Walters v. Iowa Elec. Co.

• Citation: 203 Iowa 467,212 N.W. 886
• Decision Date: 15 March 1927
• Docket Number: No. 38039.,38039.
• Parties: WALTERS v. IOWA ELECTRIC CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

203 Iowa 467

212 N.W. 886

WALTERS

v.IOWA ELECTRIC CO.

No. 38039.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 15, 1927.

Appeal from District Court, Guthrie County; W. G. Vander Ploeg, Judge.

Action to recover damages by reason of the destruction of certain personal property by fire, alleged by plaintiff to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in the operation of its electric transmission lines. Cause tried to a jury resulting in a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $1,300. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and the defendant appeals. Affirmed.John A. Reed and C. E. Richmann, both of Cedar Rapids, and Harry Wifvat, of Perry, for appellant.

A. M. Fagan, of Casey, for appellee.

DE GRAFF, J.

Plaintiff was the owner of various articles of personal property alleged to have been destroyed by fire caused by the negligence of the defendant in the maintenance and operation of its electrical transmission line. The personal property was located on a farm occupied by the instant plaintiff, but the farm was owned by his father, R. L. Walters.

The material facts and the controlling principle of legal liability in the case at bar are stated in the case of R. L. Walters v. Iowa Electric Co., 212 N. W. 884, decided at this term of court. There is no occasion for repetition either of fact or legal statement.

[1] A reversible point is stressed by the defendant that the court erred in permitting testimony to be offered on behalf of plaintiff as to certain statements or admissions made by one C. T. Harney on the evening of the day of the fire.

C. T. Harney was admittedly the division manager of the defendant Iowa Electric Company in that district. He had been notified of the fire very shortly after its occurrence by R. L. Walters, the owner of the farm. Harney came to the scene about 6 or 6:30 o'clock that evening. Two witnesses, R. L. Walters and George Hubbard, testified that each had a conversation on the evening in question with Mr. Harney with regard to the origin of the fire, and, over proper and timely objections on the part of the defendant, were further permitted to testify that Mr. Harney said he (Harney) did not have any doubt as to the origin of the fire. The exact testimony of Hubbard is as follows:

“We were talking about the knot, and he (Harney) said: ‘I don't think there is the least doubt but that is what started the fire.’ He was referring to the tree. That is what we were talking about--was the fire in the tree at that time.”

Harney, as a witness on behalf of the defendant, admitted that he had a talk with R. L. Walters, but denied that he told Walters how the fire started. “I never made a statement to Mr. Hubbard that the electric wires had caused the fire.” We disregard the conflict in the testimony in this particular, as the material question involves the admissibility of the evidence in the first instance.

The challenged testimony as to the cause of the fire may be viewed as either the expression of an opinion on the part of Harney as an individual or the expression of an opinion on the part of Harney as an agent of the defendant corporation. Under either viewpoint the objections and the motion to strike should have been sustained.

It is said in Kelly v. Muscatine, B. & S. R. Co., 195 Iowa, 17, 191 N. W. 525:

“We are committed to the rule that when all the pertinent facts can be sufficiently detailed and described to enable the jurors to form a correct conclusion without the aid of opinions no exception to the rule excluding opinion evidence will be tolerated”--citing cases.

It is apparent that the subject-matter under discussion with Harney was the cause of the fire, and what he said was but an expression of opinion based on the facts which he had before him at that time. Under the rule stated his personal opinion was incompetent to go to the jury.

[2] We next inquire, Was he an agent of the defendant, and, as such agent, competent to bind his principal as to the matter in question? It is a well-recognized rule that the offering party, under the circumstances of this character, must show that the party making the declaration was a competent party to act for his principal in relation...