Walters v. JC Penney Co., Inc.

• Citation: 82 P.3d 578,2003 OK 100
• Decision Date: 25 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 98,586.,98,586.
• Parties: Rodney James WALTERS, individually and as parent and next of kin to Rodney James Walters, Jr., a minor, and Special Joy Bell, a minor, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. J.C. PENNEY COMPANY, INC., a Delaware corporation, Chris Emler, an employee of J.C. Penney Company, Inc., and Steve Anderson, an employee of J.C. Penney Company, Inc., Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma

82 P.3d 578

2003 OK 100

Rodney James WALTERS, individually and as parent and next of kin to Rodney James Walters, Jr., a minor, and Special Joy Bell, a minor, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. J.C. PENNEY COMPANY, INC., a Delaware corporation, Chris Emler, an employee of J.C. Penney Company, Inc., and Steve Anderson, an employee of J.C. Penney Company, Inc., Defendants/Appellees.

No. 98,586.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

November 25, 2003.

Vaughn Conway, Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellants.

Kenneth A. Brokaw, Day, Edwards, Federman, Propester & Christensen, P.C., Oklahoma City, OK, for Appellees.¹

OPALA, V.C.J.

¶ 1 The sole issue tendered on certiorari is whether the nisi prius court erred when it gave summary judgment to the defendants on the false imprisonment claim. We answer in the affirmative. Although, like the Court of Civil Appeals [COCA], we reverse the trial court's disposition, today's resolution is effected by legal conclusions that differ from those reached by the appellate court's pronouncement. We hence vacate COCA's opinion, declare the issues that stand settled by the law of the case, reverse the summary judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings to be consistent with today's pronouncement.

I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

¶ 2 This controversy arose when Rodney James Walters [Walters] was detained by Chris Emler [Emler] and Steve Anderson [Anderson], two employees of J.C. Penney Company, Inc. [J.C. Penney], on the suspicion that he had shoplifted a sweater from the store. Walters alleges that on 23 December 2000 he had been shopping with his two minor children at the J.C. Penney store in Quail Springs Mall in Oklahoma City. He submits that shortly after they left the store and while they were in the mall, Emler and Anderson violently "grabbed" his hand and the back of his sweater, falsely identified themselves as police officers, accused him of shoplifting the sweater he was wearing, handcuffed him, and led him back through the mall to the J.C. Penney store. Although Walters offered to prove the sweater had been purchased at the store earlier in the week, they called the Oklahoma City Police Department and continued to detain him. Even after it was determined he had in fact purchased the sweater, the police were not advised of this fact until after they had arrived at the store to arrest Walters.

¶ 3 Walters and his two children (collectively called Walters) brought an action against J.C. Penney and its employees for his wrongful detention, resting the claim on multiple theories of liability.² J.C. Penney invoked the provisions of 22 O.S.2001 §§ 1343, 1344,³ whose joint effect is to create a statutory defense for merchants premised on a presumption of probable cause for the detention of a suspected shoplifter, and moved for summary disposition of the claim in its favor. The trial court gave summary judgment to J.C. Penney on all theories pressed. COCA held that the trial court correctly disposed of certain issues but declared other issues unfit for summary resolution. The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings to be consistent with its pronouncement. Certiorari was granted on J.C. Penney's petition.

II STANDARD OF REVIEW ON SUMMARY PROCESS

¶ 4 Summary process—a special pretrial procedural track pursued with the aid of acceptable probative substitutes⁴—is a search for undisputed material facts which, sans forensic combat, may be utilized in the judicial decision-making process.⁵ Summary relief is permissible where neither the material facts nor any inferences that may be drawn from uncontested facts are in dispute, and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense.⁶ Only those evidentiary materials which eliminate from trial some or all fact issues on the merits of the claim or defense afford legitimate support for nisi prius resort to summary process.⁷

¶ 5 Summary relief issues stand before us for de novo review.⁸ All facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant.⁹ Just as nisi prius courts are called upon to do, so also appellate tribunals bear an affirmative duty to test for its legal sufficiency all evidentiary material tendered in summary process to support the relief sought by the movant.¹⁰ Only if the court should conclude that there is no material fact (or inference) in dispute and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense is the moving party entitled to summary judgment in its favor.¹¹

III CERTAIN ADVERSE COCA ISSUE RESOLUTIONS, WHICH THE PARTIES HAVE FAILED TO RE-PRESS OR OTHERWISE TENDER ON CERTIORARI, ARE DECLARED TO CONSTITUTE SETTLED LAW OF THE CASE

¶ 6 The settled-law-of-the-case doctrine bars from relitigation issues finally determined in the review process or those that the aggrieved party has failed to raise in the course of the appellate contest.¹² Issues resolved by COCA but not explicitly re-pressed for certiorari review are deemed abandoned and beyond this court's cognizance for corrective relief.¹³

¶ 7 COCA held the trial court correctly gave summary relief to J.C. Penney on four theories of liability advanced by Walters—assault and battery, malicious prosecution, negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.¹⁴ Walters has failed to preserve these issues for corrective relief by timely including them in a petition for certiorari. The correctness of these adverse COCA dispositions now lies beyond the scope of this court's reviewing cognizance.

¶ 8 COCA declared that the actionability of the remaining three theories of recovery— false imprisonment, slander and pecuniary damages—presents material issues of fact for the jury and are hence unfit for summary disposition. J.C. Penney's certiorari argument addresses only the first issue, that of false imprisonment. Because it has failed to press for review COCA's resolution of the slander and pecuniary damages issues, they too are deemed waived. No relief avails any longer from those adverse COCA dispositions.¹⁵ The sole remaining issue tendered for corrective relief by certiorari proceedings now before us is the actionable and triable character of Walters' false imprisonment claim.

IV THE FALSE IMPRISONMENT THEORY OF LIABILITY

¶ 9 False imprisonment is a common-law wilful tort.¹⁶ The essential elements of the tort are (a) the detention of a person against his (or her) will and (b) the unlawfulness of the detention.¹⁷ At common law a merchant who detained another on a reasonable but mistaken belief that the person had stolen some merchandise would have been subject to a claim for false imprisonment.¹⁸ The legislature modified this ancient rule by its enactment of 22 O.S.2001 §§ 1343¹⁹ and 1344.²⁰ The terms of § 1343 protect from civil and criminal liability a merchant who (a) has reasonable grounds or probable cause to believe that a person has wrongfully shoplifted merchandise and (b) detains that person in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time.²¹ Section 1344 creates a presumption of probable cause to believe that concealed unpurchased merchandise was shoplifted.

¶ 10 J.C. Penney interposed these statutory provisions as its defenses to Walters' false imprisonment claim. Its certiorari brief primarily challenges COCA's declaration that the § 1344 presumption of probable cause does not avail here because the merchandise in suit was not concealed. According to J.C. Penney, (a) COCA's narrow construction of § 1344 thwarts the legislative intent and (b) the statutory presumption should be invocable when the merchandise is either concealed or in plain sight. J.C. Penney urges there are sufficient undisputed facts in the record to support its claim to the statutory defense.

A. The 22 O.S.2001 § 1344 Presumption Of Probable Cause Is Not Invocable in the Scenario Unfolded by the Proof

¶ 11 The terms of § 1344 create the presumption that when unpurchased merchandise is concealed, the act (1) is done with the intention of depriving the owner of the property and (2) the merchant may view it as conclusive of reasonable grounds or of probable cause for the detention of a suspected shoplifter. The presence of two critical elements is required for the invocation of this statutory presumption—the merchandise in question must be both "unpurchased" and "concealed." Section 1344 is a penal statute and must be strictly construed.²² The words in a statute are to be understood in their ordinary legal sense except when a contrary intention plainly appears.²³ Section 1344 clearly does not raise a probable cause presumption for purchased merchandise worn in plain view.²⁴

¶ 12 The statutory presumption is facially inapplicable to the scenario unfolded by the proof in this case. It is undisputed that the blue sweater—plainly in sight—but suspected of having been shoplifted was not stolen but rather had been purchased a few days earlier at the same Penney's store. A probable cause presumption is clearly not justified by the facts elicited.

B. Conflicting Inferences May Be Drawn From Uncontroverted Facts On Which J.C. Penney Relied For Summary Judgment On Its § 1343 Defense Against The False Imprisonment Claim

¶ 13 Against the false imprisonment claim J.C. Penney interposed the § 1343 defenses of probable cause and of the reasonableness of the detention. These two critical and dispositive fact issues call for application of a variable (rather than legally fixed)²⁵standard of care. That standard shifts with the circumstances of each case.²⁶ A variable standard that is one's due is judged by objective criteria. We pose and must resolve here the issue whether the facts available to the detaining party would warrant a reasonably prudent person to believe that the person in question had been shoplifting.²⁷ Because there exist no fashioned legal standards for gauging the invoked § 1343 defenses,²⁸ the presence (or absence) of probable cause and the reasonableness of the...