Walton v. City of Raleigh
| Decision Date | 08 March 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 50A95,50A95 |
| Citation | 342 N.C. 879,467 S.E.2d 410 |
| Parties | Russell C. WALTON, Jr. and wife, Margie G. Walton v. CITY OF RALEIGH. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Steven L. Evans, Raleigh, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Thomas A. McCormick, City Attorney, Raleigh, for defendant-appellee.
This case involves the interpretation of a consent judgment. A consent judgment is a court-approved contract subject to the rules of contract interpretation. Yount v. Lowe, 288 N.C. 90, 215 S.E.2d 563 (1975). If the plain language of a contract is clear, the intention of the parties is inferred from the words of the contract. Lane v. Scarborough, 284 N.C. 407, 410, 200 S.E.2d 622, 624-25 (1973).
In this case, the language is clear. It is said in the consent judgment that the plaintiffs may have access to the sewer line subject to their "obtaining tap-on privileges from the appropriate governing bodies." We read this to mean that before the plaintiffs can connect with the sewer line, they must have the consent of the appropriate governing body, in this case the City, which consent will only be given when the plaintiffs have complied with the City's regulations. We note that the requirement of obtaining tap-on privileges refers to "the appropriate governing bodies." This is an indication that the parties contemplated that some governing body other than the County might have to be satisfied before the plaintiffs could connect with the sewer line.
The plaintiffs argue that without the agreement to allow them to connect with the sewer line, they would have equal rights with all other property owners to make the connection. The agreement, say the plaintiffs, must give the plaintiffs something more. This may be true, but it cannot be something more that conflicts with the plain words of the consent judgment.
The plaintiffs filed affidavits from the attorneys who represented the plaintiffs and the County when the consent judgment was entered, in which they say that the parties did not contemplate that the plaintiffs would have to meet other conditions such as connecting to the water system in order to connect to the sewer line. We are governed by the plain words of the consent judgment. We cannot consider these affidavits.
The plaintiffs say further that the defendants have conceded that the "parties have a different interpretation of the relevant language," and this makes the consent judgment ambiguous. Parties can differ as to the interpretation...
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