Walton v. Federal Bureau of Prisons

• Decision Date: 05 February 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 07-0746 (PLF).
• Citation: 533 F.Supp.2d 107
• Parties: Garland WALTON, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

533 F.Supp.2d 107

Garland WALTON, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 07-0746 (PLF).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

February 5, 2008.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Garland Walton, Springfield, IL, Pro se.

Fred Elmore Haynes, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

OPINION

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss this action.

I. BACKGROUND

At all times relevant to the Complaint, plaintiff was a prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution in Waseca, Minnesota ("FCI Waseca") serving a 27-month sentence for a violation of the terms of his supervised release. Compl. at 1. According to BOP's Inmate Locator (http://bop. gov/inmateiocator/index.jsp), plaintiff was released on September 19, 2007. He now resides in Springfield, Illinois.¹

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c), plaintiff sought placement in a community corrections center ("halfway house") for the last six months of his prison term. See Compl. at 2. In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c) provides:

The Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, assure that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a reasonable part, not to exceed six months, of the last 10 per centum of the term to be served under conditions that will afford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the prisoner's re-entry into the community.

Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Jenny Jones, then his Case Manager, "denied [him] any time in a halfway house" prior to his release "based, in part, on the fact that Plaintiff refused to complete a Release Preparation Program." Compl. at 2. Plaintiff disputes this basis of Ms. Jones' decision, and states that "in fact [he] was participating in [a Release Preparation Program]." Id. Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Jones made her decision to deny him a halfway house placement "based upon Plaintiff being an African-American," thus "discriminat[ing] against Plaintiff on the basis of his race." Id. 3. It appears that, subsequently, the Warden designated plaintiff to a halfway house for the last month of his sentence. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment ("Defs.' Mot."), Ex. A (Jones Decl.) ¶ 3; Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 2-3.

Plaintiff challenged the denial of a halfway house placement through the inmate grievance procedure. See Compl., Attach. (October 17, 2006 Central Office Administrative Remedy Appeal). Harrell Watts, National Inmate Appeals Administrator, concluded that the Warden's decision as to the length of plaintiffs halfway house placement was appropriate. Id. Attach. (January 4, 2007 Administrative Remedy Response).

Plaintiff brings this action against the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), against its Director, Harley G. Lappin, in his official capacity, and against Ms. Jones and Mr. Watts in both their individual and official capacities. Compl. at 1.² Although he does not expressly state in his complaint that this is a civil; rights action, the Court presumes that plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and thus there is federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361, compelling Ms. Jones and Mr. Watts "to reconsider Plaintiff for halfway house placement" and requiring the BOP "to take [his] lack Cf resources into account in determining halfway house placement[.]" Id. at 3.³ He also demands declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, requesting a "declaratory judgment holding that Plaintiff has not refused to complete a Release Preparation Program." Id. at a. Finally, he demands compensatory damages against Mr. Watts and Ms. Jones and punitive damages against Ms. Jones. Id.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant Jenny Jones

Defendant Jones argues that no claim against her in her individual capacity may proceed for three reasons: (1) service of process, was improper, (2) this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over her, and (3) venue is improper. Defs.' Mot. at 12-17.

1. Service of Process

Review of the Court's docket shows that the United States Marshals Service sent a copy of the summons and complaint to Ms. Jones by certified mail, return receipt requested, at FCI Waseca, and that "K. Kirkland" signed the return receipts. See Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt of Summons and Complaint By Mail [Dkt. # 5]. It does not appear that personal service has been effected on Ms. Jones.

Nevertheless, plaintiff correctly notes "that the U.S. Marchals [sic] were ordered to serve Jones." Pl.'s Opp'n at 2. He is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action and thus may rely on the Clerk of Court and the United States Marshals Service to effect service on his behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R.Civ.P. 4(c)(2). He should not be penalized for a court officer's failure or mistake in properly effecting service of process. See Mandy v. Sec'y of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1060 (D.C.Cir.1988) (MacKinnon, J., concurring). Accordingly, the Court will deny Ms. Jones' motion to dismiss on this ground.

2. Personal Jurisdiction

It is plaintiff's burden to make a prima facie showing that this court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (D.C.Cir.1988). "Plaintiff must allege specific facts on which personal jurisdiction can be based; [he] cannot rely on conclusory allegations." Moore v. Motz, 437 F.Supp.2d 88, 91 (D.D.C.2006) (citations omitted). Here, plaintiff alleges only that Ms. Jones "is an employee of the [BOP]" and that she "is a case manager at FCI Waseca, Waseca, MN." Compl. at 1. Plaintiff does not allege that Ms. Jones resides within or maintains a principal place of business in the District of Columbia.

In this situation, the Court engages in a two-part. inquiry to determine whether it may exercise personal jurisdiction over Ms. Jones, a non-resident defendant. First, the Court must determine whether jurisdiction may be exercised under the District of Columbia's long-arm statute. See GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. Bell-South Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C.Cir. 2000). Second, the Court must determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies due process requirements. Id. (citing United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C.Cir.1995)).

The District of Columbia long-arm statute allows a court in the District of Columbia to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant with regard to a claim arising from the defendant's conduct in:

(1) transacting business in the District of Columbia;

(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;

(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia;

(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia.

D.C.Code § 13-423(a).

Plaintiff does not allege that Ms. Jones transacts any personal business or contracts to supply any services in the District of Columbia. Although persistent conduct undertaken in a person's individual capacity may constitute the transaction of business for purposes of the D.C. longarm statute, see Pollack v. Meese, 737 F.Supp. 663, 666 (D.D.C.1990), the complaint sets forth no allegations that this defendant has any personal connection with the District of Columbia other than her federal employment. The mere fact that Ms. Jones is an employee of the BOP, the headquarters office of which is in the District, does not render her subject to suit in her individual capacity in the District of Columbia. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 543-45, 100 S.Ct. 774, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (absent minimum contacts other than those arising from federal employment, court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over federal official in his individual capacity). Nor can plaintiff make his prima facie showing by alleging that paperwork prepared by Ms. Jones "will end up on the desk of another government employee in Washington, D.C." Pl.'s Opp'n at 4-5. See, e.g., FC Inv. Group. LC v. IFX Markets, Ltd., 479 F.Supp.2d 30, 39 (D.D.C.2007) (concluding that "defendant's `regular' phone calls into the District of Columbia from elsewhere do not constitute `transacting business' in the District of Columbia").

Finally, the complaint alleges no facts that establish that plaintiff suffered any injury in the District of Columbia. The actual injuries of which plaintiff complains occurred in Minnesota while, he was incarcerated at FCI Waseca. Regardless of whether this defendant acted in or outside of the District of Columbia, plaintiff suffered no injury here. For these rear sons, the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Ms. Jones. `Ale Court will grant defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Moore v. Motz, 437 F.Supp.2d at 93 (dismissing, non-resident defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction where there were no allegations that defendants acted any business in the District of Columbia or that plaintiff suffered any tortious injury here); Rogers v. Washington Fairmont Hotel, 404 F.Supp.2d 56, 57-58 (D.D.C.2005) (dismissing individual defendant based in Canada for lack of personal jurisdiction absent allegations actually placing her' within the reach of the. D.C....