 43 L.Ed.2d 54.) A judicial determination of probable cause could only be obtained under a 'special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30 days . . . and arraignment, which the District Court found was often delayed a month or more after arrest. (Citation.) As a result, a person charged by information could be detained for a substantial period solely on the decision of a prosecutor.' (Id.)

The Supreme Court noted initially that the standards and procedures for arrest And detention are derived from the Fourth Amendment and that the 'standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances 'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense.' (Citations.) This standard, like those for searches and seizures, represents a necessary accommodation between the individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime. . . . To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the Court has required that the existence of probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible.' (Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. 103, 111--112, 95 S.Ct. 854, 862, 43 L.Ed.2d 54.)

The high court held that although warrantless arrests are often necessary, '(o)nce the suspect is in custody . . . the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magistrate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships. (Citation.) Even pretrial release may be accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint of liberty. (Citation.) When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protections from unfounded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.' (Id., at p. 114, 95 S.Ct. at 863.)

Noting that state systems of criminal procedure vary widely and that flexibility in those systems is desirable, the court held that adversary safeguards generally were 'not essential for the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment.' (Id., at p. 120, 95 S.Ct. at p. 866.) It stated that the standard for determining probable cause to detain 'is the same as that for arrest . . .--probable cause to believe the suspect has committed the crime--traditionally . . . decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and and written testimony . . ..' (Id.) Such informal procedures were deemed to be 'justified not only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determination itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt.' (Id., at p. 121, 95 S.Ct. at p. 867.) The court held that although the confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses might improve the reliability of a probable cause determination, such formalities were not constitutionally required. The court further stated that '(b)ecause of its limited function and its nonadversary character, the probable cause determination is not a 'critical stage' in the prosecution that would...