Wright v. Family Support Div. of Mo. Dep't of Soc. Servs.
| Decision Date | 01 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:19-CV-398-RWS |
| Citation | 458 F.Supp.3d 1098 |
| Parties | Nathan WRIGHT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FAMILY SUPPORT DIVISION OF MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Phil Telfeyan, Marissa Hatton, Pro Hac Vice, Rebecca Rose Ramaswamy, Equal Justice under Law, Washington, DC, Stephanie Michelle Lummus, The Cook Group PLLC, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff Camese Bedford.
Marissa Hatton, Pro Hac Vice, Rebecca Rose Ramaswamy, Equal Justice under Law, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs Ashley Gildehaus, Lisa Mancini.
Laura M. Robb, Robert Woods Phillips, Attorney General of Missouri, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant Missouri Department of Social Services Family Support Division.
Laura M. Robb, Attorney General of Missouri, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants Jennifer Tidball, Kenneth Zellers, Reginald McElhannon, Joseph Plaggenberg.
This case is before me on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and for failing to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In their complaint, Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Missouri's system for suspending the driver's licenses of non-custodial parents who are unable to pay court-ordered child support. For the reasons discussed below, I will grant Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiffs’ equal protection and fundamental rights claims but will deny the motion as to the procedural due process claim.
Plaintiffs in this case are non-custodial parents who have had their driver's licenses suspended by the Missouri Department of Social Services’ Family Support Division ("FSD"). Am. Compl. at ¶ 15-18. Defendants are the Family Support Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services, Michael Parson in his official capacity as Governor of Missouri, Jennifer Tidball in her official capacity as Acting Director of the Missouri Department of Social Services, Reginald McElhannon in his official capacity as Interim Director of the Family Support Division, Kenneth Zellers in his official capacity as Acting Director of the Missouri Department of Revenue, and Joseph Plaggenberg in his official capacity as Director of the Motor Vehicle and Driver Licensing Division of the Missouri Department of Revenue (collectively, "Defendants").
Plaintiffs filed this action on March 4, 2019 and filed an amended complaint on August 30, 2019. In the amended complaint Plaintiffs asserted the following claims: (1) violation of equal protection and fundamental fairness under Griffin v. Illinois and Bearden v. Georgia; (2) violation of equal protection under San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez; (3) violation of fundamental right to travel; (4) violation of equal protection under James v. Strange; and (5) violation of procedural due process.
After filing their amended complaint, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction and a motion to certify a class on November 1, 2019. Defendants then filed their motion to dismiss on November 4, 2019. A hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction and motion for class certification was held on December 12, 2019 before United States District Judge Ronnie L. White. The case was subsequently transferred to me. Since the motions for preliminary injunction and class certification will depend on the outcome of the motion to dismiss, I am ruling on it first.
Under Missouri law, the FSD has the authority to issue an order suspending the driver's licenses of parents who fail to pay child support. § 454.1003 RSMo. The statute provides that FSD may suspend the license of any person who is $2500 or three or more months in arrears, whichever is less. Id. The law does not provide an indigency exception. FSD suspended Plaintiffs’ licenses under this statute. The suspensions caused hardships to Plaintiffs, making it difficult for them to maintain employment, see their children, and take care of the children in their custody. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 15-18, 152.
Under the statute, 60 days before FSD suspends the license of a person in arrears, FSD is required to send notice to the person. § 454.1003 RSMo. As outlined in the statute, the notice lists three options for preventing license suspension: pay off the arrearage, enter a payment plan approved by FSD or the court, or request a hearing before the court or the director. Am. Compl. at ¶ 128. The notice does not indicate that any of the options will take into account a person's ability to pay. Am. Compl. at ¶ 27.
Despite the notice requirement, several plaintiffs do not recall receiving notice prior to their license suspension. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 45, 72. Additionally, when FSD sends the notice, the recipient often receives the notice after the 60 day reply period has elapsed. Am. Compl., Ex. 9, at ¶ 4. Even when Plaintiffs received notice, they were unable to effectively contest the license suspension. Because of their indigency, Plaintiffs were unable to pay off their arrears. The payment plans offered by FSD often did not allow for Plaintiffs to reduce their payments below their current support order amounts, or they required payments that were still beyond Plaintiffs’ financial means. Am. Compl. at ¶ 130.
The last option for preventing a license suspension is a hearing either before the FSD Director or a state court. Am. Compl. at ¶ 131. The hearing process also does not allow for consideration of an individual's ability to pay. Am. Compl. at ¶ 131. The only issues that may be addressed in the hearing are whether the parent is the correct person; whether the arrearage is greater than or equal to $2500 or three months of support payments; and whether the parent has entered a payment plan. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 131, 132. Because of these limitations, Plaintiffs were unable to effectively contest license suspension, even though their failure to pay was non-willful.
Plaintiffs also contend that once the state suspends a license, it is difficult to stay the suspension or have the license reinstated. Am. Compl. at ¶ 134-148. For Plaintiffs to have their licenses reinstated, FSD or a court must determine that the arrearage was paid in full. § 454.1013.1 RSMo. Additionally, FSD only offers stays if parents begin making timely payments in accordance with their current child support order and toward their arrears. FSD is statutorily prohibited from issuing stays based solely upon hardship; only a court may provide a stay for hardship. Am. Compl. at ¶ 136; § 454.1010.3 RSMo. According to Plaintiffs, in practice, the process for obtaining a stay or reinstatement is unclear and inconsistent. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 139, 142.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs have been living without their driver's licenses. Because Plaintiffs’ licenses are suspended, they have been unable to maintain steady work, pay child support, and in some cases, have been unable to regularly see their children. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 59, 159-166. Additionally, many of the plaintiffs without alternatives elect to drive with a suspended license, risking criminal charges, in order to get to work or pick up their children from school. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 152, 174-179.
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate if the party asserting jurisdiction has failed to satisfy a threshold jurisdictional requirement. See Herden v. United States, 726 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2013). "Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction – its very power to hear the case – there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1990). Therefore, when ruling upon a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), a district court is free to review matters outside of the complaint such as affidavits and documents. Id. at 729–31. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion is distinct in that, unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, when a factual challenge to jurisdiction is made by a movant there is no presumptive truthfulness attached to a plaintiff's allegations in the complaint. Id. at 730 (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3rd Cir. 1977) ).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I must assume the factual allegations of the complaint to be true and construe them in favor of the plaintiff. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). I am not, however, bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Although "specific facts are not necessary," the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to "give fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
"A plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitlement to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Id. at 562, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoted case omitted). This standard "simply calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that...
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