Walters v. Weiss

• Decision Date: 17 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-3674.,03-3674.
• Citation: 392 F.3d 306
• Parties: Janice WALTERS, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons whose child support is processed by and through the Central Disbursement Agency, Margaret Powell, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons whose child support is processed by and through the Central Disbursement Agency, Appellants, Shari Rush, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons whose child support is processed by and through the Central Disbursement Agency, Appellant, Brandi McCloud, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons whose child support is processed by and through the Central Disbursement Agency, Appellant, v. Richard WEISS, as Director of the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration; Dan McDonald, as Director of the Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement of the Revenue Division; J.D. Gingerich, as Administrative Director of the Administrative Office of Courts, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

392 F.3d 306

Janice WALTERS, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons whose child support is processed by and through the Central Disbursement Agency, Margaret Powell, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons whose child support is processed by and through the Central Disbursement Agency, Appellants Shari Rush, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons whose child support is processed by and through the Central Disbursement Agency, Appellant Brandi McCloud, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons whose child support is processed by and through the Central Disbursement Agency, Appellant, v. Richard WEISS, as Director of the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration; Dan McDonald, as Director of the Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement of the Revenue Division; J.D. Gingerich, as Administrative Director of the Administrative Office of Courts, Appellees.

No. 03-3674.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: September 16, 2004.

Filed: December 17, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Brian Paddock, argued, Cookeville, TN (Theresa L. Caldwell and Barbara Elmore, on the brief), for appellant.

Mark A. Hagemeier, argued, Little Rock, AR (Mike Beebe and Sherri L. Robinson, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MURPHY, McMILLIAN and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

MCMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

A class of custodial parents ("plaintiffs") who receive child support payments collected, distributed, and disbursed by a statewide distribution unit ("SDU") operated by the Office of Child Support Enforcement ("OCSE") of the State of Arkansas ("the State") appeals from a final order entered in the United States District Court¹ for the Eastern District of Arkansas granting summary judgment in favor of Arkansas officials ("defendants") on plaintiffs' claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For reversal, plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in holding that they have failed as a matter of law to establish a violation of a federal statutory right that is enforceable under § 1983 or to establish a violation of a federal constitutional right. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

Plaintiffs initially filed this action in Arkansas state court, and defendants removed the case to federal court. The district court granted plaintiffs' request for class certification. Some of plaintiffs' claims were dismissed, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In addressing the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court set forth plaintiffs' pending claims as follows:

First Claim: Defendants' failure to provide Plaintiffs with prompt disbursement of support collected violates Plaintiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 654(27) and 654B which requires that the Defendants' state distribution unit distribute child support payments within two business days.

Third Claim: Defendants' failure to provide Plaintiffs with prompt, accurate, timely, frequent and meaningful notice of support collected and distributed violates Plaintiffs' rights under 42 U.S.C. § 654(5).

Fourth Claim: Plaintiffs claim that the denial of accurate, timely, frequent and meaningful notice of payment, collection, allocation and disbursement of child support funds violates Plaintiffs' rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Seventh Claim: Plaintiffs claim a denial of an administrative procedural mechanism for correction of errors and delays and meaningful notice of any administrative remedy in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Tenth Claim: Plaintiffs assert that 42 U.S.C. § 657 confers a specific right to be free from administrative costs and fees taken from support payments and to be free from the practice of recoupment to recover from agency errors.

Eleventh Claim: Plaintiffs claim that they are deprived of property by the taking of "administrative fees" from support.²

Walters v. Weiss, No. 4:01-CV-00628, slip op. at 1-2, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, ___-___, 2003 WL 23945621 (E.D.Ark. Oct. 16, 2003) (hereinafter "slip op.").

The district court held that 42 U.S.C. §§ 654(27) and 654B do not create an individually-enforceable federal right to have child support payments distributed within two business days. Id. at 4-8, ___ F.Supp.2d at ___-___ (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 117 S.Ct. 1353, 137 L.Ed.2d 569 (1997) (Blessing)). The district court determined that, consistent with Blessing and in view of the absence of any "`rights-creating' language" in those statutory provisions, Congress's underlying intent was to improve the overall efficiency of the states' child support enforcement programs, not to create individual rights. See slip op. at 8, ___ F.Supp.2d at ___ (citing, e.g., Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002)). The district court similarly concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 654(5) does not create an individually-enforceable right to receive "prompt, accurate, timely, frequent and meaningful notice of support collected and distributed," as asserted by plaintiffs. Id. at 8-9, ___ F.Supp.2d at ___-___. Regarding plaintiffs' claims that the OCSE's methods of collecting administrative fees and costs and recouping erroneous overpayments violate an individual right conferred under 42 U.S.C. § 657, the district court noted that plaintiffs have no right to keep funds exceeding amounts collected on their behalf and that 42 U.S.C. § 654(6) specifically provides for the collection of administrative fees and costs. Id. at 10-11, ___ F.Supp.2d at ___-___. The district court next addressed plaintiffs' procedural due process claims, in which they claimed that a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of property resulted from mistakes made by the State when recouping overpayments and assessing administrative fees and costs. Id. at 11, ___ F.Supp.2d at ___. The district court reasoned that, because Title IV-D does not impose an unambiguous, binding obligation on the states to distribute child support and to provide detailed notice in the manner demanded by plaintiffs, they had failed to establish a liberty or property interest protected by the due process clause. Id. The district court additionally observed that plaintiffs "ha[d] not demonstrated that the state law remedies are inadequate." Id. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment as moot. Id. at 11-12, ___ F.Supp.2d at ___-___. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

Discussion

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. The question before the district court, and this court on appeal, is whether the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where, as in the present case, the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary judgment is particularly appropriate. See Crain v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 920 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (8th Cir.1990).

On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that the district court erred in dismissing their tenth claim for relief. Plaintiffs contend that the error results from the district court's misunderstanding of their claim. They explain:

The custodial parents never contended they are entitled to payments in excess of the total amount collected pursuant to an order for child support. Neither have custodial parents contended they were immune to state law procedures afforded to the state as a creditor for the repayment of overpayments. But section 657 makes no provision for refusing to disburse support collected for the family because the IV-D agency's prior errors resulted in an alleged earlier overpayment.

The issue is whether the State may unilaterally assert a "self-help" remedy and elevate itself to a preferred creditor status when there are no federal statutory or regulatory provisions authorizing this action.

Brief for Appellant at 16.

In other words, plaintiffs maintain that they are not disputing the State's right to recover past overpayments; rather, they are disputing the way in which the State exercises that right. More specifically, plaintiffs contend that the State is improperly failing to distribute funds in strict compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 657. They argue: "distribution in strict compliance with Section 657 is a right enforceable by a custodial parent," which the district court "wholly failed to recognize." Id. at 19. Plaintiffs quote the following language from Blessing to suggest that such an individually-enforceable federal right has been recognized by the Supreme Court.

We do not foreclose the possibility that some provisions of Title IV-D give rise to individual rights. The lower court did not separate out the particular rights it believed arise from the statutory scheme, and we think the complaint is less than clear in this regard. For example, [one of the plaintiffs] alleged that the state agency managed to collect some support payments from her ex-husband but failed to pass through the first $50 of each payment, to which she was purportedly entitled under the pre-1996 version of § 657(b)(1). Although § 657 may give her a federal right to receive a specified portion of the money collected on her behalf by [the State], she did not explicitly request such relief in the complaint.

520 U.S. at 345-46, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (quoted in Brief for Appellants at 18) (citation omitted).

Moreover, in...