Walters v. City of Tampa

• Decision Date: 02 August 1924
• Citation: 88 Fla. 177,101 So. 227
• Parties: WALTERS et al. v. CITY OF TAMPA et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

101 So. 227

88 Fla. 177

WALTERS et al. v. CITY OF TAMPA et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

August 2, 1924

Suit by Sallie H. Walters and husband against the City of Tampa and another. From a decree for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Special taxing districts for public improvements at cost of abutting property on frontage basis valid. It may be regarded as definitely settled that the Legislature of a state may create, or authorize the creation of, special taxing districts and charge the cost of a local improvement, in whole or in part, upon the property in such districts or according to valuation or superficial area, or frontage without violating the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, and that the whole expense of paving or improving a street or highway may be assessed by a municipality pursuant to statutory authority, upon the lands abutting the street or highway so improved in proportion to the feet frontage of such lands, without providing for a judicial inquiry into the value of such lands and the benefits actually to accrue to them by the proposed improvement.

Term 'local improvements' may extend to electric lights sewers, waterworks, widening and sprinkling streets. The term, 'local improvements,' under proper restrictions, may extend to the installation of electric lights, sewers, waterworks, widening, and sprinkling streets. Ewart v. Village of Western Springs, 180 Ill. 318 54 N.E. 478; Ryder's Estate v. City of Alton, 175 Ill. 94, 51 N.E. 821; Smith v. City of Seattle, 25 Wash. 300, 65 P. 612; Cook v. Slocum, 27 Minn 509, 8 N.W. 755.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; L. L. Parks, judge.

COUNSEL

D. C. McMullen and James B. Gibson, Jr., both of Tampa, for appellants.

Hilton S. Hampton, of Tampa, for appellees.

OPINION

TERRELL J.

Sallie H. Walters, joined by her husband John A. Walters, brought suit against the city of Tampa, seeking to restrain the 'repaving, regrading, and widening' of a certain portion of Seventh avenue in said city, and for the purpose of canceling the contract therefor; the grounds of such action being that chapter 9298, Acts of 1923, Laws of Florida, undr which said repaving, regrading, and widening is proposed to be done, is void and inoperative.

The first ground of attack on chapter 9298 is that it attempts to authorize a municipality to take property without due process of law, and denies to owners of property in municipalities in this state equal protection of the law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that it provides for the assessment of the costs of local improvements on the basis of front footage, or by the front foot rule.

This ground of attack is without merit, and so conclusively settled contrary to the contention of appellants in the concluding paragraph of section 1436, p. 2524, vol. 4, Dillon on Municipal Corporations, that we do not feel that we can do better than to quote the rule as prescribed by this eminent author, as follows:

'As a result of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, it may be regarded as definitely settled that the Legislature of a state may create, or authorize the creation of, special taxing districts and charge the cost of a local improvement, in whole or in part, upon the property in such districts or according to valuation or superficial area, or frontage, without violating the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution; and that the whole expense of paving or improving a street or highway may be assessed by a municipality pursuant to statutory authority upon the lands abutting upon the street or highway so improved in proportion to the feet frontage of such lands without providing for a judicial inquiry into the value of such lands and the benefits actually to accrue to them by the proposed improvement.'

See 5 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, § 2089; French v. Barver Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 21 S.Ct. 625, 45 L.Ed. 879; Anderson v. City of Ocala, 67 Fla. 204, 64 So. 775, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 287.

There is no charge here that the assessment complained of exceeds the benefits to appellants' lots, that it is out of proportion to similar assessments for like purposes in the same vicinity, or that it is in any other respect unjust or inequitable.

The contention that said chapter 9298, Acts of 1923, is invalid because the property owner has no voice in initiating the improvements for which the assessment is made, or in determining their necessity, is equally without merit. Hetrick v. Village of Lindsey, 44 S.Ct. 486, 68 L.Ed. 1065.

It is next contended that the act in question is violative of section 16 of article 3 of the Constitution, because the subject-matter embraced in sections 1, 10, and 11 thereof is not properly expressed in the title.

The title of chapter 9298, Acts of 1923, is as follows:

'An act providing a supplemental, additional and alternative method of making local improvements in cities, towns, and municipal corporations, authorizing and providing for special assessments for the cost thereof, and authorizing the issuance and sale of bonds of such municipalities in connection with said local improvements, said bonds to be general obligations of the municipalities.'

Section 1 of said chapter 9298 in effect provides that any city town, or municipal corporation in this state may by its governing authority provide for the construction, leveling, repair, paving, repaving, hard surfacing, and rehardsurfacing of streets, boulevards, and sidewalks, and for the payment of all or any part of the...