Walters v. Mcmahen

Decision Date06 July 2011
Docket NumberCivil Action No. RDB–11–0751.
Citation795 F.Supp.2d 350
PartiesBizzie WALTERS, et al., Plaintiffs,v.Todd McMAHEN, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Frederic W. Scott Lucas, The Cochran Firm, Washington, DC, Howard M. Foster, Matthew Adam Galin, Foster PC, Chicago, IL, Lance Victor Oliver, Rebecca M. Deupree, Motley Rice LLC, Mt. Pleasant, SC, Robert J Camp, The Cochran Firm Birmingham, Birmingham, AL, William H. Narwold, Motley Rice LLC, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiffs.Brooks R. Amiot, Linda Marie Boyd, Jackson Lewis LLP, Baltimore, MD, Allan Stephen Rubin, Christina A. Daskas, Lawrence Bryant Shulman, Jackson Lewis LLP, Southfield, MI, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD D. BENNETT, District Judge.

On March 22, 2010, Plaintiffs Bizzie Walters, Annie Hodge, Annette Baldwin, Katrena Cooper and Barbara Allen filed a Class Action Complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama and initiated this class action lawsuit. Plaintiffs name as Defendants twenty-nine current and former Perdue Farms, Inc. (“Perdue”) employees.1 In a one count conspiracy claim, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired to depress the wages of the legal, hourly-paid employees of Perdue in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. through a scheme of hiring and falsely attesting to the work authorization of large numbers of illegal immigrants.

On May 28, 2010, Defendants filed a motion for joinder of Perdue, transfer of venue and/or dismissal and for stay of discovery. (ECF No. 61). Concurrently, Perdue filed a motion to intervene in the suit. (ECF No. 63). Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint (ECF No. 80) on June, 18, 2010. Plaintiffs filed this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of a class consisting of all other persons legally authorized to be employed in the U.S., who have been employed at any of the Perdue facilities identified in this action as hourly wage earners in the four years prior to the filing of this case and up through trial. Am. Compl. ¶ 185. On March 18, 2011, this case was transferred from the Middle District of Alabama to this Court, (ECF No. 147) and on April 5, 2011, Perdue withdrew its motion to intervene. (ECF No. 163).

Presently pending before this Court is Defendants' Motion for Dismissal (ECF No. 61).2 The Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Plaintiffs have filed a response in opposition to Defendants' motion (ECF No. 179). The parties' submissions have been reviewed and this Court held a hearing on June 9, 2011, pursuant to Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md.2010) 3

The Plaintiffs' one count civil RICO claim in this case relies on an expansive legal theory previously rejected by other United States District Courts. Essentially, the claim is that midlevel human resources employees have engaged in a conspiracy to indirectly enrich themselves by causing Perdue to violate United States immigration laws, thereby increasing its net profit, thereby increasing the potentiality of higher salaries for its employees. See infra n. 13. This claim is simply not plausible. The logical extent of that legal theory would be to create civil RICO causes of action as to any allegedly illegal human resources decisions made by mid-level corporate employees. Furthermore, even if this theory were plausible, a corporation cannot conspire with its employees and, with rare exception, employees of a corporation, when acting within the scope of their employment, cannot conspire among themselves. No exceptions to this intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, well recognized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, apply in this case. As the Plaintiffs simply have no discernible independent personal stake in this matter, any effort to further amend their complaint would be futile. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 61) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. Background

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, [t]he factual allegations in the Plaintiff's complaint must be accepted as true and those facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir.1999).

Defendants are employees of Perdue, the alleged third largest poultry processing company in the United States. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Perdue is headquartered in Salisbury, Maryland and owns and operates poultry processing facilities in Dothan, Alabama; Perry, Georgia; Monterey, Tennessee; Cromwell, Kentucky; Dillon, South Carolina; Accomac, Virginia; Bridgewater, Virginia; Concord, North Carolina; Georgetown, Delaware; Lewiston, North Carolina; Milford, Delaware; Rockingham, North Carolina; Salisbury, Maryland; and Washington, Indiana. Id. ¶ 3, 4. Plaintiffs allege that “Corporate Co–Conspirators,” including defendants Helfin and Miller, conspired with unnamed “Facility Co–Conspirators” and the other named Defendants, employees in Perdue's Human Resources (“HR”) departments, to implement a scheme of hiring illegal immigrants. Id. ¶ 43. Plaintiffs allege that these hiring practices save Perdue millions of dollars in labor costs because illegal immigrants will work longer hours for lower wages than American citizens. Id. ¶ 43. Plaintiffs allege that these practices depress the wages of Perdue's legally authorized workers. Id. ¶ 184.

Plaintiffs state that corporate management directs HR managers and their staff members to accept false documents from illegal immigrants and to falsely attest to the authenticity of such documents in the hiring process. Id. ¶ 45. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants therefore engage in a host of illegal practices, including but not limited to: hiring workers who were previously employed at Perdue using different identifications, hiring workers known to be present in the United States illegally or using facially false documents, and hiring workers who use multiple sets of documents in order to work extra shifts. Id. ¶ 46.

Plaintiffs allege that these practices are pervasive and that a scheme of illegal hiring is in place at each of Perdue's processing facilities. Id. ¶ 184. At the Dothan plant, for example, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants Dozier, Hollis, Alberto Asyn, Elana Fernandez and other unnamed parties in the HR department use “some or all” of the hiring practices alleged in ¶¶ 45–46. Id. ¶ 68. Plaintiffs lay out the corporate hierarchy at the plant, stating that Dozier is responsible for assisting McMahen and other corporate officers in setting the class's wages below market rates. Plaintiffs further assert that McMahen knows and approves of an immigration law conspiracy at the Dothan facility. Id. ¶ 74. Plaintiffs repeat functionally the same argument as to the named Defendants at the Perry facility, Id. ¶¶ 80–90; the Monterey facility, Id. ¶¶ 91–105; the Cromwell facility, Id. ¶¶ 106–21; the Dillon facility, Id. ¶¶ 122–35; and the Accomac facility, Id. ¶¶ 136–48. Plaintiffs further allege, on information and belief, that the same illegal hiring conspiracy is in place at Perdue's eight other facilities: Bridgewater, Id. ¶¶ 149–52; Concord, Id. ¶¶ 153–56; Georgetown, Id. ¶¶ 157–60; Lewiston, Id. ¶¶ 161–64; Milford, Id. ¶¶ 165–68; Rockingham, Id. ¶¶ 169–72; Salisbury, Id. ¶¶ 173–76 Washington, Id. ¶ ¶ 177–80.

Plaintiffs allege that Perdue's hiring practices are RICO predicate acts.4 First, Plaintiffs allege that certain Defendants violated 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A),5 a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(F), by knowingly hiring hundreds of unauthorized and fraudulently documented workers, who had been brought into the United States from Mexico with assistance. Id. ¶ 53, 54. Second, Plaintiffs allege that certain Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b)(1), (2) and (3), racketeering acts under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B), by accepting fake or fraudulent documents from newly hired workers and making false attestations as to their legal status on I–9 forms.6 Id. ¶ 56, 57. Conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity is illegal under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), and Plaintiffs therefore allege that Defendants, though their scheme of illegal hiring violated § 1962(d), which finds unlawful any conspiracy to violate § 1962(a)- (c).

II. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; therefore, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.1999). When ruling on such a motion, the court must “accept the well-pled allegations of the complaint as true,” and “construe the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir.1997).

A complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Simmons v. United Mort. and Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 768 (4th Cir.2011); Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir.2009). Under the plausibility standard, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be...

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